

Integration of the Korean Peninsula: Framework for a Positive Future in the era of the East Asia

통일과 통일 후
동북아시아의 한반도



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PARK, SE-IL

CHAIRMAN, HANSUN FOUNDATION
PROFESSOR, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES, SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

박세일

한반도 선진화재단 이사장
서울대학교 국제대학원 교수

Park, Se-Il is the founder and the current President of the Hansun Foundation (since 2006). Before the establishment of the Hansun Foundation, he served as the 17th Congressman, Chairman of the Yoido Research Center for Policy Committee of the Grand National Party. Prior to holding that post, he was the Chairman of the Committee for Model Citizens' Political Reform (National Assembly) (in 2003). Dr. Park, Se-Il is the President of Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice, President of the Society of Labor Economics of Korea, President of Society of Law and Economics of Korea, President of Systematic Economics of Korea, President of the Forum for Education Reform of Korea, and President of the Policy Forum for Citizens' Safety. He also served as a Senior Secretary at Presidential Office of the Republic of Korea (1994-1998) and as a Senior Fellow of Korean Development Institute (KDI) (1980 -1985). Dr. Park, Se-Il's books include: National Strategy for the Republic of Korea (2009); Communal Liberalism (co-authored) (2008); The Advancement Revolution: This is the Final Chance (co-authored) (2007); 4 Strategies for Advancing the Republic of Korea in the 21st Century (co-authored) (2007); Strategies for Advancing the Republic of Korea (2006); Autonomous and Responsible University Reform (co-authored) (2004); Conditions for Success of Political Reform (co-authored) (2003); The Condition for the President's Success: Recommended Responsibility Roles (co-authored) (2002); Autonomous and Responsible School Reform (co-authored) (2002); and Law and Economics (2000).

Dr. Park Se-Il holds a B.A. in Law from Seoul National University (1970). He received his M.A. in Economics from Tokyo University (1975) and his Ph.D in Economics at Cornell University (1980). In 1987, he received "Chung-Rahm Award," an award for the Society for Economics of Korea. Dr. Park, Se-Il is the 1997 Recipient of the National Peony Badge.

Dr. Park, Se-Il was a Visiting Professor at Korean Development Institute (KDI) (2000-2001), at the Brookings Institution (1998-1999), at the Law and Economics Research Center of University of Law at Columbia (1992-93). He was also a professor of law at Seoul National University (1985-1994) and is currently a professor at the SNU Graduate School of International Studies (since 2001).



BYUN YONG-SHIK

CEO & PUBLISHER, CHOSUN ILBO

변용식

조선일보 발행인 겸 대표이사 전무

<Education>

Seoul National University, BA, Political Science, 1975

<Career>

Joined the Chosun Ilbo, Seoul, 1975

CEO & Publisher, 2010.3~currently

Executive Editor, 2004.3~2010.3

Managing Editor, 2001.6~2004.3

Business Editor, Social affairs Editor, 1991~1998

Washington Correspondent, 1985~1988

<Books>

"Jaebul 25 Hours" (co-author)

"The World Economic War" (")



MR. CHONG-MOON LEE

TRUSTEE, CSIS/

CHAIRMAN OF CSIS KOREA ADVISORY BOARD

이종문

CSIS 이사 및 한국자문위원회 위원장

Mr. Chong-Moon Lee founded Diamond Multimedia Systems, served as CEO & Chairman of the company for 17 years, and took it to a successful IPO in 1995. Mr. Lee is now chairman of AmBex Venture Group, a venture capital and investment fund in Silicon Valley, and the chairman of the board of Nara Bank, Los Angeles, a leading community bank serving California and New York states.

He also is a member of Advisory Board of Stanford Technology Venture Program (STVP) of Engineering School, Stanford University. He served as a Consulting Professor at Asia Pacific Research Center of Stanford University. He currently serves as a Trustee and a Chaired Professor Emeritus of Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST). He encouraged and helped KAIST establish “Center for Science-based Entrepreneurship” to educate the engineering students to understand the value creation through combining technology and entrepreneurial minds.

Mr. Lee serves as a Commissioner & Trustee of Asian Art Museum of San Francisco – Chong-Moon Lee Center for Asian Art & Culture, which boasts of the largest Asian arts collections outside of Asia. He also serves as a Trustee Emeritus of Asia Foundation, San Francisco, and as a Trustee of Asia Society, New York, and Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC.

He has received numerous accolades for outstanding leadership in the business and civic areas, including Korea’s highest medal of honor for a civilian, the Order of Civil Merits (Mugunghwa Medal). In 2005 Asia Society honored him with the Outstanding Asian American Entrepreneur Award. Mr. Lee holds MS from Vanderbilt University, Nashville,

Tennessee, and five honorary doctorate degrees from various leading universities in the US and Korea.



CHUN, YUNG-WOO

VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE

천영우

외교부 차관

Chun, Yung-Woo is Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea. He served as Ambassador to the United Kingdom from May 2008 to November 2009. Until April 2008 he was Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs, simultaneously serving as Head of the Korean Delegation to the Six-Party Talks. From January 2005 to April 2006, he fulfilled the role of Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and International Organizations. Prior to this post, he served as Ambassador and Deputy Chief of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations from June 2003. Mr. Chun has worked as a career diplomat for 33 years since he joined the Ministry in 1977, and studied International Political Science at the Graduate School of Columbia University.



JOHN J. HAMRE

PRESIDENT AND CEO, CSIS/

FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

존 햄리

미국 CSIS 소장

전 미국 국방부 부장관

John Hamre was elected CSIS President and CEO in January 2000. Before joining CSIS, he served as the 26th U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense. Prior to holding that post, he was the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (1993-1997). As Comptroller, Dr. Hamre was the principal assistant to the Secretary of Defense for the preparation, presentation, and execution of the defense budget and management improvement programs. In 2007 Secretary Gates appointed Dr. Hamre to serve as chairman of the Defense Policy Board.

Before serving in the Department of Defense, Dr. Hamre worked for ten years as a professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. During this time he was primarily responsible for the oversight and evaluation of procurement, research, and development programs, defense budget issues and relations with the Senate Appropriations Committee. From 1978 to 1984, Dr. Hamre served in the Congressional Budget Office, where he became its Deputy Assistant Director for National Security and International Affairs. In that position, he oversaw analysis and other support for committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.

Dr. Hamre received his Ph.D., with distinction, in 1978 from the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. His studies focused on international politics and economics and U.S. foreign policy. In 1972, he received a B.A., with high distinction, from Augustana College, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, emphasizing political science and economics. The following year he studied as a Rockefeller Fellow at the Harvard Divinity School.

Dr. Hamre is married to the former Julia Pfanstiehl, and they reside in Bethesda, Maryland.



DR. RHEE, SANG-WOO

PRESIDENT AND CEO
NEW ASIA RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC.

이상우

신아시아연구소, 소장

Rhee, Sang-Woo founded NARI in 1993 with eighty supporters. NARI aims to analyze the changing relations in the Asia-Pacific region and thereby help establish a peaceful order in Asia, which in turn will insure survival and prosperity of the Republic of Korea. NARI's long term research will focus on the following four themes: Vision of New Asia, Security and New Asia, Nationalism and New Asia, and Democracy and New Asia. Dr. Rhee has led NARI since its foundation. Dr. Rhee at present serves as chairman of Presidential Defense Policy Review Board.

President Rhee is also the chairman of the Korea-Japan Cultural Foundation since 1994. From 2009 he started to serve as a member of Advisory Commission for Unification at the Blue House, and a board member of the Sejong Institute. He was a Professor of Political Science at Sogang University (1976-2003), President of Hallym University and Hallym Institute of Advanced International Studies (2003-2008). President Rhee served as President of the Korean Association of International Studies (1990), Chairman of the Policy Advisory Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1991-1993), President of the Korean Association of Communist Studies (1984-1986), and Chairman of the Presidential Commission of the 21st Century (1993-1994). He received his LL.B. and LL.M. from Seoul National University and his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Hawaii. He authored 15 professional books including *Security Environment of Korea*, *Security and Unification of Korea*, *North Korean Politics*, *Theories of International Relations*, and *International politics*.



YOO, HO-YEOL

PROFESSOR, KOREA UNIVERSITY

유호열

고려대학교 교수

Yoo, Ho-Yeol is former Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration of Korea University and a professor of North Korean Studies at Korea University. At Korea University he is responsible for teaching undergraduate and graduate students on the inter-Korean relations and North Korean politics and foreign policy since 1999.

Prior to taking up his teaching position at Korea University, he served for the Ministry of Korean National Unification as a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification(KINU). At KINU, he worked extensively on the relationship between North and South Korea as Directors of Unification Policy Division(1998). Office of Planning & Budget(1995-1997), Information Management Division(1991-1994).

He was a vice-President of the Korean Political Science Association in 2009 and worked for the Korean Association of North Korean Studies as a president in 2008. He also works for the ROK government as a policy adviser of the Diplomacy and Security Office at the Presidency, the Ministry of National Unification, a policy adviser for the Unification Committee of the National Assembly, Chairman of the Planning and Coordination Committee of the National Unification Advisory Council. He is now acting as a chairman of the advisory group in charge of national security issues for the Korean National Police. He is actively involved in the Citizens Coalition for Right Society as a senior adviser. He was also a visiting scholar at the Mershon Center of the Ohio State University, USA in 2003-2004.

He is an author of *Socialism in North Korea: Construction and Frustration*(Seoul: Itreebook, 2004) and co-authored *North Korean Policy toward Overseas Koreans*(Seoul: Jipmundang, 2003) and *North Korean Political System*(Seoul: Eulyoo, 2000). Ho-Yeol Yoo was graduated from Korea University at the department of Political Science and International

Relations with B.A. and M.A. and has a doctorate majoring comparative politics from the Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA.



KIM SUNG-HAN
PROFESSOR, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES &
ACTING DIRECTOR, ILMIN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS INSTITUTE, KOREA UNIVERSITY

김성한
고려대 국제대학원 교수 및
일민국제관계연구원 원장 대행

Kim Sung-han is Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS) and Acting Director of the Imin International Relations Institute at Korea University. Before joining GSIS in September 2007, Dr. Kim was a professor from 1994 to 2007 at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade. Prior to that, he worked as a Research Fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences and as expert advisor to the Prime Minister's Committee for Globalization (1992-1994). Dr. Kim has also served as Vice President of the Korean Association of International Studies; President of Korean Association of American Politics (KAAP); Secretary General of the Korean National Committee of Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP-Korea); and Chairman of the Vision Council for the ROK-U.S. Security Policy Initiative. Currently, he is advising the Foreign Relations Committee of the National Assembly, the Ministry of Unification, and the National Intelligence Service. He also serves as member of the Presidential Advisory Council for National Security, which consists of nine security experts. Dr. Kim specializes in U.S. foreign policy and international security and he earned a Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin. His recent contributed articles to scholarly journals include “The End of Humanitarian Intervention?”; “North Korea: Between Survival and Glory”; and “Exploring a Northeast Asian Peace and Security Mechanism.”



JO, DONGHO

PROFESSOR, EWHA WOMANS UNIVERSITY

조동호

이화여자대학교 교수

Dr. Dongho Jo is a professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University and now serves as Associate Vice President for University Planning & Coordination. Before joining the university in 2007, he had worked at Korea Development Institute for 16 years as senior fellow and director of North Korean economic studies. He was graduated from Seoul National University and received Ph.D. degree in economics from University of Pennsylvania in 1991. He has also had lots of professional experiences. He is now policy advisor for chief secretary to the President of Korea for diplomacy and national security, advisor for the national assembly budget office, advisor for the advisory council on democratic and peaceful unification for the President of Korea, member of committee for promoting inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation at ministry of unification, etc. His research areas are mainly the North Korean economy and inter-Korean cooperation



VICTOR CHA

PROFESSOR, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY/
SENIOR ADVISOR AND KOREA CHAIR, CSIS/
FORMER DIRECTOR FOR ASIAN AFFAIRS (NSC) AND
U.S. DEPUTY FOR SIX PARTY TALKS

빅터 차

조지타운대학교 교수/CSIS 한국 실장/
전 NSC 보좌관

Victor Cha is Senior Adviser and inaugural holder of the newly created Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Previously, he served as director for Asian affairs at the White House National Security Council, where he was responsible for coordinating U.S. policy for Japan, the two Koreas, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Island nations. He also served as U.S. deputy head of delegation to the Six-Party Talks and has acted as a senior consultant on East Asian security issues for different branches of the U.S. government. A recipient of numerous academic awards, including the prestigious Fulbright scholarship (twice) and MacArthur Foundation fellowship, Dr. Cha spent two years as a John M. Olin National Security Fellow at Harvard University and as a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. He also teaches as the D.S. Song professor of government and Asian studies at Georgetown University.

Dr. Cha is the award-winning author or coauthor of numerous books and articles, including *Beyond the Final Score: The Politics of Sport in Asia* (Columbia University Press, 2009), *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies* (Columbia University Press, 2003), and *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford University Press, 1999). He is also a frequent contributor and guest analyst for various media outlets, including *Choson Ilbo*, *Joongang Ilbo*, CNN, National Public Radio, *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Time*, *Newsweek*, *Asahi Shimbun*, and *Japan Times*. Dr. Cha holds a B.A., an M.I.A., and a Ph.D. from Columbia University, as well as an M.A. Oxford University.



PANG ZHONGYING

PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
RENMIN UNIVERSITY OF CHINA

팡종잉

중국인민대학교 교수

Professor Pang Zhongying teaches the study of global governance and diplomacy at Beijing-based Renmin University. His current research interests are China in global economic governance, multilateralisms, regional cooperation/integration in Asia-Pacific and China's grand bargains with the others. He graduated from China's Nankai University with B.A. in economics, UK's University of Warwick with MA in Politics and International Studies, China's Beijing University with Ph.D. in International Relations. Pang served as a political research member of the Chinese Embassy Jakarta, Indonesia. He was a senior fellow in the study of world economy at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and a professor of International Relations at Nankai University, Tianjin. He was a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Northeast Asia Policy Studies (CNAPS), Brookings Institution in Washington DC and Visiting Professor at Nanjing University-Johns Hopkins University Center for Chinese-American Studies in Nanjing.



HITOSHI TANAKA

SENIOR FELLOW, JAPAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE (JCIE)/

FORMER DEPUTY MINISTER, FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN

다나카 히토시

일본국제교류센터 선임연구위원/
전 일본외무성 심의관

Hitoshi Tanaka is Senior Fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange and was Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan until August 2005. He has also been a visiting professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Tokyo, since April 2006. He had previously been Director-General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau (2001–02) and the Economic Affairs Bureau (2000–01); Consul-General in San Francisco (1998–2000); and Deputy Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau (1996–98). He was Director for Policy Coordination of the Foreign Policy Bureau, Political Minister at the Japanese Embassy in London (1990–93), a research associate at the IISS, London (1989–90), Director for North East Asian Affairs (1987–89), and Director for North American Affairs (1985–87).

He has a B.A. in law from Kyoto University and B.A./M.A. in PPE from Oxford University. Mr. Tanaka has contributed many articles to various newspapers and monthly magazines. His latest publications include *Purofeshonaru no Kosho-ryoku* [The Logic of Strategic Negotiation] (2009), *Gaiko no Chikara* [The Power of Diplomacy] (2009), and *Kokka to Gaiko* [The Nation and Diplomacy] (2005).



KATHLEEN STEPHENS

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

캐슬린 스티븐스

주한 미국 대사

Kathleen Stephens was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on August 1, 2008 to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Korea. She arrived in Korea on September 23, 2008, and presented her credentials to President Lee Myung-bak on October 6, 2008.

A Foreign Service officer since 1978, Ambassador Stephens has held numerous senior diplomatic positions in Washington and abroad. From 2005 to 2007, Ambassador Stephens was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. She was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs from 2003 to 2005, where she focused on post-conflict and stabilization issues in the Balkans. Other Washington assignments included Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council, Senior United Kingdom Country Officer in the European Bureau, and Director of the State Department's Office of Ecology and Terrestrial Conservation in the Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Scientific Affairs.

Ambassador Stephens' overseas postings have included Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal (1998-2001), and U.S. Consul General in Belfast, Northern Ireland (1995-1998) during the consolidation of ceasefires and negotiation of the Good Friday Agreement. Earlier foreign assignments included consular and public affairs officer in Guangzhou, China (1980-1982), chief of the internal political unit in Seoul (1984-1987), and principal officer of the U.S. Consulate in Busan, Korea (1987-1989). Ambassador Stephens was a political officer at the U.S. mission in Yugoslavia during that country's violent disintegration in the early '90s.

Ambassador Stephens was born in El Paso, Texas and grew up in New Mexico and

Arizona. She has longstanding family ties to Montana. She holds a B.A. (Honors) in East Asian studies from Prescott College and a master's degree from Harvard University. Ambassador Stephens also studied at the University of Hong Kong. She holds honorary doctoral degrees from Chungnam National University and the University of Maryland. She is a 2009 recipient of the Presidential Meritorious Service Award and numerous State Department awards throughout her career. Ambassador Stephens was a Peace Corps volunteer in Korea from 1975 to 1977. Her foreign languages are Korean, Serbian and Chinese. She has one son, an electrical engineer.



YIM, SUNG-JOON

ENDOWED CHAIR PROFESSOR, HANKUK UNIVERSITY
OF FOREIGN STUDIES/ FORMER SENIOR PRESIDENTIAL
SECRETARY FOR DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY AFFAIRS

임성준

한국외국어대학교 석좌교수
전 외교안보수석

Yim, Sung-Joon is the former Senior Presidential Secretary for Diplomatic and Security Affairs. In March 2010, he was nominated as the Endowed Chair Professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. In 2007, he became the President of The Korea Foundation. He also served as an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Canada (2004), Research Commissioner, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) (2003), Senior Secretary to the President for Foreign Policy and National Security (2002), and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) (2001). After passing the High Diplomatic Service Examination in 1971, he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and served in numerous positions.

Mr. Yim received his B.A. from the Department of International Relations at Seoul National University in 1971. He also studied at the Graduate School of Oxford University in London and at the Graduate School of Keio University in Tokyo.

He is married and has a son and a daughter.

EDUCATION

Feb.1971 Graduated from the Department of International Relations, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea

Jun.1976 Studied at the Graduate School of Oxford University, London, U.K.

Aug.1978 Studied at the Graduate School of Keio University, Tokyo, Japan

CAREER

Jan.1971 Passed High Diplomatic Service Examination

Nov.1974Joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
Aug.1978Second Secretary, Korean Embassy in Japan
Jan.1984Counsellor, Korean Embassy in Burma
Sep. 1986Assistant Secretary, Office of the President
Mar.1988Director, Northeast Asia Division I, Asian Affairs Bureau, MOFA
Dec. 1988Senior Research Officer, Department for Asia and Pacific Studies, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security(IFANS), MOFA
Apr.1990Counsellor, Korean Embassy in the United States of America
Aug.1993Deputy Director-General, American Affairs Bureau, MOFA
Dec.1993Secretary to the President for Foreign Affairs and National Security, Office of the President
Jan.1995Director-General, American Affairs Bureau, MOFA
Mar. 1996Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Arab Republic of Egypt
Apr. 1999Executive Director-General, Headquarters of Summit Preparation for Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)
Jan.2001Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT)
Feb. 2002Senior Secretary to the President for Foreign Policy and National Security
Feb. 2003Research Commissioner, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), MOFAT
Mar. 2004Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Canada Feb. 2007 President, The Korea Foundation
Mar. 2010 Endowed Chair Professor, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

AWARDS

Dec. 2000Order of Service Merit (Yellow Stripes)



YOON, YOUNG-KWAN

PROFESSOR, SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

윤영관

서울대학교 교수

Yoon, Young-kwan (Ph.D., SAIS, The Johns Hopkins University) is Professor of international political economy at Department of International Relations, Seoul National University. Before he joined the faculty of Seoul National University in 1990, he taught at University of California at Davis for three years. He wrote several books and published about 50 articles in the field of international political economy, Korea's foreign policy, and inter-Korean relations, some of which appeared in *World Politics*, *International Political Science Review*, *Asian Survey*, etc. He established and served as the president of the Korean Institute for Future Strategies(KIFS), a private non-profit research institute. He is now senior advisor to the (KIFS) and president of another private research institute, the Korea Peace Institute (www.koreapeace.or.kr). After serving as Chairman of Committee of Foreign Relations, Security, and Unification of Presidential Transition Team (Jan.-Feb., 2003), he served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade until January 2004. Born in Namwon and married with one daughter.



MICHAEL J. GREEN

SENIOR ADVISER AND JAPAN CHAIR, CSIS/ FORMER
SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR ASIAN AFFAIRS, NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC)

마이클 그린

미국 CSIS 일본 실장

Michael Green is a senior adviser and holds the Japan Chair at CSIS, as well as being an associate professor of international relations at Georgetown University. He previously served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council (NSC) from January 2004 to December 2005 after joining the NSC in April 2001 as director of Asian affairs with responsibility for Japan, Korea, and Australia/New Zealand.

His current research and writing is focused on: Asian regional architecture, Japanese politics, American foreign policy history, the Korean Peninsula, Tibet, Burma, and U.S.-India relations.

Green speaks fluent Japanese and spent over five years in Japan working as a staff member of the National Diet, as a journalist for Japanese and American newspapers, and as a consultant for U.S. business. He has also been on the faculty of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses, and a senior advisor to the Office of Asia Pacific Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He graduated from Kenyon College with highest honors in history in 1983 and received his M.A. from Johns Hopkins SAIS in 1987 and his Ph.D. in 1994. He also did graduate work at Tokyo University as a Fulbright fellow and at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as a research associate of the MIT-Japan Program. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Aspen Strategy Group and is vice chair of the congressionally mandated Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission. He serves on the advisory boards of the Center for a New American Security and Australian American Leadership Dialogue, and is a member of the editorial board of The Washington Quarterly.



WANG ZAIBANG

VICE PRESIDENT AND RESEARCH PROFESSOR, CHINA
INSTITUTES OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (CICIR)

왕 자이방

중국 현대국제관계연구원 부원장

Wang, Zaibang is currently the Vice President and Research Professor of China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). From 1995 to 1997, Dr. Wang worked as a Deputy Director of Division for World Politics Studies, from 1997 to 1999, he served as a Director of Division for World Politics Studies at CICIR, and in 1999, he became the Assistant President of CICIR.

Dr. Wang's articles in English include: "Reflections on 2001 International Situation", *Contemporary International Relations*, Vol.12, No. 1, January 2002; "Features of International Situation in the Early new Century", *Contemporary International Relations*, Vol.11, No. 1, January 2001; and "Reflections on the Transformation of world Pattern and Responsibility Adjustment", *Contemporary International Relations*, Vol.10, No. 2, February 2000.

Dr. Wang received his Ph.D. in the history of international relations from Nanjing University in 1988. He received his B.A. in history from Qufu Normal University in 1982.



YOICHI FUNABASHI

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, ASAHI SHIMBUN

후나바시 요이치

아사히신문 주필

Yoichi Funabashi is Editor-in-Chief of *The Asahi Shimbun*, one of Japan's most renowned national daily newspapers. He also serves on the Editorial Board of *Global Asia* (Seoul), and is a member of the Board of Trustees of the International Crisis Group (Brussels).

Dr. Funabashi previously served as correspondent for the *Asahi Shimbun* in Beijing (1980-81) and Washington (1984-87), and as American General Bureau Chief (1993-97). In 1985, he received the Vaughn-Ueda Prize for his international affairs reportage. He won the Japan Press Award, known as Japan's "Pulitzer Prize," in 1994 for his columns on foreign policy, and his articles in *Foreign Affairs* and *Foreign Policy* won the Ishibashi Tanzan Prize in 1992.

Dr. Funabashi's books in English include: *Alliance Adrift* (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998, winner of the Shincho Arts and Sciences Award); *Asia-Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC* (Institute for International Economics, 1995, winner of the Mainichi Shimbun Asia Pacific Grand Prix Award); and *Managing the Dollar: From the Plaza to the Louvre* (Institute for International Economics, 1988, winner of the Yoshino Sakuzo Prize). His recent Japanese books include: *In Search of Blue Sea* (2005); *Globalization Trick* (2002); *How to Come to Terms with Japan's War Responsibility* (2002, ed.); and *Why Not Make English the Second Official Language?* (2001). His recent articles and papers in English include: "A 21st century vision for the alliance," (*PacNet*, February 18 2010), "Tokyo's Trials," (*Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2009) "Forget Bretton Woods II: the Role for U.S.-China-Japan Trilateralism" (*Washington Quarterly*, April 2009); and "No One Model for Global Economy" (*Yale Global Online*, 3/23/09).

Dr. Funabashi received his B.A. from the University of Tokyo in 1968 and his Ph.D. from Keio University in 1992. He was a Nieman Fellow at Harvard University (1975-76), a visiting Fellow at the Institute for International Economics (1987), a Donald Keene Fellow at Columbia University (2003), Distinguished Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. (2005-2006), and Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo Public Policy Institute (2005-2006).



SCOTT SNYDER

DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR U.S.-KOREA POLICY, THE
ASIA FOUNDATION
ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW FOR KOREAN STUDIES,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

스캇 스나이더

아시아재단 한미정책연구소장

Scott Snyder is Director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at The Asia Foundation and a Senior Associate at Pacific Forum CSIS. He is also the Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korean Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and is based in Washington, DC. He lived in Seoul, South Korea as Korea Representative of The Asia Foundation during 2000-2004. Previously, he served as a Program Officer in the Research and Studies Program of the U.S. Institute of Peace, and as Acting Director of The Asia Society's Contemporary Affairs Program.

His latest book, *China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security*, was published by Lynne Rienner in 2009. His publications include *Paved With Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea (2003)*, co-edited with L. Gordon Flake and *Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (1999)*. Snyder received his B.A. from Rice University and an M.A. from the Regional Studies East Asia Program at Harvard University. He was the recipient of a Pantech Visiting Fellowship at Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center during 2005-2006, received an Abe Fellowship, administered by the Social Sciences Research Council, in 1998-99, and was a Thomas G. Watson Fellow at Yonsei University in South Korea in 1987-88.



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Dr. Jin Canrong is a professor and Associate Dean with the School of International Studies at Renmin University of China. He is also a visiting professor at the Gerald Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, and the “Weilun” Chair Professor at Tsinghua University.

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Dr. Zhu Feng began his college studies at the Department of International Politics of Peking University in 1981 and received his Ph.D. from Peking University in 1991. He is currently a professor at the university's School of International Studies and Deputy Director of Center for International & Strategic Studies (CISS) of Peking University.

Dr. Zhu served as the research fellow a couple of distinguished institutes like Washington-based Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Fairbank Center for East Asian Studies at Harvard University and a visiting scholar at Durham University in UK. He writes extensively on regional security in East Asia, nuclear N. Korea issue, American national security strategy, China-US relations and missile defense. He is a leading Chinese security expert and senior research fellow of the Center for Peace and Development of China. Dr. Zhu Feng sits on a couple of editorial boards of several scholarly journals, consults independently for the Chinese government and private sector, and comments frequently on television, radio, and print media on China foreign affairs and security policy.

His recent books are *Ballistic Missile Defense and International Security* (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 2001), *International Relations Theory and East Asian Security* (Beijing: People's University Press, 2007), and *China's Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics* (co-edited with Prof. Robert S. Ross, Cornell University Press, 2008).



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Dr. Park's recent publications in English include: *Impact and Outlook of Currency Exchange in North Korea*, KINU On-line Series, Co 09-49 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2010); *North Korea's Economic Policy in 2010*, KINU On-line Series, Co 10-02 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2009); and *Looking Back and Looking Forward: North Korea, Northeast Asia and ROK-US Alliance* (Brookings Institution, December 2007).

His publications in Korean include: *Revisiting Changes in North Korea and Suggestions for North Korea Policy* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2009); *Assisting North Korea: Implications from International Discussions on Relief and Development* (Seoul: Haenam, 2007); *Reform and Opening of North Korea in Comparative Perspective* (Seoul: Haenam, 2004); and *North Korea's System of Economic Management* (Seoul: Haenam, 2003).

Dr. Park received his Ph. D. in political science from the Philipps University at Marburg in Germany (1992). His current interests are North Korean economy and politics, inter-Korean

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Seong-Phil Hong had received both Master, and Doctorate Degree in international law from YALE LAW SCHOOL, after writing his Master Thesis, in 1986, at College of Law, SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY in Korea, on "Federalism as a way of Korean Unification".

He had taught international law, international trade, and investment at EWHA WOMENS' UNIVERSITY from 1995 to 2001, after which he served as CEO for some years for a Korean mobile phone maker, MAXON TELECOM, whose annual revenue was around USD 0.5 billion.

Since 2005, he belongs to the Faculty of Yonsei Law School teaching on international law, human rights, and international investment law.

He had served as extern legal advisor, on many occasions, to Governmental Departments in Korea, including Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Ministry of Unification. From 1996 to 2001, he attended consecutive sessions of both the Human Rights Commission, and its Sub-Commission at the United Nations in Geneva. He had also been a member of the Presidential Committee for National Policy Planning.

Professor *Hong* has written extensively on many subjects of international law, ranging from Korean unification, return of cultural properties, human rights in North Korea, Asia, and elsewhere, transitional justice, to investment dispute resolution under the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement, international law and investment law, and corporate responsibilities of Multinational Companies. He also serves as conciliator at the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID), established under the auspices of the World Bank.



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Coauthor of The History of Social Science Concepts in Modern Korea (2009), East Asian Community: Myth and Reality(2008), Transformation of World Politics (2007), Network Knowledge State(2006), North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Peace on the Korean Peninsula(2006), Korean-American Alliance: A Vision and a Roadmap(2006), Korea's Grand Strategy for a New Century: Weaving a Network State(2006), Korean Diplomatic History and the Study of International Politics(2005), New Perspective of Changing World(2004), 100 Years Plan for the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century(2004).World Politics of Cyberspace(2001)

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His research interests are history and ideas of international relations, strategic studies, and foreign policies of China and the United States. He has had 25 books published (including 11 he has personally translated) together with more than 470 articles and essays. The books he has written include *Thirty Studies on Strategy: Reflections of China's External Strategy* (2008), *History of Modern International Relations: From the 16th Century to the end of the 20th* (2006); *International Politics and Statecraft* (2006); *A Strategic Thinking on China-Japan Relations* (2004, published in Japan in Japanese); *From Napoleon to the Vietnam War: Lectures on Modern Strategy* (2003); *International Politics: Theoretical Exploration, Historical Survey, and Strategic Thinking* (2002).

His most recent publications in the years 2009 and 2010 include “Continuity with Change in China’s History and the Modern and Contemporary Chinese Nationalism,” “Peaceful Rise of India in World Politics: Reality and Prospect,” “Strategic Thinking in Contemporary China’s Foreign Relations”, “China and the North Korean Nuclear Issue: Competing Interests and Persistent Policy Dilemmas,” “The Challenge of North Korea’s WMD Program and Its

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He has published great books and articles including “朝鮮半島の緊張の構造: 恒久的平和體制の摸索」齋藤元秀編東アジア國際關係のダイナミズム (東洋經濟新聞社, 1998); "Historical Origins of the North Korean Nuclear Issue," Korea Journal, Vol.45, No.4, Winter 2005.



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2004年 3月 ~ 10月 : 韓國開發研究院 國際交流協力센터
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研究關聯 活動

1995. 3 - 2005. 2: 民主平統 政策諮問委員
1993. 3 - : 통일부 자문위원
1997 10 - 11: 루마니아 體制改革委員會 諮問團
2001. 1 - 12: 國家安全保障會議(NSC) 政策諮問委員
2003. 9 - 2005. 5: 國家情報院 諮問委員
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主要 論文 및 著書

"The Future of the Two Korean States," Politik und Gesellschaft: Inter- national Politics and Society, Herausgegeben von der Friedirch- Ebert-Stiftung. 4th quarter/1994.
"Complementarity of Industrial Structures between North and South Korea," Korean Options in a Changing Inter-national Order, U.C. Berkeley Press, 1994.

□ 남북한 경제통합의 새로운 전략□, (편저) 한국개발연구원, 1997. 8.

“ 'Homemade Risks': The Economic Security of Russia in East Asia," Russia and East Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment, Vol. 3, Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov, and Koji Watanabe (ed.) EastWest Institute, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999, pp. 101-125, (co-authored with Tsuneaki Sato and Chun-Sheng Tian).

□ 한중일 경제협력의 추진방안과 주요부문별 과제

□ 한국개발연구원 연구보고서, 2001, 12.

□ 北朝鮮經濟の軟着陸のための日本と韓國の對應課題

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□ 북한의 재정위기와 재정안정화를 위한 과제

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“Uzbekistan's Development Strategy and Lessons from Korea's Experience," Industrial Development and Export Promotion Policy for Uzbekistan, MOFE and KDI, December 2005. pp. 31-87.

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「남북경협: 상생과 공존의 길」, 건국 60년 기념 학술세미나 발표자료,

한국개발연구원, 2008. 8. 20.

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□ 연구보고서 2008-05, 한국개발연구원, 2008. 12.

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, May 2003.

EMPLOYMENT

- Research fellow, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 2004.5 – present.
- Head of WTO Research Team, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 2007.7 – 2008.10.
- Chief Advisor, Presidential Committee on Facilitating KORUS FTA, 2006.8 – 2007.5 (seconded).
- Research fellow, Korea Economic Research Institute, 2003.8 –2004.4.

SELECTED RESEARCH PAPERS

- “A Study on Transparency in the GATS Domestic Regulation,” with Han-Young Lie, Journal of International Trade and Industry Studies, vol. 14(no. 4), pp 52-76, Nov. 2009.
 - “KORUS FTA and US Bipartisan Trade Deal: Provisions of Environment and Labor,” Gyeonggi Forum, vol. 9, Autumn 2007.
 - “Korea-US FTA and Korean Economy,” Korean Economic Journal, Vol. 46, June 2007.
-

SELECTED POLICY REPORTS

- “Development Strategies for Korean IT Services in the Era of Globalization,” KIEP, December 2009.
 - “A Study on a Way to Utilize Foreign High-skilled Workers in Korea Through the Policy of Recruiting Foreign Students,” KIEP, December 2009.
 - “The Project for Export Promotion and Special Economic Zones Improvement In Kazakhstan,” Sponsored by KOICA, Korea, September 2009.
 - “Development Strategies for Higher Education in an Era of Globalization,” KIEP, December 2008.
 - “The Effectiveness of Korean Regulations of Foreign Capital as Defensive Mechanisms against Foreign Hostile M&As,” KIEP, December 2007.
 - “The Effect of Korea-ASEAN FTA on the Movement of Natural People,” Sponsored by Ministry of Finance and Economy, Korea, December 2005.
 - “An Introduction to Domestic Regulation in GATS,” KIEP, December 2005.
 - “The Implication of WTO Discussions of Domestic Regulations in Services Sectors on Korean Legal Service Market,” Sponsored by Ministry of Justice, Korea, November 2005.
 - “The Effect of Korea-Japan FTA on Korean Services industries,” Sponsored by Ministry of Finance and Economy, Korea, December 2004.
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Wang Dong is an assistant professor in the School of International Studies at Peking University. Wang Dong received his bachelor in law from Peking University in 1999 and M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), in 2003 and 2007 respectively. Dr. Wang had taught at York College of Pennsylvania, with a tenure-track appointment, before joining the faculty of Peking University in May 2008. He now also concurrently holds an appointment as a research fellow at the Center for International and Strategic Studies, Peking University.

Using a wide array of recently declassified archives from China and the United States, Dr. Wang's dissertation, entitled "From Enmity to Rapprochement: Grand Strategy, Power Politics, and U.S.-China Relations, 1961-1974," examines why and how China and the United States, long time Cold War rivals, went from enmity to rapprochement. Dr. Wang's scholarly articles and reviews appear in *Encyclopedia of the Cold War*, *Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series*, *Journal of American Studies*, *China Information*, *Journal of East Asian Studies*, among other academic as well news outlets. Dr. Wang's current research interests include: international relations theories, the Cold War studies, American Foreign Policy, and Chinese foreign policy.

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Andrei N. Lankov, Ph. D., is Associate professor in the College of Social Studies at the Kookmin University. He is Lecturer in the Faculty of Asian Studies at China and Korea Centre. Prior to Joining Kookmin University, he is Assistant Professor of Korean History in Department of Far Eastern History at the Leningrad/Petersburg State University (USSR/Russia). He earned Ph. D. degrees in the history at the Leningrad State University. His research interests include North Korean political and social history, with a special emphasis on the state's formative periods (1945-1965) and the Soviet and Chinese policy toward the Korean Peninsula; the Modern Korean city and social and cultural aspects of modernization in Korea.

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1989.06.24 - Leningrad State University. Ph.D. (history). Thesis on factionalism in Yi Dynasty Korea. An enhanced version published in 1995 as a book (A.H.Ланьков. Политическая борьба в Корее веков. Спб: Центр "Петербургское востоковедение", 1995).

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Ph.D. thesis title: Political Factions and Conflicts in Korea, 16-18th cc.

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September 1989 to August 1992 - Assistant Professor of Korean History in Department of Far Eastern History, Faculty of Asian Studies, Leningrad/Petersburg State University (USSR/Russia). Taught Korean history, history of East Asia, Korean and Classical Chinese.

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March 1995 to August 1996 - lecturer of Russian Language in Osan College, Republic of Korea
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Dr. Bae has received his Ph.D in international business from Seoul National University.



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|-----------|--|
| 1967-1971 | B.A., International Relations, Seoul National University |
| 1971-1976 | M.A., Political Science, Seoul National University |
| 1999 | Ph.D., Political Science, Kyungnam University |
| 2007 | Honorary LL.D, Korea Maritime University |
| 2008 | Degree of Honorary Doctor in Education, Kongju National University |
| 2009 | Degree of Honorary Doctor, Tianjin University, China |

Parliamentary activities

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| 1992-2000 | Member, Science, Technology and Information Committee/Transportation Committee, National Assembly |
| 1994-1996 | Member, Special Committee on Women's Affairs, National Assembly |
| 1999 | Member, Sub-Committee on Coefficient Adjustment, Special Committee on Budget and Accounts, National Assembly |
| 2001-2001 | Chairman, Special Committee on Unemployment Policy, National Assembly |
| 2000-2008 | Chairman, Korea-the Netherlands Parliamentarians' Friendship Association, National Assembly |
| 2001-2003 | Chairman, Science, Technology, Information, and Telecommunications Committee, National Assembly |
| 2006-2007 | Floor Leader, Grand National Party |
| 1992-present | Five-term lawmaker (14 th , 15 th , 16 th , 17 th and 18 th National Assembly) |
| July 2008-present | Speaker of the National Assembly |

Political activities

| | |
|-----------|---|
| 1996-1997 | Chairman, Planning and Coordination Committee, New Korea Party |
| 1998-1998 | The 1 st Deputy Secretary General, Grand National Party |
| 1998-2000 | Chairman, Information and Telecommunications Committee, Grand National Party |
| 2000-2001 | Chairman, Busan Metropolitan City Regional Party Chapter, Grand National Party |
| 2003-2003 | Chairman, 2 nd Sub-Committee, Special Committee on Reform, Grand National Party |
| 2003-2003 | Chairman, “Digital Grand National Party” Committee, Grand National Party |
| 2004 | Chairman, the 17 th General Election Campaign Pledge Committee, Grand National Party |
| 2004-2005 | Chief, the 17 th General Election Campaign Headquarters, Grand National Party Secretary General, Grand National Party |
| 2005-2006 | Chairman, Committee on Candidate Recruiting, Grand National Party |
| 2007 | Chairman, World Class National Vision Committee of the 17 th Presidential Election Committee, Grand National Party |
| 2007-2008 | Vice Chairman, the 17 th Presidential Transition Committee |

Professional activities

| | |
|-----------|---|
| 1975-1978 | Reporter, Dong-a Ilbo daily newspaper |
| 1978-1982 | Researcher, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Foreign Ministry |
| 1982-1986 | Staff official, Office of Press Secretary to the President/Office of Political Affairs Secretary to the President |
| 1986-1990 | Secretary for Political Affairs to the President/the Prime Minister |

Other activities

| | |
|-----------|---|
| 1993-1997 | Executive Director, Volunteering and Welfare Center |
| 1999 | Debuted as an essayist |

Publications

- The World Seen by Kim, Hyong-O, Kim, Hyong-O Seen by the World, 1996
 - Overhearing People, 1999
 - The Sound of Waves Heard in the Stone Fence House-Life and Thought of a Digital Politician, KIM Hyong-O, 2003
-

-A Letter of Hope Written On the Road, 2009

Awards

- 1999 Presidential Award for Excellence in Service
- 2001 Shanghai Magnolia Award (for extraordinary contributions to the city's international relations)
- 2008 The 8th Proud Korean Award for Excellent Contribution in Political Development from the Journalists Federation of Korea
- 2009 Honorary Sign with a Blue Band of Sofia University 'Saint Kliment Ohridski'

Hobbies and Interests

Jogging, Mountain climbing, Golf and Korean checkers



Park, Jin

Chairman of Foreign Affairs, Trade & Unification Committee

박진

국회 외교통상위원회 위원장

Chairman of Foreign Affairs, Trade & Unification Committee

Member, The 16th, 17th & 18th National Assembly

District of Jongro, Seoul, The Grand National Party (GNP)

Education

New York University, School of Law, J.D, 2000

University of Oxford, D.Phil., Political Science, 1994

Harvard Kennedy School, M.A., Public Administration, 1985,

Seoul National University, College of Law, LL.B., 1978

Certifications

Admission to New York State Bar, 2000

11th National High Diplomatic Service Examination, Republic of Korea, 1977

Professional Experiences

Chairman, Foreign Affairs, Trade & Unification Committee (Current)

Member of 16th, 17th, and 18th National Assembly (Electoral District: Jongno, Seoul), 2004-Present

President, Asian Culture & Economy Forum (Current)

President, Parliamentary Diplomacy Forum, National Assembly (Current)

President, Korea-U.S. Parliamentary Council, National Assembly (Current)

Member, Korea-U.S.-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Council, National Assembly (Current)

Ranking Member, Korea-Japan Parliamentary Federation (Current)

Ranking Member, National Defense Committee, National Assembly (Current)

Chair, International Affairs Committee, Grand National Party 2004-2006
Member, Science, Technology, Information and Telecommunications Committee, National Assembly
Chair, District Office for the Seoul Metropolitan Area, Grand National Party
Secretary, Sub-Committee on Foreign Affairs, Unification and National Security, Presidential Transition Committee for the 17th President 2004
Chair, Special Committee on International Relations, the GNP Presidential Election Campaign Committee for the 17th Presidential Election 2003
Vice Chair, Presidential Primary Management Committee, Grand National Party
Spokesman, The Grand National Party, Republic of Korea, Jun 2003-Feb 2004
Special Advisor to the Presidential Candidate of the Grand National Party, Republic of Korea, 2002
Special Advisor to the President of the Grand National Party, Republic of Korea, 2001-2002
Advisor/Attorney, Kim & Chang Law Firm, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 1998-2001
Presidential Press Secretary and Presidential Aide for Political Affairs, Blue House, Republic of Korea, 1993-1998
Naval Officer, Republic of Korea, 1980-1983

Publications

Park Jin's Report on the North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Hankyung, 2003)
The Blue House Memorandum (Joongang M&B, 2002)



CHO, YOUNG KEY

PROFESSOR, KOREA UNIVERSITY

조영기

고려대학교 교수

Professor Cho is a North Korea Professor at Korea University (since March, 2009). He is also serving as an assistant director of the Hansun Academy at *Hanbando sunjinhwa jaedan* or Hansun Foundation (since June, 2006). He is currently an active council member in The National Unification Advisory Council (NUAC) and an expert advisor in the Presidential Committee on Social Cohesion. In 1997, he received his Ph. D. from Konkuk University , Seoul, with a thesis on “A study of Interdependence of North and South Korea’s Economy.” His main focus on research ever since then has been issues related to the North Korean economy. He has written several books and articles, including A Discourse on the North Korean Economy (co-author), “Normalization Strategy of the North Korean Economy,” etc. Professor Cho’s recent research interests are “Initiatives of advanced unification.” “Initiatives of advanced unification” refers to the Korean peninsula’s unification strategies associated with North and South Korea’s integration and its relevant appropriate diplomacy that will lead the Korean peninsula to an advanced country.



SON, KISUP

PROFESSOR, PUSAN UNIVERSITY OF FOREIGN STUDIES

손기섭

부산외국어대학교 교수

Dr. Son, Kisup is a Professor of International Relations at Pusan University of Foreign Studies (PUFS). From 2006 to 2007, Dr. Son served as a visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo. Also, he served as a Senior Research Fellow at Seoul National University (2002-2006) and a Research Professor at Ajou University (2000-2002). Dr. Son received his Ph.D. in International Politics at the University of Tokyo in 1999, majoring in Japanese politics and Diplomacy and Japan-China Relations.





CHOO, JAEWOO

PROFESSOR, KYUNG-HEE UNIVERSITY

주재우

경희대학교 교수

Jaewoo Choo is Associate Professor of Chinese foreign policy in the Department of Chinese Studies at Kyung Hee University, Korea. He is a graduate of Wesleyan University (BA in Government) and Peking University (MA & Ph.D. in International Relations). Prior to his teaching at Kyung Hee, Professor Choo worked as a researcher at a number of think tanks in Korea. He was also a contributor to Asia Times Online (www.atimes.com) on the Korean affairs from 2002 to 2005.

His most recent English publications include “China’s Relations with Latin America: Issues, Policy, Strategies, and Implications,” *Journal of International and Area Studies* (2009), “Ideas Matter: China’s Peaceful Rise,” *Asia Europe Journal* (2009), “East Asia Security Community Building,” *Journal of Korean Political Science*, (2009). “Mirroring North Korea’s Growing Economic Dependency on China: Political Ramifications,” *Asian Survey*, (2008), and book chapters in *Korea in the New Asia* (2007), *Interesting China’s Development* (2007), *China in the International Order* (2008), *Strategic Yearbook 2007 China Rising: Reaction, Assessments, and Strategic Consequences* (2008), *Governance and Regionalism in Asia* (2009), *Energy and Security Cooperation in Asia: Challenges and Prospects* (2009), and *East Asia’s Relations with China: Facing a Rising China* (2010).



BARBARA DEMICK

BEIJING BUREAU CHIEF, LOS ANGELES TIMES

바바라 데믹

로스앤젤레스 타임즈 기자

Barbara Demick is Beijing bureau chief for the Los Angeles Times. Her book, *Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea* was published by Spiegel & Grau/Random House in December 2009 and by Granta Books in the United Kingdom. Her previous book is *Logavina Street: Life and Death in a Sarajevo Neighborhood*. Demick has spent 16 years as a foreign correspondent, posted in Seoul, Jerusalem, Sarajevo and Berlin. Her reporting on North Korea has been recognized with awards from the Asia Society, the Overseas Press Club and the American Academy of Diplomacy. She joined the Los Angeles Times staff in 2001. She was previously with the Philadelphia Inquirer where she won the Polk Award for international reporting, the Robert F. Kennedy award for international reporting and was a Pulitzer finalist. Demick was born in Ridgewood, N.J. and graduated from Yale University. Before moving to Beijing, she was a visiting fellow at Princeton University teaching a course on coverage of repressive regimes.



DR. JOSEF MULLNER

AMBASSADOR OF AUSTRIA TO THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

요세프 뮐르너

주한 오스트리아 대사

born January 7th, 1952

married to Kai WANG; one son David

- 1974-1978: Studies of Law and Political Science, Vienna University
- 1979-1981: Post graduate studies; Diplomatic Academy, Vienna
- 1981: Joining the Austrian Foreign Service, Vienna
- 1981-1984: Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Vienna
- 1984-1986: First Secretary; Austrian Embassy, Paris
- 1986-1989: Councillor; Austrian Embassy, Bucharest
- 1998-1994: Head of Unit; Division of Economic Affairs,
Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- 1994 - 1999: Deputy Head of Mission; Austrian Embassy, Beijing
- 1999 - 2004: Austrian Ambassador to Vietnam
- 2005 to date: Head of Department; Development Cooperation,
Federal Ministry of European and International Affairs

Assignments at the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs/ Federal Ministry for European and
International Affairs, Vienna:

- International Law Office
 - Division of Consular Affairs
 - Division of Economic Affairs
 - Division of Political Affairs
 - Division of Development Cooperation
 - Office of the Federal Minister
-



JUAN BAUTISTA LENA CASAS

AMBASSADOR OF SPAIN TO THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

후안 레나

주한 스페인 대사

Born on 16 October, 1940 in Cabra (Córdoba).

Joined Diplomatic Service on 2 December, 1974.

Graduated in Law.- International Studies Diploma from the Diplomatic School.

Secretary of the Embassy of Spain in The Hague from 3 December 1974.

Secretary of the Embassy of Spain in Tokyo from 20 April 1980.

Advisor at the International Department of the Government's Presidency Cabinet from 31 August 1984.

Deputy Director-General of Philippines and Pacific Affairs, in Directorate General of Foreign Policy for North America and Asia, from 1 August 1986.-

Deputy Director-General of North America from 9 February 1987.-

Director-General of the Diplomatic Information Office from 22 February 1988.

Ambassador of Spain to the People's Republic of China from 26 November 1993.-

Ambassador of Spain to Mongolia, with residence in Beijing, from 7 November 1995.-

Ambassador of Spain to Japan from 18 March 1999.

Ambassador on Special Mission.- Chief Inspector of the General Inspection of Services from 7 February 2003.-

Ambassador of Spain to the Democratic People's Republic of Algeria from 25 June 2004.

Ambassador of Spain to the Republic of Korea since 10 November 2008.

Integration of the Korean Peninsula

Opening Ceremony & Keynote Speeches

April 8th

Opening Remarks:

Park, Se-Il (Chairman, Hansun Foundation)

Welcoming Remarks:

Byun, Yong-Shik (CEO & Publisher, Chosun Ilbo)

Lee, Chong-Moon (Trustee, CSIS)

Congratulatory Address:

Chun, Young-Woo (Vice Minister, MOFAT)

Keynote Speeches:

Park, Se-Il (Chairman, Hansun Foundation)

Integration of Korea for the Advanced North-East Asia

John J. Hamre (President and CEO, CSIS)

The United States, Korea, and the Future of East Asia

Opening Remarks

Park, Se-II
Chairman, Hansun Foundation

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Today I am particularly honored and privileged to pronounce the opening of this conference entitled "Integration of the Korean Peninsula: Framework for a Positive Future in the era of the East Asia".

We have gathered today from 5 different countries. We are here because we share the acute sense that the issue of Korean integration is an imminent challenge as well as an opportunity to all of us. We are all here, for we unitedly believe that the integration of the Korean Peninsula could serve as a historic opportunity to realize regional peace and prosperity, rather than a threat or unexpected calamity.

In this conference, I truly hope that we can clarify how Korea, as the bearer of primary responsibility in this endeavor, should prepare and act, and how the regional and international community should cooperate and take concerted course of action in the creation of the integrated Korean peninsular.

Most of all, I hope that we can picture and share the vision of the future of the Korean peninsula and the whole region of North-East Asia, blessed with the collective enjoyment of peace and affluence.

I believe today's gathering is meaningful in marking itself as the first international conference on the issue of Korean unification, truly reflecting the essential and comprehensive spectrum of most respected specialists, and leading opinion makers.

I want to thank CSIS, and Chosun Ilbo for their kindness to co-host this event; the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry of Unification for their support; Last but not the least, the Korea Foundation, the Korea Development Bank, and the Korea Exim Bank for their sponsorship, respectively.

Thank you all, and let this conference begin.

Welcoming Remarks

Byun, Yong-Shik
CEO & Publisher, Chosun Ilbo

President John Hamre of CSIS, Chairman Park Se-il of Hansun Foundation for Freedom and Happiness, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Chun Young-woo, respected participants, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to today's conference.

To commemorate its 90th anniversary, Chosun Ilbo, together with the Hansun Foundation, and the CSIS, is hosting an international conference on the integration and Korean peninsula in the era of post-integration Northeast Asia.

Recently, Chosun Ilbo, in collaboration with the Hansun Foundation, published the results of our research on the best strategy to become an advanced country in series of columns entitled "The Seoul Consensus". In the course of these series, at one point, I felt proud. That was when I learned that because Korea succeeded in both democratization and economic development, many developing countries were interested in learning the Korean developmental model.

In November, Korea will host the G20 conference. Korea has also entered OECD's Development Assistance Committee, a group of countries engaged in advanced development assistance activities. As can be seen, Korea's status in the international community has been completely transformed.

In spite of such remarkable achievements, I am far from being elated, because these successful developments that the world community envies only applies to South Korea. When we gaze upon the North, things that one would never, even in the worst of nightmares, dream of happening on the Korean peninsula are taking place. The infant mortality rate in North

Korea is 48 per 1,000 births. This is 12 times higher than that of South Korea where the rate is only 4 per 1,000 births. Of every 100,000 Korean women who become pregnant and give births, only 14 die. But in North Korea, 370 women die. The average life expectancy of South Korean men is 75.1 years of age where as it is merely 65.1 for North Korean men. Women born in South Korea live up to the age of 82.3 years, while North Korean women live to be 69.3 years old. These numbers clearly show that in spite of being part of the same race, life becomes so vastly different according to which part of the Korean peninsula one is born into and there are many more shocking figures and statistics than the ones I presented.

However, the Kim Jong-il regime has absolutely no regard for the miserable reality that the average North Koreans are facing. Instead, they are desperately searching for ways to pass down the feudal dictatorship to Kim's descendants which has no historical precedents anywhere in the world.

But I believe, despising the North Korean regime for their wrong deeds is one thing and helping the North Koreans is another. Providing assistance to those North Korean infants and mothers that lack the most basic medical service and are dying of malnutrition is our rightful task in our path to integration. Aiding the North Korean people so that they may be lifted out of the wretched conditions and enjoy a better life also works towards our benefit after the integration. Against this backdrop, today's conference is a rare opportunity for us to put our heads together and think about the integration, the East Asian region and the peninsula after integration, and the future of the Korean peninsula. The Korean integration is primarily a Korean problem, but it is also an issue of key importance to the neighboring countries that will influence the integration and also be influenced by the integration process. During the past decade, we were unable to regularly discuss the integration formula per se. Now it is high time that we discuss a positive way forward for integration that meets the needs of South Korea, the Korean peninsula, the Northeast Asian region, and finally, the world community.

I hope that the experts participating in today's conference will produce many different ideas and engage in constructive discussions. Thank you.

환영사

변용식
조선일보 발행인 겸 대표이사 전무

CSIS 존 햄리 소장님, 박세일 한반도 선진화재단 이사장님, 천영우 차관님, 그리고 이 자리에 참석하신 여러분들께 감사의 말씀을 드립니다.

조선일보는 창간 90 주년을 맞이하여 한반도 선진화재단, CSIS 와 함께 통일과 통일 이후 동북아시아의 한반도를 생각해보는 국제회의를 열게 되었습니다.

최근 조선일보는 한반도 선진화 재단과 함께 선진국으로 가는 전략에 대해 고민하고 연구한 결과를 ‘서울컨센서스’란 제목으로 연재했습니다. 그 중 마음 뿌듯한 대목이 하나 있었습니다. 한국이 민주화와 경제발전에 동시에 성공하면서 개도국들이 한국의 경험을 하나의 발전모델로 배우고 싶어 한다는 점이었습니다.

오는 11 월엔 한국에서 G20 정상회의가 열리고, 한국은 원조선진국들의 모임인 개발원조위원회(DAC)에도 가입하게 되었습니다. 한국의 위상이 이전과는 완전히 달라진 것입니다.

그렇다고 마음이 마냥 가볍지만은 않았습니다. 세계가 부러워하는 그런 발전은 어디까지나 한반도 남쪽, 한국에만 해당되는 일이기 때문입니다. 북쪽으로 시선을 돌려보면 같은 한반도에서 일어날 수 있으리라고 상상하기 어려운 상황이 전개되고 있습니다.

북한의 영아사망률은 인구 1000 명 당 48 명입니다. 남한은 4 명이니까, 북한의 아기들은 남한 아기들보다 12 배나 사망률이 높은 것입니다. 한국여성 10 만명 중 임신, 출산 관련해 사망하는 경우는 14 명에 불과하지만, 북한에선 370 명이 목숨을 잃습니다.

한국 남성의 평균수명은 75.1 세인데, 북한남성은 65.1 세입니다. 한국에서 태어난 여성은 82.3 세를 사는데 북한 여성은 69.3 세입니다.

같은 민족임에도 불구하고 한반도 남쪽에 태어나느냐, 북쪽에 태어나느냐에 따라 얼마나 다른 인생을 살 수밖에 없는지를 보여주는 수치는 이것 말고도 많고도 많습니다.

하지만 김정일 정권은 북 주민들의 이런 비참한 현실엔 아랑곳없이 세계 어느 나라에도 유래가 없는 봉건적 독재 권력을 대물림하는 데만 혈안이 되어 왔습니다.

저는, 북한 정권의 죄상은 많지만 최소한의 의료 서비스도 받지 못하고 영양실조로 죽어가는 북한 영아와 산모들을 줄여나가도록 지원하는 것이 우리가 통일로 가는 길에 당연히 해야 할 일이라고 생각합니다. 북한 주민의 비참한 상황을 개선해 더 나은 삶을 살 수 있도록 도와주는 것은 통일 이후 우리 모두를 위한 일이기도 합니다.

오늘 이 회의는 통일과 통일 이후의 동북아에 대해, 또 한반도의 미래에 대해 고민해보는 자리입니다. 한반도 통일은 일차적으로는 한국이 가장 진지하게 고민할 문제지만, 한국의 통일에 영향을 주고 영향을 받을 주변 국가들의 중요한 관심사이기도 합니다.

지난 10년 동안 우리는 통일 방안 그 자체에 대해 자주 논의하지 못했습니다. 그러나 이제는 우리가 한국, 한반도, 동북아, 나아가 세계를 위해 추구해야 할 긍정적인 통일 방안에 대해 목소리를 낼 때가 됐다고 생각합니다.

훌륭하신 학자와 전문가들의 다양한 의견과 열띤 토론을 기대하겠습니다.

감사합니다.

Lee, Chong-Moon

Trustee, CSIS/ Chairman of CSIS Korea Advisory Board

As a trustee of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and chairman of the Korea Chair Advisory Board, it is truly an honor for me to welcome such distinguished experts to this conference.

This is the first time that the CSIS Korea Chair has hosted a conference in Seoul since its foundation last year, and I hope that in the many years to come we can contribute to more fruitful discussions regarding the Korean peninsula.

It is a special pleasure to once again be able to collaborate with Chosun Ilbo, as well as the Hansun Foundation, and I hope that through this conference many more cooperative relationships can be forged.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization based in Washington DC that provides strategic insights and policy solutions to policymakers in government, international institutions, the private sector, and civil society.

By conducting research and analysis to develop policy initiatives, CSIS strives to look into the future and anticipate change. In its efforts to do so, in 2009, the CSIS launched a Korea Chair to meet the growing demands for in-depth research and analysis on the Korean peninsula.

Headed by Dr. Victor Cha, former Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council and current Georgetown University Professor, the Office of the Korea Chair leads a number of initiatives.

To name a few, the CSIS Korea Chair organizes Senior Policy Group meetings on a periodic basis in order to facilitate dialogue among U.S. policymakers and the expert community on Korea issues. The CSIS Korea Chair hosts various events and independent research seminars by visiting scholars, analysts, businessmen and media representatives for informed discussions of Korea policy issues.

The Korea Chair strives to provide such arenas for discussions and to highlight policy analysis which informs a wide range of major policy issues important to Korea, the United States and neighboring countries as well. Topics the Chair has covered range from the KORUS FTA, the future prospects of the US-ROK alliance relationship, and security considerations with North Korea.

Not only is it important that the long-term issues on integration of the Korean Peninsula should be discussed, but it is also crucial that such issues be discussed in the context of a greater East Asian region.

This brings me to the topic of this conference. I am so happy to see such a renowned group of scholars, policy makers and opinion leaders from Korea and the neighboring countries convening here to exchange ideas on the future of Korea and the region.

The timing of this conference could not be better. This year is the 60th anniversary of the Korean War, marking a significant milestone for Korea's relations with its friends and neighbors. The U.S.-ROK alliance, which was forged in blood on the battlefield more than half century ago, has expanded in ways that could not have been imagined.

A partnership that began as a Cold War military alliance now also encompasses a new set of 21st century challenges. Today the U.S. and Korea are working hand in hand on a host of diverse issues such as free trade, climate change, counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, human rights and humanitarian disaster relief.

Korea's global relevance is manifest in its recent peacekeeping contributions in Lebanon, its humanitarian work in Afghanistan, and its disaster responses in Haiti and Chile. Most important, as you all know, Korea will host the G20 summit this coming fall.

There were times when the world's most important issues were discussed and decided by G2 or G7. But today is G20. We will see how it goes with G20. It may hardly produce any handsome results from the beginning, however, we will have to expect for the best out of it. Under today's changing situations, various options in terms of integrating the Korean

Peninsula need to be studied more in-depth and in expanded scope by all the parties surrounding the peninsula.

At the same time, Korea has greatly deepened its cooperation with its good neighbors, China and Japan. Relationships that were marred by volatility and suspicion have blossomed into partnerships of mutual respect and collaboration. Truly this diverse conference for the next 2 days is a testament to the evolution of Korea's role in the region as well as the global community, witnessing consensus and promoting global peace, security and prosperity.

With extraordinary experts and intellectual leaders from China, Japan, South Korea and the United States gathered here at this conference, I am confident that in the course of the next two days high-level discussions and exchanges regarding integration of the Korean peninsula will prove to be highly innovative and fruitful. After all, the future of Northeast Asia and the U.S. position in this vibrant region is intimately tied to Korea's destiny.

I would again like to welcome all of our distinguished experts and guests and look forward to our ensuing discourse. Thank you very much.

CSIS 이사 및 한국자문위원회 위원장

미국 국제전략문제연구소(CSIS)의 한국 Chair 자문위원회 위원장으로서, 본 회의에 참석하신 훌륭한 전문가들을 환영할 수 있는 것은 저의 영광이라고 생각합니다. 작년 설립 이후, CSIS 한국 Chair 가 처음으로 서울에서 국제회의를 개최했습니다. 개인적으로 앞으로도 오래도록 CSIS 한국 Chair 가 한반도에 관한 주요한 논의에 기여할 수 있기를 바랍니다.

조선일보와, 더불어 한반도선진화재단과, 다시 한 번 협력할 수 있게 된 것도 기쁨입니다. 이 회의가 좀 더 많은 협력관계를 만들어가는 계기가 되기를 바랍니다. CSIS 는 워싱턴에 근거한 비정부적, 비영리기구입니다. 정부와 국제기구들을 비롯해 사적 부문과 시민사회에 전략적인 영감과 정책 대안들을 제공하는 단체입니다.

CSIS 는 정책 방안들을 제안하기 위해 연구와 분석을 지속적으로 병행하여 미래를 전망하고 변화를 도모하는 노력을 기울이고 있습니다. 이러한 노력의 일환으로, 2009 년 CSIS 는 점증되고 있는 한반도에 관한 심층적 연구와 분석의 수요에 부응하여 한국 Chair 를 신설했습니다. 전 미국 국가안보위원회의 아시아 국장이자 현 조지타운 대학 교수인 빅터 차 박사의 Chair 취임으로 빅터 차 박사의 주도로 현재 다수의 사업들이 진행되고 있습니다.

몇 가지 예를 든다면, 미국 내 정책담당자들과 전문가집단간의 대화를 원활하게 하기 위해 정기적으로 고위정책그룹간 간담회를 열고 있습니다. 동시에 다수의 행사와 방문교수, 정책분석가들, 사업가들, 언론 대표자들에 의한 독립적인 연구 프로젝트 세미나들을 통해 한국의 정책문제에 관한 심도 있고도 의미 있는 대화를 진행하고 있습니다.

한국 Chair 는 한국, 미국과 주변국가들에게 관련되는 광범위한 주요 정책의제들에 대한 토론의 장을 제공하고, 정책분석에 대한 적절한 주목을 이끌어내기 위해 노력하고 있습니다. 그간 다루어졌던 주제들은 한미 FTA, 한미동맹의 미래, 북한에 대한 안보적 쟁점들을 포함합니다.

한반도의 통합에 대한 장기적 과제들에 대한 논의가 중요한 것처럼, 동일한 논의가 대 아시아 지역이라는 맥락에서 다루어지는 것이 중요합니다.

이러한 점에서 오늘 회의의 주제에 대해 주목하게 됩니다. 이렇게 훌륭한 한국과 주변 국가들로부터 모이신 학자, 정책 수립자, 의견주도층들께서 함께 한국과 이 지역의 미래에 대하여 의견을 교환하게 되었다는 것을 기쁘게 생각합니다.

본 회의는 참으로 시의 적절하다고 생각합니다. 올해는 한국 전쟁 60 주년이 되는 해입니다. 한국과 우방국가들, 동시에 주변국가들과의 관계에 있어서 중요한 시금석이 될 수 있는 해입니다. 반 세기 이전 전장에서 혈맹으로 맺어진 한미 동맹 관계는 우리의 상상을 훨씬 뛰어넘는 정도로 발전하였습니다.

냉전시대의 군사적 동맹으로부터 출발한 파트너관계는 21 세기의 변화를 맞아 새로운 도전들을 맞이하고 있습니다. 오늘 날 미국과 한국은 자유무역, 기후변화, 테러예방 및 진압, 확산방지, 인권, 재난 시 인도적 지원에 이르기까지 다양한 주제에 관해 협력하는 관계로 발전하게 되었습니다. .

한국의 세계적 중요성은 최근 레바논에서의 평화유지 기여, 아프가니스탄에서의 인도지원, 아이티와 칠레에 대한 재난 구호 등에서 확인되고 있습니다. 가장 중요한 것은 주지하는 바와 같이, G20 정상회담을 주최하는 것입니다.

역사상 지구촌의 주요 의제들이 G2 또는 G7 에 의해서 논의되고 결정되던 시기가 있었습니다. 이제 G 20 의 진행을 주목합니다. 처음부터 훌륭한 가시적인 성과를 기대할 수는 없으나, 최선의 결과가 나올 수 있기를 기대합니다. 오늘날과 같이 많은 변화가 있는 상황에서 한반도 통합의 문제는 심도 있는 연구를 통하여 다양한 선택안들이 한반도 주변의 모든 당사자들을 포함한 광범위한 참가자들에 의하여 검토되어야 합니다.

동시에 한국은 우호적인 이웃국가들인 일본, 중국과의 협력을 적극적으로 강화해 왔습니다. 유동적인 상황과 신뢰의 부족으로 인해 지장을 받았던 국가간 관계들이 상호 존중과 협력의 파트너십으로 훌륭하게 변화하였습니다. 진정으로 앞으로 이틀간 이어질 다양성에 기반한 금 번

회의는 아시아와 전 세계에 있어서 진화하고 있는 한국의 역할에 대해 새로운 확인이 될 것입니다. 동시에 지구적 평화와 안보, 번영에 대한 합의의 장이 될 것입니다.

이제 중국, 대한민국, 미국, 일본, 러시아의 비범한 전문가들과 지적 지도자들이 모이셨기에, 저는 개인적으로 앞으로 이틀간의 고위급 회의와 의견교환을 통한 한반도통합에 대한 논의가 혁신적이고 열매를 맺는 일이 될 것이라고 확신합니다.

다시 한 번 이 자리에 함께 하신 훌륭한 전문가들과 참가자들을 환영하면서, 이어지는 토론을 기대해 마지 않습니다. 대단히 감사합니다.

Keynote Speech

“Integration of Korea and the Advanced North East Asia”

Park, Se-II
Chairman, Hansun Foundation

Asia and the international community have long awaited North Korea’s voluntary and naturally grown reforms and normalized relation with the outer world. Had the North followed such a track, we, the South, would have offered full cooperation. Unfortunately, the prospects for reform are bleak as the North remains unyielding with its nuclear aspiration and hereditary succession.

Many have expressed concerns, rightly, and warned against dramatic turn of events in North Korea. To sustain the idea and the reality of regional peace and security, it cannot be overstressed that all the inhabitants of Asia and the world should be vigilant to any changes in the North Korean theater.

Yet, we are obviously gathered here to accomplish and discuss more than that. Our gathering today purports to take the issue of Korean unification, not as a mere subject for concerns and responses, but as both a challenge and opportunity to achieve unprecedented level of regional peace and prosperity.

What we want to develop here is a framework of regional governance, i.e., what course of action Korea should take as the bearer of primary responsibility, what types of regional and international cooperation should be at work throughout and after the process of integration.

For this end, the Korean government should work on the following three things.

Firstly, it has to pursue a proactive integration policy and stop dwelling on the ideas of maintaining status quo and/or managing the current division. Leaving behind the past when

the primary policy directives of South Korea were the preservation of the demarcation line, the Korean government should move forward toward the era of the integrated Korea and the advanced East Asian region.

For this end, Korean government should:

Emphasize the value and the importance of integration, thereby building the national consensus to this end;

Seek both hard and soft approaches to induce the North to denuclearization and reforms toward normalization of status in its relation to the outer world;

Build up firm and concrete plans as to how it will link dramatic changes in the North to the realization of integration of the peninsula, especially in economic terms.

Win the heart of North Korean people. The goodwill of the South should be fully conveyed to North Koreans.

Secondly, the government should be able to persuade the concerned states in the region, including the US, China, Japan, and Russia, into sharing a common perception about Korean integration, and its worth as an essential component in the peace and prosperity of the East Asia as a whole.

To this end, the government should;

Increase the regional awareness that the integration of the Korean peninsula in a democratic and liberal fashion, as shown in Article 4 of the Korean Constitution, is a critical prerequisite to the peace and prosperity of the region;.

Help all concerned states to realize that the integrated Korea, and not a divided one, will present greater benefits and advantages to everyone, whereas the perpetuated division of the

peninsula, on the contrary, is certainly disadvantageous to the peace and prosperity of the region.

Thirdly, Korea should be able to offer a vision and outlook of an integrated Korea while seeking ways to induce active cooperation and participation from the neighboring states.

Korea should be able to state how and where an integrated Korea will position itself in terms of diplomacy, security, economy and regional prosperity. Korea should be able to identify its position on the issue of a peace regime of Northeast Asia. It should also be able to state its vision on how an integrated Korea can make a constructive contribution to the economic development and prosperity of Northeast Asia.

The integration and economic development in the northern part of Korea, I firmly believe, will facilitate developments in China's three Northern Provinces, and the Russian Far East region, enabling regional cooperation to come into fruition. In this process, North East Asia will become one of the most dynamic and rapidly developing regions in the world in this century.

Integration is a pressing issue not only for South Korea, but to all in this part of the world. Denuclearization is hardly conceivable without integration. The possible exodus of North Korean refugees into China cannot be prevented without integration. Most of all, the great era of the unprecedented regional peace and prosperity will not be ours without the integration of the Korean peninsula.

First and foremost, the members of the East Asian region should forge a venue for dialogue where future vision of Northeast Asia can be discussed. Such venue should be pursued and promoted at various levels, ranging from Track I to Track 1.5 to Track II. At these talks, we should seek ways to better shape the future order of regional security and economy while serving the region's interest in peace and stability.

A variety of agreements on a wide range of issues are conceivable if and when the participating nations can focus their discussion fully on the long-term interest of the regional development, while putting aside those short-term interests for individual development.

Unfortunately, for North Korea, conditions are not ripe for its full participation. Such talks, therefore, should commence among five-parties in the first place, while opening the possibility to expand to six-party talks. The imperatives of these talks should be directed to proactively welcoming the coming era of Northeast Asia's development and prosperity.

In this vein, I would also like to propose that a dialogue between bi-partisan and independent think tanks from five nations be held on a regular basis. These independent institutions should be the core members in drafting the blueprint for the future development of Northeast Asia. It is my sincere wish that conclusions and agreements from these talks be disseminated to respective governments and civil societies. By doing so, I venture to say that shared perception, coherent understanding, common goals, and persistent efforts on the integration of Korea and the Northeast Asia's prosperity and peace can take firm roots within the decision making circles and civil communities of these five nations.

I once again want to stress that we should not forget that the true peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia cannot be built on the divided Korean peninsula. North Korea may either change, or persist, whether gradually or dramatically. In any case, we should be prepared to materialize the prosperity and peace of Northeast Asia, on the foundation of integrated Korea.

I sincerely ask you to join this historical and sacred mission of opening a new chapter of history in this region of North East Asia.

Integration of Korea for the Advanced North East Asia

박세일

한반도선진화재단 이사장

한국과 국제사회는 북한의 자생적 개혁과 개방을 오랜 기간 기다려 왔다. 개혁과 개방의 길로 가기로 결정만 한다면 같은 민족으로서 우리는 모든 협력을 다 하려고 기다려 왔다. 그러나 점점 그 가능성은 줄어들고 있다. 오히려 북은 핵개발의지를 포기하지 않고 있으며, 북한동포의 정치적 경제적 어려움은 깊어가고 있으면, 지도자가 건강이 문제되는 상황에서 제 3 대째의 권력세습이 진행되고 있다. 따라서 북한미래의 불확실성이 그 어느 때 보다도 높아지고 있다.

우리는 모든 가능성에 대하여 대비해야 한다. 단순한 대비가 아니라 적극적으로 한반도와 동북아에 새로운 밝은 역사를 쓸 준비를 하여야 한다. 그래서 점진적 변화이든 급격한 변화이든 모든 변화는 반드시 한반도의 통일과 동북아의 평화와 발전의 방향으로 나가도록, 반드시 그러한 결과가 나오도록 모든 노력을 다 해야 한다. 이것이 대한민국의 역사적 민족적 사명이고 평화와 번영의 동북아를 만들기 위해 이웃 4 강-미국 중국 일본 러시아-이 짝지어야 할 역사적 시대적 책무라고 생각한다.

우리 모두는 동북아의 번영과 평화를 희망한다. 그러나 동북아의 번영과 평화는 한반도의 통일 없이는 불가능하다. 분단된 한반도를 놓고 동북아의 번영과 평화가 불가능하다는 사실은 지난 60년의 역사가 증명하고 있다. 우리는 더 이상 공허한 구상은 하지 말아야 한다.

따라서 우리가 동북아의 번영과 평화를 진정으로 원한다면, 그래서 선진한반도와 선진동북아를 만들기를 원한다면 우리 모두가 함께 공동노력을 해야 한다. 잘못된 [분단의 역사]위에 동북아의 번영과 평화를 세우려는 허망한 꿈을 버리고 바른 [통일의 역사]위에 동북아의 번영과 평화를 추구하는 노력을 우리 모두-대한민국과 이웃 4 강-가 함께 해야 한다.

이를 위해 한국정부는 다음의 3가지를 해야 한다고 생각한다.

첫째는 분단유지 내지 분단관리정책에서 벗어난 적극적 통일정책을 추구해야 한다.

그동안 북한을 어떻게 다룰 것인가, 북한 당국을 soft 하게 다룰 것인가 hard 하게 다룰 것인가 등을 중심으로 한국 내에서 보수와 진보 간에 갈등이 많았다. 그러나 그것은 잘못된 논쟁이었다. soft 나 hard 나쁜 정책수단에 불과하다. 문제는 정책목표가 무엇인가에 있다.

1970년대 중반까지 남의 국력이 북보다 약한 때는 분단유지 내지 관리가 국가목표일 수 있다. 그러나 1980년 이후 남의 국력이 북보다 강하게 되면 당연 통일을 국가목표로 해야 했다. 따라서 1980년 이후 우리 정부가 -좌와 우를 불문하고- 분단유지 내지 관리를 정책 목표한 것은 크게 잘못된 것이었다. 더욱이 지금은 더 이상 분단유지나 분단관리가 가능하지도 않은 시기로 진입하고 있다. 따라서 우리의 정책목표를 통일에 확실히 두어야 한다.

이를 위해 한국정부는 우선

(1) 통일에 대한 국론을 통일하는 것이 중요하다. 지난 10년간 한국국민의 통일의지가 크게 약화되어 왔고 동시에 통일을 보는 시각이 좌와 우간에 크게 분열되어 왔다. 분열된 국론을 통합하고 적극적 통일의 방향으로 국민의 의사를 모아야 한다.

(2) 북한을 비핵화와 개혁과 개방의 방향으로 유도하기 위한, 혹은 적극적으로 촉발하기 위한, 대화와 교류 그리고 견제와 제재라는, 소위 soft 하고 hard 한 모든 방법을 강구해야 한다.

(3) 북의 급변 사태 시 이를 통일로 연결시키기 위한 철저한 모든 정치적 경제적 그리고 안보적 준비를 해야 한다. 특히 중요한 것이 경제적 준비이다.

(4) 가장 중요한 것은 어느 경우이든, 즉 급변의 경우든 점진적 변화의 경우든 북한동포의 마음을 얻는 것이 중요하다. 남과 북이 하나가 되어 한반도 전체가 선진화의 길, 즉 번영과 평화의 길로 함께 나가기를 간절히 원하는 남한 동포의 진정성과 열정이 북한 동포들에게 올바르게 전달되어야 한다. 그리고 그들의 적극적 공감과 연대를 얻어내야 한다.

둘째, 이웃 4 강에 대한 통일외교를 적극 전개해야 한다.

여기서 통일외교란 두 가지를 의미한다. 하나는 한국헌법 제 4 조가 천명하고 있는 자유민주주의적 방향으로의 한반도 통일만이 동북아에 번영과 평화를 가져 올 수 있다는 사실을 이웃 4 강에게 설득하고 협조를 얻어 내는 일이다. 다른 하나는 [분단된 한반도]가 아니라 [통일된 한반도]가 중국과 미국 그리고 일본과 러시아 각국의 국가이익에도 크게 도움이 된다는 사실을 설득하고 이해를 얻어내는 일이다. 다시 말해 분단의 지속이 동북아의 평화와 번영에 크게 해로울 뿐 아니라 이들 4 강의 국가이익에도 크게 해롭다는 사실을 알리는 일이다.

사실 통일은 우리 대한민국의 절박한 이슈이다. 민족통합의 문제이고 국가발전의 문제이다. 통일 없이 민족통합도 국가발전도 없다. 따라서 우리가 나서서 이웃 4 강을 적극 설득하고 이해를 구해야 한다. 즉 한반도 통일 없이 핵문제해결이 어렵다는 사실, 한반도 통일 없이 중국 변방의 안정의 확보나 난민문제의 방지가 어렵다는 사실, 그리고 통일된 한반도는 앞으로 4 강들과 함께 힘을 합쳐 보다 풍요롭고 평화스러운 동북아를 만들어 나갈 수 있다는 사실 등을 적극 설득해야 한다.

그런데 이러한 방향으로 효과적 설득이 가능하려면 두 가지가 필요하다.

하나는 대한민국이 통일과정을 비교적 안정적으로 관리할 수 있는 의지와 능력을 보여야 한다. 정치 외교적 능력뿐 아니라, 경제적 능력과 국민적 의지를 확실히 보여야 한다. 다른 하나는 통일 후의 한반도 비전과 모습을 제시해 이웃 4 강이 안심할 수 있도록 만들어야 한다. 통일한반도의 미래에 대한 불확실성을 최소화해야 한다.

그런데 이 두 가지는 우리 대한민국이 먼저 적극적으로 노력해야 한다. 사실 이 두 가지의 성공을 위해서는 4 강의 적극적 이해와 협력도 필수적이다.

셋째, 통일 후 한반도의 비전과 모습을 제시하고 4 강의 협력과 적극적 참여를 호소해야 한다.

우선 대한민국 정부는 통일 한반도가 군사 안보 면에서 그리고 외교 면에서 어떠한 position 을 취할 것인지에 대해 비전을 밝혀야 한다. 장기적 안목에서의 동북아 평화체제구축에 대한 우리의 의견을 밝혀야 한다. 결국 동아시아의 평화체제는 중국 일본 한국이

주축이 되어 이루어질 [동아시아 군사안보 공동체]가 중심이 될 것으로 본다. 그리고 이 공동체에 미국이나 러시아도 어떠한 형태로든지 참여하는 것이 좋다고 생각한다. 한미동맹은 상당기간 유지되면서 새로운 동아시아 평화구조의 구축을 돕는 역할을 할 것으로 본다.

다음으로 우리 정부는 통일 한반도가 동북아의 경제 발전과 번영에 어떠한 기여를 할 수 있는지에 대한 비전을 밝혀야 한다. 통일과정을 잘 관리하면 남과 북의 경제는 엄청나게 positive 한 시너지 효과를 나타낼 것이다. 그리고 북의 경제개발은 반드시 중국의 동북 3 성, 러시아 연해주지방등의 발전을 촉발시키고, 또한 그 지역의 발전과 연계되면서, 즉 상호상승작용을 하면서 이루어지리라 본다. 시베리아 유전개발을 위한 중국과 한반도를 잇는 철도건설, 일본과 한국을 잇는 해저 터널건설 등도 한반도 통일이 되면 쉽게 이루어질 것이다. 서해안과 동해는 새로운 통상과 교통과 관광의 명소가 될 것이다. 동북아를 위한 개발은행의 설립도 반드시 필요할 것이다. 한마디로 동북아는 21 세기 세계에게 가장 역동적인 고도성장지역이 될 것이다. 이에 대한 밑그림을 한국정부가 제시하면서 4 강의 의견을 구하고 협력과 참여를 만들어 내야 한다.

이상 3 가지는 한반도 통일과 동북아의 발전과 평화를 위해 대한민국 정부가 시급히 노력해야 할 과제이다. 다음은 동북아의 발전과 평화를 위해 이웃 4 강이 해야 할 역할과 과제를 생각해 보자.

우선 시급한 것이 동북아의 미래비전에 대해 대한민국과 이웃 4 강간의 진솔한 소통과 대화의 장을 만드는 것이라고 생각한다. 그러한 의미에서 [5 자 회의]를 다양한 차원에서 추진할 필요가 있다. 민간, 정부, 그리고 1.5 track 등 다양한 차원의 대한민국과 미국 중국 일본 러시아간의 대화와 토론의 장을 마련해야 한다. 그래서 통일 한반도의 미래와 동북아의 미래에 어떠한 경제적 안보적 질서를 만드는 것이 이 지역의 평화와 발전과 안정을 가져올 것인가에 대해 진지하게 서로 토론하고 그 방안을 강구해야 한다. 개별국가의 단기적 국가이익(national interest)을 뒤로 하고 이 동북아지역의 장기적 지역이익(regional interest)을 우선하면서 논의할 수만 있다면 5자간에 비교적 쉽게 여러 종류의 합의를 이룰 수 있을 것이다.

따라서 가능한 빨리 [동북아의 미래건설을 위한 5 자회의]를 시작할 필요가 있다. 불행하게도 북한은 지금으로서는 동북아의 미래건설에 책임 있는 partner 로 참여할 수 없는 여건이다. 북한이 핵개발을 포기하고 그리고 개혁개방으로의 체제전환을 결정한다면 얼마든지 우리들과

함께 동북아의 미래를 구상할 수 있다. 그래서 5 자회의를 6 자회의로 확대할 수 있을 것이다. 그러나 핵개발을 포기하지 않고 개혁개방으로의 체제전환의지가 없는 지금은 생산적이고 미래지향적인 대화를 할 수 있는 상황이 아니다. 따라서 우선 5 자가 만나 다가오는 한반도통일의 시대, 동북아 발전과 평화의 시대에 적극적으로 공동대처하고 공동 노력하는 것이 우선 시급하다고 생각한다.

이를 위해 나는 앞으로 5 개국에 있는 비정파적 독립적 민간연구소(think tank)가 앞장서서 이 5 개국 간의 대화를 상례화 할 것을 제안하고자 한다. 5 개 민간연구소가 중심이 되어 [동북아미래발전의 청사진]을 함께 만들어 나갈 정례적 포럼을 구성할 것을 제안하고자 한다. 그리고 정례회의의 결과와 합의를 각국의 정부와 시민사회에 알려, 5 개국 사이에 한반도의 통일문제와 동북아의 번영과 평화의 문제에 대한 공동인식—공동이해와 공동목표—과 공동노력이 가능하도록 노력해야 한다고 생각한다. 즉 5 개국의 실천적 지식인들이 모여 동북아에 새로운 역사, 즉 평화와 번영의 새로운 역사를 쓰는 공동노력을 해야 한다고 생각한다.

다시 강조하지만 한반도 통일 없이는 동북아의 번영과 평화는 영원히 있을 수 없다는 사실을 우리는 잊어서는 안 된다. 한반도 분단하의 동북아에는 평화도 번영도 있을 수 없다는 사실을 잊어서는 안 된다. 따라서 북한이 핵개발을 포기하고 개혁개방으로 돌아서면, 우리 대한민국과 4 강이 힘을 합쳐 공동지원하면서 점진적 통일의 방향으로 나아가야 한다. 그러나 만일 북이 필요한 변화를 만들어 내지 못해 체제나 리더십위기로 나간다면 우리는 이 위기를 반드시 한반도통일로 귀결되도록 대한민국과 4 강이 함께 노력해야 한다. 그래서 통일된 한반도위에 동북아의 번영과 평화를 만들어 나가야 한다. 그리고 그것이 오늘 이 시대를 사는 실천적 지식인들 -정책실무자와 학자 등- 의 신성한 역사적 책무라고 생각한다. 우리 모두가 손을 잡고 동북아의 새로운 역사를 위해 함께 진군하자고 호소하고자 한다.



**Integration of the Korean Peninsula:
Framework for a Positive Future in the Era of East Asia**

CSIS—Chosun Ilbo—Hansun Foundation Conference
Grand Intercontinental Hotel, Seoul, South Korea
April 8, 2010

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great honor for me today to participate in this important, landmark conference. At the outset, let me thank the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry of Unification for their support of this conference, and the Korea Foundation, the Export-Import Bank of Korea, and the Korea Development Bank for their sponsorship. I also want to thank our cohosts—the Hansun Foundation and the Chosun Ilbo—for making this conference possible. These two great institutions have done so much to help strengthen Korean security and improve Korean-American relations. I am grateful to be able to partner with them.

Let me also say that it is a source of great pride that this conference represents the first major program of the new Korea Chair at CSIS. Establishing the Korea Chair was the culmination of a long-held dream that I have had since I came to CSIS 10 years ago. When I arrived at CSIS, we had a Japan Chair and a China Chair. We did not, however, have a Korea Chair. As I will explain in a few minutes, I saw this as a major shortcoming and a strategic flaw. Fortunately, working with great friends here in Korea and in the United States, we were able to establish the Korea Chair at CSIS. My heart today is filled with pride that we can now participate with our great friends in Korea through this important platform in Washington, D.C. Thank you.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the overall theme of this conference concerns the integration of the Korean peninsula. I have been asked, however, to offer a few remarks on a related theme, and that is the future of Northeast Asia—and of Korean-American relations after unification. I have absolutely no doubt that the Korean peninsula will become unified one day, and I am convinced that day is not so far in the future. The task for all of us is to think through the many complex problems we may encounter on the road to unification. The United States must remain a partner to the Republic of Korea until we have accomplished unification.

But I also believe that America and Korea need to think about Northeast Asia after unification. I do not believe that our historic partnership ends upon unification. Indeed, I believe there is a perpetual requirement for our partnership.

Friends, I must confess that there have been times during the past decade when I was worried about our partnership. I was worried that our two nations were drifting apart. I was worried that there was a growing sentiment in the United States that America's role on the

Korean peninsula was an artifice of the past and that our continued military presence on the peninsula should end. Military experts were arguing that we needed to pull troops out of Korea—to move them to places that provided more flexibility for action.

I resisted that thinking then and resist it now. America places its forces in foreign countries not so we can move them to other locations more efficiently, but as a tangible sign of what we are prepared to fight for and die for. We are prepared to fight and die for a free, democratic Korea.

So does this mission end with unification? I don't think so. Northeast Asia has three other powerful nations—China, Japan, and Russia—that have in the past fought each other and often fought each other over Korea. Korean history is marked with deep scars caused by these battles. And now we live in an era when warfare is more violent and destructive.

The United States has an abiding interest in helping to secure a peaceful and stable environment in Northeast Asia. This region has been peaceful and stable for 60 years because of our strong alliance with the Republic of Korea and with Japan. And during this period we have peacefully transformed a hostile standoff with China into a constructive and mutually beneficial positive engagement. Because of the reassuring presence of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula, Korea has been able to transform itself from a shattered country into the ninth-most-prosperous nation in the world during this period.

We want to sustain this peaceful and prosperous framework on a perpetual basis. Yet Korea is part of a region that in the past has collapsed into violence and turmoil. Korea cannot afford to be weak in this region. And it also should not strive to be overly strong and militarily threatening to others. Striking this balance is where we find the future of Korean-American relations. America's military presence is a tangible sign of our continuing commitment to a free, independent Korea that contributes to stability and prosperity in the region.

This does not mean that the nature of our military partnership cannot change or should not change. It must change as the underlying political reality in the region evolves. But it must change through intelligent design and mutual collaboration, not through unilateral action or rash gestures.

And both of us need to speak in new ways to our respective citizenries about our essential partnership for the future. We need to speak with a clear vision that is neither sentimental and nostalgic on the one hand nor suspicious and reserved on the other. We are equal partners on this journey into the future, a journey designed to bring peace, stability, and prosperity to Northeast Asia. This is very strongly in America's interests, as it is in Korea's. A strong, perpetual alliance between Korea and the United States is a threat to no one in the region and a benefit to all.

Thank you all for coming to this important conference, and my sincere thanks to the sponsors who have made it possible for all of us to come together these two days.

Thank you.

기조연설

미국, 한국, 그리고 동아시아의 미래

존 햄리

미국 국제전략문제연구소 소장

이 번 회의의 전반적인 주제는 한반도의 통합이지만 기조연설에서는 동북아시아의 미래와 통합 이후의 한미 관계에 대한 생각을 제안해 보겠다.

한반도의 통합이 이루어질 것이라는 것은 의심의 여지가 없으며, 한국과 미국은 굳건한 파트너십 아래 통일로 가는 길 위에서 맞닥뜨릴 많은 복잡한 문제들을 함께 풀어 나아가야 할 것이다. 하지만 더 나아가 고민해 보아야 할 주제는 통일 이후의 동북아시아의 미래와 그 미래를 위한 한국과 미국 간의 영구적인 파트너십이라고 생각한다.

역사적으로 이 곳 동북아시아 지역, 특히 한반도는 중국과 일본, 러시아 등 열강들의 각축전이 벌어진 곳이었다. 하지만 미군의 한반도 주둔에 의해 지역적인 균형이 형성되었으며 이러한 환경아래 한국은 전쟁의 폐허로부터 세계 제9위의 경제대국으로 성장할 수 있었다.

미국은 영구적으로 이러한 평화와 부강의 틀을 지속시키고자 한다. 따라서 한미 관계의 미래는 동북아시아 지역의 균형을 이루는 데 있다고 할 수 있다. 하지만 이를 위한 군사적 협력의 성격은 이 지역 저변의 정치적 현실을 반영하고 적절한 형태와 상호 협력을 통하여 변화해야 한다.

한편, 미래를 위해 이처럼 핵심적인 한미 간의 협력 관계에 대해서 한미 양국은 강력하고 영구적인 한미 동맹은 이 지역의 그 누구에게도 위협이 되지 않으며 모두를 위한 이득이 될 것이라는 제안으로 양국 국민들에게 비전을 명확하게 제시해야 한다.

Integration of the Korean Peninsula

Session 1:

April 8th

**Session 1: Internal Integration of the Korean Peninsula:
Visions and Strategies**

Chair

Rhee, Sang-Woo (President, New Asia Research Institute)



Presentation

Yoo, Ho-Yeol (Professor, Korea University)

Kim, Sung-Han (Professor, Korea University)

Jo, Dongho (Professor, Ewha Womans University)

Victor Cha (Senior Adviser and Korea Chair, CSIS)

Position in Brief

Pang Zhongying (Professor, Renmin University of China)

Hitoshi Tanaka (Senior Fellow, JCIE)

Choo, Jaewoo (Professor, Kyung-Hee University)

Luncheon Speech

Kathleen Stephens (Ambassador, U.S.)

Strategies for Internal Integration of the Korean Peninsula*

Kim Sung-Han
Korea University

* Presented at International Conference on “Integration of the Korean Peninsula: Framework for a Positive Future in the Era of East Asia” co-hosted by Hansun Foundation, Chosun Ilbo, and CSIS on April 8-9, 2010.

I. Introduction

There can be two scenarios with respect to internal integration of the Korean Peninsula, or reunification of the two Koreas. One is a multistage process in which economic and political union will be gradually achieved through negotiations between North and South Korea. There are various theories on how gradual reunification will take place. For example, The Lee Myung-bak government’s “Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness” initiative suggests a paradigm of a mutually beneficial inter-Korean relationship. It shows the Lee government’s commitment to encourage the North Korean leaders to realize that pursuing economic growth by opening its regime is the only way to ensure the regime security, as well as peace and prosperity. In addition, the Lee government argues that the “Vision 3000” is designed to prepare a foundation for peaceful unification. When the North and the South achieve the annual per capita income of \$3,000 and \$40,000 dollars respectively, both Koreas can minimize prospective social shocks and budget in the case of unification. Raising the North’s annual per capita income up to the level of \$3,000 dollars within 10 years will make the North Korean economy ready for unification.

The other scenario comes from pessimism on the future of North Korea. When North Korea’s muddling through strategy breaks down, North Korea could face failure, collapse, and for most observers, absorption by the South. The so-called North Korean "contingency"

can be defined as a "state of anarchy, or an overall paralysis of governing and administrative powers internally and externally, compounded by a weakened concentration of military power." In short, it coincides with the concept of "state collapse." A North Korean contingency is highly likely to take place when regime unity is undermined and the people's disaffection with the regime escalates to the point of a danger line; once they surpass the "tipping point," the situation is expected to deteriorate rapidly.

Against this backdrop, unification could come overnight, but that does not mean we have the luxury of waiting until North Korea collapses. On the contrary, a proactive strategy is required so that denuclearization and a permanent peace regime may be realized on the peninsula. In addition, all of the countries in Northeast Asia should make efforts to share the common vision with respect to the security architecture in Northeast Asia. The most realistic vision is that U.S.-led alliances will be coexisting with a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (NEAPSM). When we share the common vision, particularly after Korean reunification, we can expect genuine cooperation from China in the effort to resolve the North Korean question let alone the nuclear problem. Finally, we need to prepare for North Korean contingency. A North Korean contingency will highly likely to escalate into a knotty situation depending on the responses of neighboring countries, each of which has disparate strategic interests vis-à-vis the Korean peninsula. The possibility of a North Korean contingency calls for extensive analysis and planning; only then will we be able to minimize the ripple effects in the region and bring about the unification of the Korean peninsula.

II. Peace Regime-Building on the Korean Peninsula

The most updated North Korean position toward peace regime was highlighted through its Foreign Ministry statement on January 11, 2010. "For the sake of reinvigorating denuclearization process on the Korean peninsula, we should pay the primary attention to promoting trust between DPRK and the United States. To that end, we should establish a peace treaty that will put an end to the state of war that is the fundamental reason for the hostile relationship. If we had established a durable peace regime on the Korean peninsula, the nuclear problem would not have happened...." Here we can find two important points.

One is that North Korea argues a peace treaty between North Korea and U.S. should be a precondition for denuclearization on the Korean peninsula. The other point is that North Korea defines a durable peace regime as the establishment of a peace treaty between itself and U.S.

With respect to the position toward peace regime, there are two major stakeholders (schools) in South Korea: (1) school of North Korea sympathizers; and (2) school of alliance supporters. The school of North Korea, who mainly consists of opposition parties, labor unions, and pro-North Korean NGOs, tend to argue that peace regime-building should be a precondition for the denuclearization of North Korea. They support the North Korean argument that the hostile environment North Korea is faced with should be changed so that North Korea may no longer need nuclear weapons. However, they are divided over the ways of changing the hostile environment: some support the North Korea-U.S. peace treaty while others support inter-Korean peace treaty that is to be followed by the North Korea-U.S. peace treaty. But, they are not different in the sense that they put peace-regime building before the denuclearization of North Korea. Once the North Korea nuclear problem is resolved, they argue, the status of ROK-U.S. alliance will be changed to reflect a new reality.

On the other hand, the school of alliance, who consists of the governing party, a right-wing opposition party, and big businesses, argue that the denuclearization of North Korea should be a precondition for a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula. They firmly believe that the closest policy coordination between ROK and U.S. is the most effective mechanism to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem, and once the North Korean nuclear problem is resolved, a peace regime on the Korean peninsula will be realized as an end state. Here we can see that the school of alliance defines a durable peace regime in a broad manner, which means it is not just confined to a peace treaty but expanded to include denuclearization of North Korea, U.S.-North Korea / Japan-North Korea normalization of relations, and the construction of a NEAPSM (Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism). When they refer to a peace treaty, it means an inter-Korean peace treaty that could be endorsed by the U.S. and China. It seems that the Lee Myung-bak government is closer to the school of alliance since it believes that the ROK-U.S. alliance should be a primary mechanism to realize the North

Korean denuclearization and that a peace regime on the Korean peninsula will come after denuclearization.

One strategic approach to creating a peace regime on the Korean peninsula involves comprehensive and phased policy options ranging from a passive policy of maintaining the status quo to a proactive policy of working to create a durable peace mechanism. In a strict sense, this means that the basic concept for converting the armistice regime into a peace regime should be focused on creating a practical peace structure rather than the hasty conclusion of any peace agreement. Therefore, the creation of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula should be promoted with an emphasis on effectively countering the attempts by North Korea to render the armistice system powerless and to conclude a peace treaty with the United States. On the other, this should be done while easing tension and promoting confidence building through respect for the existing armistice regime and the implementation of the North-South Basic Agreement. In the long run, the two Koreas should institutionalize their peaceful coexistence by promoting confidence-building measures under the principle of resolving problems directly between the parties involved. In this way, the two Koreas should lay a foundation for peaceful unification in an environment conducive to “permanent peace.”

A political prerequisite for the creation of a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula involves an atmosphere of "political confidence-building." Confidence-building in the political realm between the two Koreas refers to a situation in which North Korea renounces any intention to engineer a subversive revolution in South Korea and agrees to abide by the spirit of the North-South Basic Agreement, while South Korea promotes an environment in which North Korea is convinced that the South has no intention to achieve unification through absorption of the North. Since military confrontation on the Korean peninsula reflects underlying political antagonism, military confidence-building will more easily follow suit once trust is developed in political relations. In addition, the priority focus for promoting confidence building in military relations involves prohibition of the development, possession and use of weapons of mass destruction. If either North or South Korea possesses or attempts to develop nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, this would shatter the political goal of peaceful coexistence and constitute a fundamental obstacle to the development of inter-Korean relations.

III. Envisioning a New Security Architecture in Northeast Asia

If strategic uncertainty prevails in Northeast Asia, reunification of the two Koreas could face a lot of obstacles. In this light, all of the countries in the region should make efforts to share the common vision with respect to the security architecture in Northeast Asia. The most realistic vision is that U.S.-led alliances will be coexisting with a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism as we are already witnessing the coexistence between NATO and OSCE in Europe. More than anybody else, South Korea could play a constructive role in envisioning a new security architecture since it has excellent relationships with China, Japan, and Russia although it is an ally of the United States. Only when all of the countries in the region share the common vision, can we expect genuine cooperation from China in the effort to resolve the North Korean question let alone the nuclear problem.

Moving Toward a Strategic ROK-U.S. Alliance

President George W. Bush and President Lee Myung-bak announced their vision of a “strategic alliance” at Camp David on April 18, 2008. The strategic alliance declared by the two leaders means the alliance will go beyond the Korean Peninsula and expand its scope of cooperation to the Asia Pacific region and the world. With the military cooperation at the center (particularly on the Korean Peninsula), the countries should closely cooperate and create exchanges in politics, diplomacy, economies, and culture. However, the strategic alliance does not mean a “globalization” of the ROK-U.S. military alliance since South Korea, unlike the United States, is yet to have the capability to commit itself to global issues militarily.

Presidents Lee and Obama also agreed that the geo-strategic range of the ROK-US alliance should not be limited to the Korean peninsula. They also agreed that, in addition to deterring the 19th-century-style hegemonic struggle between China and Japan, the alliance should be a strategic deterrent against new threats of the 21st century: terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, drugs, illegal immigration and piracy, among others. During the June 16 summit meeting, both leaders signed on a vision statement entitled ‘the Joint Vision for the Alliance of the

United States of America and the Republic of Korea.’ The most impressive and conspicuous sentence in the statement is that “Through our alliance we aim to build a better future for all people on the Korean Peninsula, establishing a durable peace on the Peninsula and leading to peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy.” This signifies two things: 1) The ROK-U.S. alliance is an alliance of shared values; and 2) The ROK-U.S. alliance is an alliance for peace-building and Korean reunification.

From a Korean perspective, one advantage of a strategic ROK-U.S. alliance would be for mediating the interests of major powers during the process of unification. As was seen in the case of the unification of Germany where the U.S. was the go-between for the U.K., France and Russia, the U.S. will be an important mediator between neighboring powers during the unification process on the Korean peninsula. In addition, the strategic alliance can work as protection against possible foreign interference after unification. A unified Korea, which will need enormous resources to rebuild the northern region, will remain at a disadvantage to Japan and China for a long time—recalling the case of Germany, it could be more than 20 years. Thus, a unified Korea will desperately need protection—i.e., a Korean-U.S. strategic alliance—against unwelcome interference from its neighbors.

Making Bilateral Alliances Compatible with NEAPSM

In Northeast Asia, bilateral security arrangements will remain the backbone of Northeast Asian security for a considerable period of time. This means a strategic thinking based on realism is still necessary in order to foster the basis for multilateral security cooperation. Despite the strategic uncertainty and prevailing bilateralism, Northeast Asia needs to search for a multilateral arrangement like a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (NEAPSM). In this light, Six-Party Talks (SPT) need to be kept alive, since the existing norms and procedures within the SPT will be used to deal with new problems. This means the countries need to rely on historical institutionalism. A Northeast Asian peace and security mechanism should take the following points into consideration.

First, a Northeast Asian peace and security mechanism should be seen as a supplement,

rather than as a substitute for the system of bilateralism in the region, for a considerable period of time. Bilateralism and multilateralism, even trilateralism, are not mutually exclusive concepts. Second, U.S. attention toward Asia should be "restored" either by expanding the security role of APEC or by its participation in EAS. Among 27 EU member states, 21 states are NATO members, which means the United States should actively pursue Asia Pacific regionalism, while going beyond its traditional "hub-and-spoke" approach to expand its alliance network in Asia. Third, China should create an image of championing of East Asian regionalism plus(+), not minus(-), while Japan should be reminded of Former Prime Minister Obuchi's "human security diplomacy." In the meantime, Japan and South Korea should set a role model for human security cooperation. Fourth, Northeast Asia should reinforce the forging of a credible sub-regional CSBM mechanism. Examples include greater transparency in force modernization and enhanced coordination regarding non-traditional security threat.

Finally, a Northeast Asian peace and security mechanism should be pursued in a way which is consistent with and conducive to the progress on the North Korean nuclear problem. A charter of the NEAPSM emphasizing multilateral security cooperation and non-aggression could be used by North Korea to legitimize its nuclear power status. Tangible progress in inter-Korean relations should thus be the precondition to guaranteeing the stability of Northeast Asia. For South and North Korea, participation in such a multilateral security mechanism could contribute to establishing a solid peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

There were significant differences between the security environments in Europe and Asia. Northeast Asia was faced with a dual challenge, stemming from existing traditional security threats as well as new ones. Although it might be premature to replicate the OSCE process and experience directly in Northeast Asia, the OSCE experience provided a useful lesson for addressing the region's dual challenges. In particular, the OSCE's experience with the CSBM regime could serve as an important reference, *mutatis mutandis*, for building upon multilateral dialogue and mutual trust, bearing in mind the unique situation in Northeast Asia. Northeast Asia needs to make extra efforts to enhance international cooperation on addressing new security threats, including terrorism, trafficking in human beings and natural disasters. In

that regard, the role of OSCE missions and other field activities in managing conflict could serve as a valuable reference for the region.

IV. Preparing for North Korean Contingency

The South Korean government's position is that it does not want unification through absorption. However, if the situation is such that unification through absorption is the only alternative available, it would be reasonable for South Korea to take a positive approach and aspire for unification, even if it means taking some risks. The thrust of South Korea's unification diplomacy with respect to a North Korean contingency would be to convince neighboring countries that a unified Korea's foreign policy will not pose threats to neighboring countries or undermine the regional order by any means. Some academics and pundits in South Korea have contended that "Japan opposes Korean unification" or "China is opposed to unification." These allegations, however, are not useful at all for achieving the unification of the Korean peninsula. The problem is how South Korea convinces Japan and China that Korean unification will not undermine their interests in any way.

A North Korean contingency is a situation unique to the Korean peninsula; at the same time, it is a universal problem that can have impact on the international community. South Korea is highly likely to be the worst victim of a North Korean contingency. Above all, if an explosion occurs, the perfect status quo will be impossible. In short, as long as the North Korean regime lives on, it will be difficult to prevent the recurrence of war.

In this context, South Korea needs to win the support and cooperation of the outside world, including that of the interested parties. Yet, South Korea's leading role must not be sacrificed by foreign powers' excessive or unnecessary intervention. Above all, China's intervention has the potential of in effect prolonging the division of the Korean peninsula. In a worst case scenario, it is even possible for the Korea peninsula to be trifurcated into a pro-China region, a neutral region, and South Korea. In this vein, South Korea urgently needs to minimize China's intervention, no matter what. Likewise, America's rash or excessive military intervention or entry into North Korean territory may well trigger China's intervention,

exacerbate the situation, or spread the ill effects of the situation. South Korea, therefore, should seek U.S. understanding and cooperation so that the latter's actions are preceded by cooperation with its ally, South Korea.

A North Korean contingency will require international cooperation and support, even if it is just to address the mass exodus of refugees and hostage situations and perform humanitarian relief operations. The mass exodus of refugees and humanitarian relief activities, in particular, will likely exceed South Korea's capacity. Hence, South Korea will need support from international organizations and a number of countries. International endorsement and support for South Korea's position will be vital if South Korea is to minimize neighboring nations' negative intervention, for example China's unilateral actions, and ramifications thereof. The international community's support and cooperation are important assets that are only second to cooperation with the United States. Hence, South Korea must maximize its diplomatic capacity to win the international community's support and cooperation.

V. Policy Consideration

Strengthening ROK-US-Japan Cooperation

The most pressing task regarding ROK-US-Japan cooperation is to reduce the possibility of friction among the three countries and work out a North Korea strategy based on their common interests. To that end, the three nations must first confirm their shared set of policy goals vis-à-vis North Korea and fine-tune their approaches to attaining those goals. They should understand that only those policies that are coordinated between South Korea and the United States or among South Korea, the United States, and Japan will be effective with regard to most North Korean issues raised recently, namely the nuclear and missile issues, the peace regime issue, a possible contingency, possible armed aggression, mass exodus of people, inter-Korean dialogue, and the improvement of US–North Korea or Japan–North Korea relations.

To establish a successful trilateral cooperative system, the three countries need a policy

whereby they first find common denominators in their interests in the North Korean question and then seek to fulfill those interests through cooperation. In fact, South Korea's North Korea policy interests are not too different from those of the United States and Japan. South Korea's North Korea policy interests are to deter North Korea's military threats, such as by resolving the WMD issue, and stabilize without any commotion North Korea's critical situation, drawing out North Korea's change and gradually laying a foundation for unification in the process. These coincide with U.S. and Japanese interests. Furthermore, South Korea's interests in effect will best be guaranteed when they are pursued in concert with the United States and Japan, rather than by its own.

In addition, those three countries need to formulate a comprehensive set of methods of cooperation to prepare for a contingency, such as military cooperation among the three nations, material support, handling of refugees, evacuation of noncombat personnel, prevention of foreign powers' intervention, restoration of order in North Korea, diplomatic cooperation, and information exchange, and build a cooperative system to that end. In the meantime, ROK-US-Japan cooperation is symbolically important for drawing out China's support. China is North Korea's ally, but its prosperity is largely reliant on its economic ties with South Korea as well as economic relationships with the United States and Japan. In this vein, ROK-US-Japan cooperation may serve as crucial leverage for winning China's understanding.

Preventive Diplomacy vis-à-vis China

South Korea, the United States, and Japan should conduct preventive diplomacy toward China and Russia by taking proactive steps, not reactive steps. To that end, the three nations should be aware of two issues before they start to persuade China. First, China's foremost strategic priority on the Korean peninsula is the maintenance of peace and stability. Second, in China's mind, an ideal unified Korea peninsula would be wealthy and maintain neutrality at a minimum. South Korea and the United States need to convince China that the ROK-US alliance is conducive to these very two Chinese objectives.

South Korea needs to stress that the unification of the Korean peninsula will guarantee a prosperous Korean peninsula, and that that, in turn, will benefit China's national development in the long term. It needs to convey to the Chinese that, if they wish for a unified Korea to maintain neutrality, the North and South Korean people must not perceive China as a stumbling block to North-South unification. Seoul needs to remind Beijing that Germans in the post-unification era do not by any means think highly of the former Soviet Union's support to East Germany for more than four decades following World War II.

ROK-US-China Strategic Dialogue

At present, it appears that there are more shared than conflicting interests between China and the United States in regard to the Korean peninsula. It does not seem inevitable, therefore, that the two countries will clash over Korea in the near future. Nonetheless, Korea will undoubtedly be influenced by developments in China-U.S. relations. There is no evidence that China's North Korea policy has been directly affected by China-U.S. relations. South Korea and the United States, however, do need China's cooperation to resolve North Korea's nuclear and missile development problems. A positive and cooperative China-U.S. relationship is thus essential for a smooth transition toward a unified Korea let alone peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas.

Given the nature of the international system, great powers focus more on the broader stability of the international system or the negative ramifications of the international system's instability than on local interests. We cannot rule out the possibility that the United States and China may already have formed a significant strategic consensus on the Korean peninsula question, particularly regarding the future of North Korea. Washington and Beijing understand that the North Korean question, multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, and a possible change in the Northeast Asian order in a post-North Korean nuclear era are factors for bilateral cooperation and at the same time sources of conflict and rivalry. In this context, the two countries are probably engaged in a close strategic dialogue on the future of the Korean peninsula. In order to transform a North Korean contingency into the unification of the Korean peninsula, South Korea must ensure that the US-China approach is

not a "conspiracy" between two great powers but that the two countries can become helpers and cooperators in the birth of a "South Korea-led unified Korean peninsula that is stable and wealthy." For that reason alone, an ROK-US-China trilateral strategic dialogue is in order, no matter what the format. If South Korea does not want the US-China approach to amount to a "conspiracy" between two great powers, it will need to promote mutual understanding and build a strategic consensus through a ROK-US-China trilateral strategic dialogue.

**Together we prosper:
Structural imperatives for Korea-China cooperation on integration**

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Words like ‘unification,’ ‘integration’ for a long divided-nation only can be received by neighboring states with great sensitivity and suspicions. It is particularly the case if the integration question is not met with prior consultation, planning, and therefore, consensus and understanding, not to mention alternatives to changes in power distribution and structure. Regardless of the degree of the impact that an integrated Korea might have on the international structure, the integration *per se* will inherently entail strategic and structural consequences. Korea’s reunification will mean fundamental changes to the status quo, equilibrium in the balance of power, the current power distribution, and therefore, power configuration, as well as the order and structure of the current international system of the region. These implications will require the neighboring states to meet such challenges by amending their strategies and adjusting policies to not only the Korean peninsula but also North-East Asia.

Since the major powers of the Korean peninsula as well as the two Koreas do not seem to have alternative policy choices readily available in hand to effectively confront these challenges, they are most likely to get caught off guards. The main subject of unification, the two Koreas, is void of strategic countermeasures to such changes, and so are the neighboring states, the US, China, Japan, and Russia. The underlying implications of Korean unification will not be as imminent and pressing to such geographically and physically distant states as the US and Russia, as they would be to China and Japan. Regardless, the so-called major powers must also take a more proactive approach to integration question, and have concrete, constructive, and realistic policy options readily available.

Of all the major powers, China and Japan would be particularly of a nation with great concerns because of its geographic proximity. Without advanced arrangements so as to

effectively greet the unification of the Korean peninsula, the neighboring states would not be too fond of the idea of Korea's integration. They will not be too excited about the prospect of Korea's unification without having prior consensus with others including Korea. It is conceivable by reading their concerns and policy on Korea's unification.

While China, for instance, openly and publicly acknowledges the benefits and advantages that Korea's unification might bring to her as well as the region as a whole will be much larger than the costs and other negative consequences, it stipulates that the unification must be autonomous and independently realized by the Korean people without foreign intervention. China's policy line on the unification of Korea implies that Korea must be able to present a substantive plan as to how it will manage and solve, for instance, structural implications arising from unification as China might foresee. What will Korea as a sovereign state do with the question of American military presence in the post-unification? How will Korea, and with what measures, assure China that it will not become a strategic fortress of the US against China and it will respect its territorial integrity by effectively controlling so-called 'pan-Korean aspiration'?

Those who gathered here might have a better understanding on that post-unification Korean government and people will not pursue 'pan-Korean' aspiration to reclaim China's northern territory for one simple reason. Both Korea and China are well aware it is senseless to make claims of ownership to territories whose sovereignty is already defined. We also know better that China welcomes unification as long as it is realized independently and autonomously without foreign intervention and only by the Korean people. The same logic is also well found in other powers' policy regarding the unification question. However, there is an emerging concern among the Koreans in reading their stance: powers may take the collapse of the North to the UNSC, if all decide not to adopt unilateral intervention, alas the trusteeship in the early years of the post-war period. Hence, sufficient policy planning in advance by the Korean government will make Koreans less skeptical and critical with their perception on China's Korea unification policy. Mutual suspicion and distrust can all be worked out by the two nations, both individually and bilaterally. To further facilitate their

trust and confidence, for instance, the two nations can first discuss and consult on possible policy co-operation regarding prospective North Korean refugees, for instance.

The heart to the matter, however, much looms larger in the context of world politics. Will Korean government be able to advance any kind, any form of pre-arrangement in collaboration with others to sufficiently meet the demands of structural changes arising from unification? If not, there is no doubt that the major powers would like to see the status quo of the peninsula to persist. The status quo preserves balance of power, meaning stability and security (or peace) is very much secured. Interests of the major powers are also well met by the status quo. American primacy is well served, Japanese security well secured, and the ultimate goal of Chinese foreign policy underlined by peace and stability in the periphery is well realized. The consequences of integrated Korea would be contrary, especially if integration were met without effective planning. American primacy in the region will be undermined because of subsequent restructuring in alliance with Korea. With uncertainties arising from integration, China's foreign policy goal in the region will be jeopardized.

Since Korea and the major powers are all concerned parties of the unification, the imperatives for cooperation between the two sides are predicated upon the geographical proximity as well as geostrategic interests. In perspective, the two parties must work together and come up with alternatives to the changing equilibrium in the power balance, shift in power distribution, and newly forging international structure. For Korea, to get support from the neighboring states, it must plan ahead for integration to be an autonomous and self-determined consequence. For the neighboring states, they must have close consultation with Korea in planning its nation-building efforts. It would have to include such sensitive issues as an alternative to American alliance and security question of an integrated Korea. Korea otherwise may have to continue to rely on a policy of "Leaning to one side (*yibiandao*)," and that side has to be the US, which may not serve the interests of others including China and Russia.

The integration of the two Koreas will have to evoke the balance of power in the North-East Asian region, and Northeast Asia in particular. Without proper planning in advance, the

prospects for all the positive assessments on the effects of integration, i.e. peace and prosperity, will not be too sanguine. The integration, instead, will be full of uncertainties and conflicts, only to intensify distrust, misunderstanding, and misperception. Thank you.

구조적 운명: 한중협력과 통일

주재우

경희대 교수

중국인 한반도의 최대 이웃국가이자 국경선을 공유하는 나라이다. 그리고 동북아시아에서의 평화와 안정의 추구를 외교정책의 기초로 삼고 있는 나라이다. 중국에게 한반도 통일문제는 상당한 지정학적, 전략적 의미를 내포하고 있다. 가장 비근한 예로 한반도 통일은 이른바 ‘세력균형’의 근본적 변화를 유발하기 때문에 동북아시아의 권력배분, 권력구조에 변화가 발생하고 이는 동북아의 국제질서의 변화도 불러 일으킬 것이다. 그러므로 한반도통일은 기타 강대국과 마찬가지로 중국의 외교정책에 상당한 변화와 조정, 그리고 전략적 수정을 요구할 수밖에 없는 결과를 초래할 것이다. 주지하듯이 중국이 ‘현상유지(status quo)’를 추구하는 국가로 한반도통일에 대비하지 않은 상황에서 한반도의 통일을 반기지 않을 것이고 원하지도 않을 것이다. 이 경우를 대비하여 우리는 여타 이웃국가와 함께 중국과 이에 대비할 수 있는 공조체제를 마련하고 대비책을 공동으로 논의해야 할 것이다.

중국인 한반도의 통일문제 처리 원칙을 일찍이 세운 나라 중 하나다. 즉, 한반도통일이 한국인이 독립적으로, 자주적인 결단으로 외세의 간섭 없이 실현하면 지지하겠다는 원칙이다. 그러나 우리 국민은 이를 중국이 한반도통일을 원하지 않는 것으로 해석하고 있다. 그리고 우리는 북한 붕괴 시 중국이 이를 유엔안보리의 의제로 상정해 우리의 국운을 외세의 손에 맡길 것으로 이해하고 있다. 반면 중국은 통일 한국의 영향력이 자국의 동북지역에까지 확대되는 것을 우려하고 있다. 이 모든 것을 종합하면 한반도가 통일로 가는데 양국 간의 신뢰가 부족하다는 것으로 귀결된다.

한반도통일문제는 남북한 간 뿐 아니라 주변국가와의 신뢰가 전제되어야 할 것이다. 이런 신뢰를 구축하기 위해서는 우리가 한반도통일에 대한 정확한 비전을 가지고 신뢰구축을 위한 이니셔티브를 걸어야 할 것이다. 이의 명제는 통일에 대한 대비가 이루어진 상황에서 한반도통일이 국제질서의 급격한 변화나 혼란을 야기하지 않기 때문에 중국 외교정책의 기본 목적인 주변 국제환경의 안정과 평화를 위해하지 않는다는 것이다. 그리고 중국이 우려하는 통일 후 한반도의 미군주둔문제 역시 이런 신뢰구축과정에서 우리의 보장과 보증으로 논의되고 해결될 수 있을 것이다. 중국이 우리와 통일에 대한 대비를 논하지 않고 통일을 맞게 된다면 우리는 결국 중국식 표현대로 이른바 미국 ‘일변도’로 갈 수밖에 없을 것이다.

준비된 통일은 중국의 국익을 보호할 것이고 미국의 전략적 이익(동아시아에서의 주도적 위치), 그리고 일본의 안보를 지켜줄 것이다. 그렇지 않으면 통일로 인해 필연적으로 발생하는 동북아의 구조적 변화는 역내 질서를 붕괴시키고 혼란만 더욱 가중시켜 중국의 국익은 물론 미국의 전략적 이익에 타격을 줄 것이고 일본의 불안만 증폭시킬 것이다. 그러므로 이런 구조적 변화에 대비하는 한국과 주변국 간의 공동으로 통일을 대비하는 공조체제가 신뢰의 바탕에서 마련되어야 할 것이다.

Integration of the Korean Peninsula

Session 2:

Session 2: Integration of the Korean Peninsula: Articulation of the Regional and International Cooperation

Chair

Yim, Sung-Joon (Former Senior Presidential Secretary for
Diplomatic and Security Affairs)

Presentation

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Korean Unification: Turning a Conflict Zone into a Hub of East Asian Prosperity

Yoon Young-kwan (Seoul National University)

1. Why should we talk about Korean unification now?

Since the Cold War ended through the German reunification in 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the dynamics of international politics has radically changed. The impact of the seismic change of international politics was equivalent to the historic legacies of the Napoleonic War or the Second World War. However, Korean Peninsula still remains divided along the line of ideologies and inter-Korean relations remains no less confrontational than it was in the Cold War years.

Why did this discrepancy between the post-Cold War international order and the Cold War inter-Korean order last so long? It was mainly because all of Korea's neighboring countries as well as the two Koreas themselves were satisfied with the status quo on the Korean Peninsula. Korea's neighboring countries wanted stability on the Peninsula and no disruption of international balance of power surrounding Korean Peninsula. South Korea also adopted a gradualist approach and did not want a sudden unification, in fear of a possible military conflict and huge economic burdens. North Korea too has been trying hard to survive despite economic difficulties and diplomatic isolation due to its own nuclear program. Thus, all the parties wanted a status quo on the Korean Peninsula.

However, contrary to the wishes of the related parties, the status quo on the Korean Peninsula seems more and more untenable as time goes by. Although all the neighboring countries of Korea and even most Korean people may prefer a gradualist approach, the possibility of a sudden change seems to become even higher, as the North Korean system seems to be failing as a result of its leaders' own making. Let me briefly enumerate a few factors which are causing increasing instability in North Korea and on the Korean Peninsula as a whole.

First, North Korean economy is in a dire state. Its economic system needs a transition toward a market economy. History of Eastern Europe and China has already proved that centrally-controlled planned economy is doomed to fail. Even though North Korea cannot be an exception, the North Korean leader seems to think otherwise and tries to crush market mechanism which he reluctantly tolerated after the devastating famine in the mid-1990s. For example, the “currency reform” of November 2009 turned out to be a total failure. Media reported that a high-level North Korean government official formally apologized for the policy mistakes to the people and a key figure responsible for implementing the “currency reform” had been executed. Political tension between the power elites and the ordinary residents seems to be heightening due to futile government efforts to smash market mechanism.

It is reported that ordinary North Koreans are saying that they would be willing to stop transactions in the market only if their government can provide them with something to eat and wear. But the North Korean government cannot acquire enough materials to distribute to the people. It is true that North Korean residents would not dare to organize mass riots for fear of ruthless suppression. However, according to North Korean refugees living in Seoul, the loyalty of the residents to the regime and its leader has been significantly weakened.

Second, the leadership succession is another factor for increasing instability in North Korea. After Chairman Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in the fall of 2008, there seems to be a succession process handed down from Kim Jong-il to his son Kim Jung-un. The problem for Kim Jung-un is that, unlike his father, he has never taken intensive training to become the leader, and is just under 30 years of age. It is widely expected that there will be a collective leadership centered around Kim Jung-un in the post-Kim Jong-il era. However, it is highly uncertain whether this kind of new leadership system will be as stable and effective as the old one in facing so many serious domestic and external challenges ahead.

Third, North Korea’s isolation from international society will deepen as long as North Korea does not give up its nuclear development program. Although they may want to be recognized as a nuclear power by the international society and then get economic and political assistance from the West, as Pakistan did in the past, they will not succeed. According to the U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, “North Korea is not Pakistan.” International isolation and economic sanction will further deteriorate

North Korea's economic situation.

Each of these factors will not be a sufficient cause for a regime or system collapse in North Korea. However, if all these factors operate simultaneously in combination with a certain fortuitous factor like a natural disaster, then an uncontrollable situation may lead to a radical change in North Korea. In that case, even if the Koreans and the neighboring countries may want a status quo, history may unfold itself in Korea as it did in Germany in 1990 and in the Soviet Union in 1991. This is why we have to think about the issue of Korean unification now.

2. Korea's Position on the Unification Issue

Unification has long been a cherished national desire for all the Koreans. However, as to the method of achieving this goal, there has been a difference between the South and the North. While the North was willing to use force to unify with the South, as we witnessed in the early 1950s, most of the South Koreans want a peaceful unification. This is why South Korean governments have adopted a functionalist approach to unification and have been trying to engage North Korea in various ways. However, whether this engagement policy will succeed or not will depend on North Korea's decision. So far, the North Korean leaders seem to prefer just cash transfer from the South instead of trying a gradual but genuine reform of their economic system.

Most South Koreans, in my view, also understand that the unified Korea should keep the international norm of nuclear non-proliferation. Not only should the process leading to unification be peaceful, but the new state of united Korea should contribute to international peace in Northeast Asia. Most South Koreans also recognize that all the neighboring countries want a denuclearized Peninsula. Thus, in the case of a sudden change in North Korea, South Koreans will cooperate with the international society to remove and dismantle weapons of mass destruction located in North Korea. The fact that South Koreans want a peaceful unification and denuclearized Korea will be an important positive factor for Korea's neighboring countries and the international society.

Another principle which most Koreans regard as essential and should be applied in the process of unification is the principle of self-determination. Although

South and North Korea have been in confrontation with each other since the division of Korea in the 1940s, the two Koreas did not differ in their views about the principle of self-determination. Some might say that both Koreas have been members of the United Nations since 1991. However, both Koreas have long agreed that the inter-Korean relation is not a state-to-state relation. The Basic Agreement of 1991 between the South and the North, probably the most important document between the two Koreas, defines inter-Korean relations not as “a relationship as between the states,” but as “a special one constituted temporarily in the process of unification.”¹ The constitutions of both South and North Korea also regulate that the whole Korean Peninsula is their own territory.

This does not mean that the South Koreans would intervene in internal affairs of North Korea prematurely and imprudently before the final moment of contingency situation. Contingency situation may be defined as an anarchic and chaotic situation in North Korea in which the state mechanism does not function and cannot control over the people (state failure, not leadership or regime failure) causing serious domestic/international security, humanitarian, political, and economic problems. However, in such an urgent, final moment of North Korean contingency, the right of the Korean people to decide their own future should be respected by neighboring countries and the international society. As China adopted the One China policy, Korea’s One Korea policy should be respected by the international society. The fact that the two Koreas are separate members of the United Nations should not be interpreted by external powers as an excuse for pursuing two Koreas on the Peninsula permanently.

3. Korean Unification and the International Society

As explained above, there may come a moment when unification of Korea will be unavoidable whether the international society likes it or not. If that is the case, how can we make Korean unification contribute to peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia and the national interests of the four neighboring countries?

One important concern for neighboring countries may be which direction the new

¹ Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea, effective February 19, 1992. (<http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eg/index.htm>.)

unified Korea will move toward. In my view, the unified Korea should be a denuclearized, democratic, trading state. It should become a country like the Netherlands in Europe rather than becoming like Israel. The Netherlands is a relatively small country compared with its neighbors but is a thriving hub of European commerce and transportation contributing to economic prosperity of Western Europe. Similarly, the united Korea's geographical location surrounded by three big nations of Russia, China, and Japan, and its ally, the U.S., will provide a good condition for becoming a hub of international commerce, transportation, and culture in East Asia. Korea will be no more a focal point of security conflict as it used to be in the last several decades, but a new commercial hub which will deepen the network of interdependence by linking each nation commercially and culturally in Northeast Asia.

Let me briefly explain how a new unified Korea can benefit each country in Northeast Asia. From Japan's point of view, disappearance of security threat of North Korea's nuclear and missile development will be a great contribution to her national security. Unified Korea's pursuit of denuclearization will further satisfy the Japanese desire, regardless of whether the recent shift of foreign policy initiated by Prime Minister Hatoyama endures or not.

Also, economic construction projects in the North will provide an important opportunity for Japanese investments. Advanced technology and geographical proximity of Japan to North Korea will be a comparative advantage for Japanese enterprises which are interested in investing in the North. Furthermore, if we build an underground tunnel connecting Korea and Japan, the Japanese will be able to transport their export goods much faster to Europe and Russia via Korea through railroads.

For Russia also, unification of Korea will bring about very important opportunities for economic development of Siberia. Development of Siberia has been an important issue on Russia's national agenda for some time. If Korea becomes united, it means the most important hurdle against the idea of connecting the trans-Siberian railroad to trans-Korean railroad will disappear. Although the Russian government wanted to start the project as soon as possible, there was no progress at all, mainly due to lack of cooperation from North Korea. However, once united, Korea will probably start the project soon, since it will have to rebuild railroad system in the North anyway. If the underground tunnel is built between Korea and Japan, Russia will also benefit from it much.

Building a pipeline for energy transportation between Russia and Korea has been a topic for frequent discussions among specialists in the recent decades. Again, North Korea was not willing to cooperate on this matter. However, the government of the unified Korea will be considering this project seriously, mainly because acquiring energy supply will continue to be one of the most important issues on the national agenda for Korea. Perhaps building a gas pipeline between Sakhalin and a few major cities of Korea will be one of the first priorities for the Korean government.

China has long supported stability of North Korea for quite understandable reasons. Serious instability in North Korea may cause several major problems for China. First, China may fear that there would be a mass inflow of North Korean refugees at a time of crisis. However, there will be ways to handle the refugee problem. For example, Korean and international investments in rebuilding the economy of the North will create jobs and make it unnecessary for the North Koreans to move abroad. The Korean government will also have to consider providing the North Koreans with such incentives as land and housing ownership to those who promise not to leave their home villages and towns.

Second, China has been concerned about possible unsettling of China's Korean minorities in Northeast provinces. In the past, especially immediately after the diplomatic normalization between South Korea and China in 1992, there were some South Koreans who were insensitive about the Chinese concern on this possibility. However, nowadays, most Koreans tend to regard this as a legitimate concern for the Chinese government. Once united, I think most Koreans will be prudent and careful on this sensitive issue.

From an economic perspective, it would be in China's interest if the Korean Peninsula transforms itself from a region of lasting instability toward a region of burgeoning commercial activities. It is especially so, since domestic economic development and creation of a favorable international environment will continue to be the most important agenda for China in coming decades. In particular, the Chinese government has been trying to stimulate economic development of Northeast China since the region lags behind the Southeast provinces economically. A newly unified and actively trading nation in Korea will be able to facilitate economic development through linking that region to Korea and Japan through various commercial and transportation networks.

China may also be concerned about the role of the U.S. troops in the process of unification and stationing of the U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula after unification. In my personal view, the regular U.S. troops should not enter into the North at the time contingency. However, with agreements from China and South Korea, the U.S. may send a small number of special technical troops into the North to dispose the weapons of mass destruction. Weapons of mass destruction in North Korea have been major concerns not only for the U.S. and South Korea but also for China. Thus, there may be room for mutual cooperation among the three nations on this issue.

The Korea-U.S. alliance will have to be readjusted in consideration of the new international situation caused by Korea's unification. The form and function of the alliance will be restructured. For example, in the new situation of the Korean Peninsula after the unification, I would recommend that the U.S. troops not be stationed in the North of the 38th parallel and even the number of U.S. troops in the South be significantly reduced.

For the U.S., unification of Korea will mean the resolution of one of the most difficult national security problems, that is, North Korea's nuclear development. For the last two decades, the U.S. government has been struggling with this problem without much result. Resolution of the North Korean nuclear development problem will contribute to the strengthening of the NPT regime which is one of key foreign policy goals for the U.S.

Furthermore, unification of Korea may enable the U.S. to reduce the number of troops stationed in East Asia, which will reduce the economic and strategic burden for the U.S. The U.S. troops have been stretched thinly all over the world. Unification of Korea will be a favorable new development for the U.S. when it is struggling to reduce huge budget deficits after the global economic crisis of 2007.

4. Need for International Cooperation

In this way, Korean unification can be beneficial for all major actors in Northeast Asia from a medium- and long-term perspective. However, to realize the benefits of the Korean unification, we need a strong international cooperation. There will be a few major and immediate problems that will be difficult to resolve for the

Koreans alone. Let me name just a few of these problems.

First, how to locate and dismantle weapons of mass destruction is a very important issue for all the countries in the region and the international society. In this age of rampant terrorism, the danger of loose nuclear materials cannot be overemphasized. In order to resolve this issue, there should be close consultations among neighboring countries. In particular, there should be a very close consultation and coordination among Korea, China and the U.S.

Second, there may be a major humanitarian crisis occurring in the North as the result of an anarchical and chaotic situation. Properly tackling this problem also requires international coordination among governments, international organizations, and civil groups. In particular, the Korean government and the United Nations will have to cooperate closely. Experiences of state-building in Iraq and other regions may provide a meaningful guidance.

Third, how to finance economic rebuilding in the North will be another important matter. There should be huge investments in building infrastructure and factories and in providing social safety net for the individuals living in the North. The government of the unified Korea will have to do its best to mobilize domestic and international financial resources for this purpose. However, international cooperation will be crucial. Probably, we may need a Korean version of Marshall Plan.

In order to make Korean unification a positive-sum event for major actors in Northeast Asia, we need a close international cooperation to resolve these issues. We need close consultations and strategic dialogues among governments, NGOs, think-tanks, and specialists to discuss concrete ways to make Korean unification contribute to further promoting peace and prosperity of the region.

In conclusion, although the international society and the Korean people may want a status quo on the Korean Peninsula, they will also have to be prepared for the case of sudden unexpected changes in North Korea which may lead to the unification of the Korean Peninsula. A peacefully united Korea will become a positive asset for every major actor in Northeast Asia, instead of becoming a liability. The birth of a new Korea, which will be a denuclearized, democratic, and internationally trading state, will be able to strengthen the momentum for international economic prosperity and peace through

becoming a hub and facilitator of political and economic integration of East Asia. Pundits have observed that the center of economic gravity moved from the West to East Asia. Unification of Korea will be a boon in the process of this historic development.

THE KOREAN INTEGRATION: A CASE FOR A REGIONAL DIALOGUE IN TRUST

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To this day, Asia has grown in the spirit of solidarity, and the same should be true of the Korean integration. What most counts at this point is the establishment of a forum for the regional dialogue based upon mutual trust, and the spirit of cooperation, and the commencement of the actual dialogue. We all should train ourselves to perform dialogue in a world where the regionalism, well-rooted in trust and confidence, prevails. Multifaceted dialogues among governments, private research institutions, well-informed intellectuals, policy makers, and opinion leaders should unfold.

Every idea and proposition cannot be right at all times. No single idea can be preemptive, and free from faults. Yet there has to be a free market of ideas and efforts in the region, where such attempts can be subjected to collective supervision for identifying the best course of policy and action. Without the establishment of such a regime, and the exchange of ideas in advance, however, every unseasoned move has the danger of generating consequences harmful to all.

I

For some time and during last two decades more specifically, many have commonly expressed concerns on the issue of Korean unification. To the eyes of those who hold this view, the Korean integration is a threat, insecurity, expense, and even catastrophe.

Obstacles and threats in the process of the Korean integration, however, do not seem to lie much in the insecurity or possible confrontations in the transitional period. The real threat is in the lack of vision on the future of East Asia as a region, and the collective inexperience to settle differences through reason and regional dialogue. A dominant threat of all is the collective anxiety and lack of confidence in our capacity to handle regional problems by our own hands. The threat, in this regard, is the insufficiency of the experience to settle common problems through thinking, conversing, and solving together as a team.

Another threat is the want of free, innovative, and out-of-the-box thinking to solve old problems with fresh ideas and new perspectives. More woeful threat is the non-presence of those innovative groups that share such ideas and are determined to effectuate them through collective efforts. If all these concerns are real, then the Korean integration can be a threat.

The ultimate threat is an idea of regional governance rooted in ill-informed suspicion, distrust, defense, and lack of confidence. In a world where such mindset prevails, every player is forced to take options ultimately destructive to all. In this scenario, Korea is subjected to anxieties of possible isolation, insecurity, and foreign domination in the North, thus becomes tempted to secure the status quo through buying out the North, and to create “special” trade zones eventually to reach at a stalemate. China comes to prefer for the present situation to persist, and to stick to its traditional approach to the North, while suffering from the lack of its vision for the future order in Asia. In this classical picture, China is contained to such concerns that the mass exodus of North Koreans would cause enormous insecurity in the borderline; the integrity of China as a nation might be harmed by possible disruptions among minority ethnic groups; the possible northward advancement of US and South Korean army would pose threat to its military balance. Japan may be tempted to exert its best efforts

only to mitigate the impact of any change in the Korean peninsula, and try to keep its stance as a spectator, and not the concerned player.

Every state in this region maintains relatively stable forms of political governance when compared to their counterparts in others. Stability tends to yield preference for the status quo. Yet such a tendency results in the virtually non presence of essential policy directives suited to sudden changes, and may produce unexpected instabilities, quite to the contrary.

Preference for the present state of affairs, and unilateral approaches to the North will do no good to all eventually. Korea had created the Kae-Song industrial complex, and peace-making tourism directed to Kae-Song, and Kum-Gang Mountain. What it confronts now is the threat of confiscation of its property by the hands of the North, and the malfunction of any peaceful dispute resolution system. China, Russia as well, has been in unilateral economic engagement with the North, yet at the cost of overly burdensome assistance, and possible ultimate stalemate of the Korea's kind. North Korea appears to stick to its old divisive diplomacy, and to believe that the holding of nuclear weapon would render stability to its ruling system. The case of the Soviet Union, and its transformation to Russia, however, speaks so eloquently against it. The change of the former Union was not because it had less nuclear protection, but the people of Russia wished for more for their lives. Anything nuclear will not render expected help to the stability of the North, and would hamper the foundation for foreign investment to the contrary. Hence, the resulting instability.

Unilateralist approaches, in the scenario of sudden changes, would be neither desirable, nor effective. Such moves are even dangerous, for, at the point of collapse, the last opposition of the North would be primarily directed to South Korea, and China, rather the United States, or Japan. They cannot be regarded as wise choices in terms of legitimacy, and economic expense either. The possible resistance and antipathy of the North Koreans, against any intervention from outside, let alone those of its administration, could be much stronger and resilient than expected. The drain of population, arms, and industrial facilities would reach beyond the capacity of any unilateral intervention to control. The collapses of former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and the Eastern Europe are cases in point.

II

The world cannot afford the emergence of another Iraq, former Vietnam, or Afghanistan. Collective transitional management in association of the United Nations is an option. Even then, imperative is that Korea, as the bearer of primary responsibility, China, the United States, Japan, and Russia should play a key role.

In the process of integration and beyond, from today and on, regional consultation and conversation should actively progress on how to handle the scenario of integration; how to cope with the issue of mass movement of North Koreans; and how to redress and enhance the dire economic situation in the North. The involvement of the North is most welcome, yet if not feasible, dialogue in the spirit of solidarity, should commence at least among five concerned states.

Unilateral advancement into the North, whether political or economical, would exacerbate the situation and the issue of North Korea. Individual advantage will eventually turn out to be a disadvantage for all, including North Korea. For North Korea and all, a common market and stable institutional foundation for the protection of foreign investment are a must. In the process of establishing such a market, and industrial bases, the North will also be able to train itself toward the normalization of its relation to the outer world. A settled system of regional cooperation should continue to be at work throughout the process of integration, and extend to the time beyond. China rightly pays much attention to the positive side of regional cooperation, given its current effort regarding the six-party talks. Military option is neither desirable nor permissible. Simply none can afford that here and in the world.

To this day, Asia has grown in the spirit of solidarity, and the same should be true of the Korean integration. What most counts at this point is the establishment of a forum for the regional dialogue based upon mutual trust, and the spirit of cooperation, and the commencement of the actual dialogue. We all should train ourselves to perform dialogue in a world where the regionalism, well-rooted in trust and confidence, prevails. Multifaceted dialogues among governments, private research institutions, well-informed intellectuals,

policy makers, and opinion leaders should unfold.

Every idea and proposition cannot be right at all times. No single idea can be preemptive, and free from faults. Yet there has to be a free market of ideas and efforts in the region, where such attempts can be subjected to collective supervision for identifying the best course of policy and action. Without the establishment of such a regime, and the exchange of ideas in advance, however, every unseasoned move has the danger of generating consequences harmful to all.

In the history of Europe, the exchange of ideas among intellectuals, notably the pacifist campaigners, has brought the birth of the League of Nations, and eventually the United Nations. Even the failure of the LN was led into the emergence of the UN as a better world system of collective security.

III

Today's EU is not only a common economy, but a community bound in the shared belief of collective security and its value structure. 48 respective states with utter difference in religion, nation, ethnicity, culture, and economy have agreed to establish a region of peace and prosperity. Asian states that take pride in their common cultural and philosophical heritage can achieve more with certainty.

Europe, however, had to go through two World Wars to have EU as a regionally agreed scheme that promotes collective security and economic cooperation, and more importantly the idea of human dignity, and manifest objection to the resurgence of any totalitarian and anti-pluralistic radicalism. We all do not want Asia to repeat European errors to achieve peace, security and human dignity in the region.

A noticeable paucity in East Asia is the non-presence of any regional organization on any topic including economic cooperation, security, or value system, despite the presence of numerous bilateral agreements on minor topics. At a more fundamental level, it seems that

Asian states have rarely been engaged in a meaningful regional dialogue in the recent history, without the intervention of the 3rd party, the United States.

In this regard, it is likely that this issue of Korean unification may be mishandled, not because of possible nationalistic, or expansionist ambitions, but for reasons of inexperience in the regional settlement of disagreement through reason, and dialogue among seasoned experts, and the concerned governments.

A simple reasoning tells us that the issue of Korean unification is an imminent challenge for Asia. One ground for that is, in the recent history of East Asia, China, Japan, Korea have yet been stronger than ever. Chinese economy and power, Japanese financial capability and technology, and Korean entrepreneurship are destined to meet. The whole world is yearning to invest upon first sight of security and assurance. The place is North Korea. The historic encounter never stops there, and will expand to the whole Asian continent throughout the Afghanistan.

Korean unification may bring instability for brief moments, and many express concerns and, even fear for possible change. Yet change and challenge are the common feature of the international life. We can and should make changes to yield positive outcomes. The one and foremost outstanding feature of today's international affairs is the reemergence of Asia as a world leader. We can do it.

In this regard, I hope that the region of Asia and concerned states may agree to allow the process of integration to unfold based upon the spirit of international cooperation, where South Korea may shoulder the primary responsibility of integrating the Peninsula under an international scheme of security and investment in the transitional period.

The issue of Korean unification will present itself as a historic opportunity to bring in the era of unprecedented collective peace and affluence in this region. Such a wishful thinking should be disseminated by our hands throughout Asia, and the whole world, so that it could prove itself as a self-fulfilling prophecy.

한반도 통합: 신뢰에 기반한 지역주의로 해결하자

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한반도의 통합에 대하여 불안정, 위협, 비용, 재난의 내용으로 보는 시각이 있다. 하지만 진정한 위협은 1) 통합된 한반도와 아시아의 미래에 대한 비전의 부재; 2) 지역적 대화를 통해 생각의 차이를 극복한 경험의 부족; 3) 한반도 통합의 문제를 해결할 수 있다는 자신감의 부족과 집단적인 불안; 무엇보다 4) 오래된 문제를 새롭고 신선한 시각과 방법으로 해결하려는 혁신적이고 파격적인 생각의 부족이다. 동시에 이러한 생각을 같이 나누고 실천하려는 지역적인 혁신 그룹의 부재이다.

불신과 의심, 방어적 태도, 자신감의 부족에 근거한 현 체제에서는 한국, 중국을 비롯한 모든 국가가 북한의 개별관계와 단기적인 개별 이익에 집착하게 되고 결과적으로 북한을 포함한 모든 당사자들에게 해로운 방향의 행동을 하게 된다.

현상을 유지하려는 생각은 모두를 공동 이익에 반하는 방향의 결정으로 몰아가게 된다. 한국은 최소한의 안정을 유지하고 평화를 사기 위한 노력으로 공단을 만들고, 관광을 주선하며, 중국이나 러시아는 양자관계에서 북한의 항구를 이용하고 자원을 개발하려 하지만, 이러한 노력은 결국 북한의 다자적 경험을 줄어들게 하여 고립을 심화시키고, 북한을 포함하여 모두에게 불리한 결과를 가져온다. 한국은 재산수용의 위기에 놓이고, 중국은 계속적으로 막대한 지원의 부담을 지게 되며, 북한은 단기적인 외교적 이익에 집착해 세계를 향한 보편적인 관계수립의 기회와 능력을 상실하게 된다.

일방주의는 누구에게도 도움이 되지 않는다. 우리에게 필요한 것은 신뢰와 문제해결의 자신감에 근거한 지역적 공동주의와 공동행동이다. 정부간, 민간간, 정책수립기관, 전문가간, 여론주도층간의 지속적이고 혁신적인 열린 대화의 공간을 마련하고 경험을 축적하여야 한다.

유럽은 경제공동체, 안보공동체, 가치공동체로서의 EU 를 만들기 위해 2 번의 세계대전을 치루어야 했다. 아시아는 이러한 실수를 반복할 여건도 필요도 없고 현재의 국제질서 속에서 허용되지도 않는다. 아시아에는 그럴듯한 지역적 기구도, 미국 등 제 3 자가 개입하지 않은 우리들만의 대화를 나누어 본 경험도 최소한 근세사에서는 드물다. 아시아에서 하루 빨리 이러한 생각과 대화의 자유시장을 열어야 한다. 혁신적인 생각과 노력들이 민간간, 정책수립기관, 전문가간, 여론주도층간에서 만들어지고, 행동에 옮기기 전에 충분히 논의되고 걸러져야 한다. 충분히 익지 않은 생각과 행동은 자칫 모두를 재난으로 몰고 갈 수 있다.

한반도의 통합은 한반도, 아시아, 전 세계에게 새로운 역사적인 기회를 주고 있다. 중국의 자본력과 시장, 일본의 기술과 자본, 한국의 폭발적인 기업정신의 만남은 필연적이며, 그 장소는 북한이 될 것이다. 한반도의 통합은 남북한의 일이 아니다. 남방경제와 북방경제의 통합이고, 지역적으로 동남아시아로부터 아프가니스탄에 이르는 대륙의 연결을 의미한다. 한반도의 통합은 아시아와 전 세계에 새로운 번영의 시대를 예고하고 있다.

중요한 것은 신뢰이고 자신감이며, 대화이고 공동의 행동이다. 21 세기의 중요한 특징은 아시아의 부흥과 성장이다. 신뢰, 희망, 자신감, 대화에 근거한 지역주의에 기반 할 때 우리는 역사가 주는 기회를 축복으로 바꿀 수 있다. 이러한 희망이 모든 아시아인들에게 전파될 때, 그러한 바람은 자기충족적 예언으로 나타날 것이다.

In Asia, We Trust.

Integration of the Korean Peninsula

Session 3:

Session 3: Future of the Post-Integrated Korea: Forging the Architecture of Regional Prosperity in East Asia

Chair

Ha, Young-Sun (Professor, Seoul National University)

Presentation

Thomas J. Byrne (Senior Vice President, Moody's Investors Service)

Shi Yinhong (Professor, Renmin University of China)

Yoon, Deok-Min (Professor, IFANS)

KOH, IL-DONG (Senior Research Fellow, KDI)

Position in Brief

L. Gordon Flake (Executive Director, Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation)

Song, Yeongkwan (Research Fellow, KIEP)

Wang Dong (Professor, Peking University)

Naoki Tanaka (President, CIPPS)

Andrei Lankov (Professor, Kookmin University)

Bae, Chong-Ryel (Senior Research Fellow, EXIM)

Choo, Won-Suh (Principal Economist, KDB Research Institute)

Dinner Speech

Kim, Hyong-O (Speaker, 18th National Assembly Republic of Korea)

**Back to the Future:
Looking Ahead into Post-integration by Looking the Past and the Present**

Shi Yinhong
Professor of International Relations, Renmin University of China

Korean Tragedy: Partition and Opposite Developments

Korean Peninsula has been a tragic place, both in modern and contemporary times. It was dominated and then formally colonized by Japan in 1910 after decades of complicated power competitions and finally wars among China, Japan, and Russia in despite of the will and nominal “sovereignty” of the Korean Government and people. In 1945, partly because of a seemingly improvised or even absent-minded decision proposed by bureaucracy in Washington and endorsed by both President Harry Truman and Marshal Joseph Stalin, it was divided into two parts and occupied respectively by the American and Soviet armed forces, rather than emancipated from the Japanese colonial rule as a unified independent country as it fully entitled.

Following that, the division had been transformed more and more from a temporary great power arrangement to a rigid permanent existence. Two mutually hostile Korean governments backed by two antagonistic superpowers were established respectively in the North and South. Then, they fought against each other for three years with the U.S. and China as belligerents in one of the bloodiest wars the world has ever seen since 1945, which was finished by such an armistice that left the divided *status quo ante* almost intact.

The Korean tragedy since then has even been further aggravated by what has happened respectively within the two divided Korean territories. In the northern part of the Peninsular, DPRK operates along totalitarian, militarist, and, for the most of the time, xenophobia line under a sort of hereditary dynasty, with terrible poverty and extreme lack of freedom of most

of its people as the primary result. In foreign and defense policy, the ruling regime there has been characterized by a militant and nearly isolationist posture, by an armed forces extremely huge in size comparing with that of the whole population and privileged in every area of the national life, and finally by tested nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles.

In increasingly stark contrast, in the southern part of the Peninsular, ROK has developed a prosperous industrial economy, promoted with impressive achievements civil high technology, and occupied a quite important position in world trade, with its people thereby enjoying a level of living standard much higher than that of most developing countries. Politically ROK has progressed so far that it already has an effective liberal democracy, securing its people civil and political liberties while maintaining law and order, and allies with the United State in military front but at the same time, as a quite active and important member of the international community, engages diplomatically almost every country in the world.

All of the above contrast pictures between the North and South, together with the almost perennial military confrontation, political antagonism, and economic separation, have appeared to push the desired (at least desired by the South) really peaceful co-existence and final reunification through peaceful and autonomous integration more and more distant from realization.

The First Integration Agreement: The Basic Agreement of 1991

However, fortunately, the situation is not so bleak. There is at least a prominent (prominent especially in the minds and hearts of ROK government and people) historic South-North document signed on December 13, 1991 by Prime Minister of ROK and Premier of DPRK, Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea (Basic Agreement). It declares that “in keeping with the longing of the entire Korean race for the peaceful unification of our divided fatherland”, the two governments reaffirm the three basic principles of unification set forth in the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972, determine to end the state of political and military

confrontation and achieve national reconciliation, and express the desire to realize multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation to promote interests and prosperity common to the Korean people. It also emphatically stipulates that the relations between ROK and DPRK is “a special one constituted temporarily in the process of unification” rather than a relationship as between states.

Although the Korean tragedy continued, with implementation of the Basic Agreement soon suspended indefinitely by various negative developments including the first North Korea nuclear crisis, but the Agreement itself has become a significant symbol with substance that can be invoked solemnly for the cause of peaceful development and reunification through integration of the Peninsular.

How could this nearly unique Basic Agreement be produced, keeping one still holding hope about the prospect of what it legally aims at? At least one of the possible causes is plausible: President Kim Il-sung, the founder of DPRK and its leader for nearly a half century, was a special, self-contradictory figure in the positive sense compare with his successor. In despite of all his major negatives in the eyes of ROK people, he anyway spent many of his political years in mountains and forests in the war against the Japanese imperialism and for national liberation, making him inevitable more “Pan-Korean minded” than his successor who lived all the life in “court”. Also remarkable is the fact that during Kim Il-sung’s years, militarism in DPRK had not yet deteriorated to such a degree that *Sungun Policy*, an invention of his successor, became the overwhelming and omnipresent national program. Besides, Kim Il-sung had a decades-long personal relationship with the first generation of PRC leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, a relationship much less rosy of course than the official public statements issued then from both Pyongyang and Beijing expressed, but one anyway shaped mainly during the common struggle and with remarkably more elements of amicability than that during his successor, whose attitude toward China could often be characterized by antagonism, cynicism, and exploitation.

China and Two Koreas

China factor thus appears in the context here. Eight months after the signing of the Basic Agreement, China established diplomatic relations with ROK in despite of North Korea's opposition, angry, and perhaps even more. This was a great event, having great potential for a transforming international structure in Northeast Asia and ushering a new era of China's relations with the Peninsular. China has since then insisted with firm determination its approach of "parallel friendship" with two opposite countries DPRK and ROK, in despite of complaints from the former or the latter at different times and of the difficulties inherent in this kind of diplomacy.

This consistency and determination are dictated by China's vital interests, including *primarily* preventing various damages that could inflict upon China by a hostile or chaotic North Korea and enhancing China's prosperity, long-term security, and diplomatic status through economic cooperation and other beneficial intercourses with ROK, a neighboring country quite important in world economy and East Asia international politics.

The "parallel friendship" has been a complicated matter. It means major change in China's traditional policy toward North Korea, making relations with that "ally" become more and more "normal", or sometimes even remarkably less than that since China's participation in 2006 in the international condemnation against North Korea's longer-range missile launching and the U.N. sanction against its nuclear armed program, with very remarkable angry and pressure against Pyongyang's dangerous and bigot actions. However, the change is still limited, because first of all the above-mentioned vital interest of a preventive nature, as well as "adamancy" of tradition and "remnant" long-term strategic consideration.

As to China's posture toward South Korea, there has been undoubtedly great sea change comparing with that before 1992, taking into account among other things that China now is ROK's biggest trade partner and relations between two countries were defined by their Presidents formally as strategic partnership, though perhaps still more rhetorical than politically substantial. This change, on the other hand, is also limited as that in the case of North Korea, mainly because of the complications coming from China's relationship with North Korea and the China-ROK mutual strategic suspicions.

China and Korean Integration: Mutual Suspicions

These mutual strategic suspicions have so closely related to the issue of China's *perceived* attitude on the Korean reunification through integration as well as to the *perceived* future of an integrated Peninsular, perceived respectively by ROK and China.

Especially on the mass medias in ROK, Pyongyang's bigotry in insisting nuclear arms program often leads complaints or rather sharp criticism of China's unwillingness to exert economic pressure against DPRK, but the latter's occasional softening posture partly due to China's incentives and persuasion could easily brought out statements in South Korean media warning China's "ambition" or "strategic plan" to expand her power and influence for controlling the north part of the Peninsular through diplomatic efforts, economic assistance, trade, and direct investment. An Editorial in April 2007 by the biggest newspaper in ROK may be representative. Titled "China's 'Incorporation' of North Korean Natural Resources and Market Can't Be Tolerated," it declared that "the North Korea's economy has been rapidly incorporating into China's economic sphere. Therefore people worry that North Korea will be reduced to the fourth province of China's Northeast region after Liaoning, Jiling, and Heilongjiang." A commentator of this newspaper in an article titled "China and The Future of the Korean Peninsular", published in August 2009, declared that "China quietly exerting its pressure, has already 'permeated' through all the Peninsular;" "The Peninsular will probably become the stage on which the two Great Powers [China and the United State] contest against each other, visibly or invisibly."

Another issue with a similar nature, which has produced even severer strategic suspicion against China on the part of ROK, is what China might probably do in the event that Pyongyang regime drastically disintegrates or becomes very near to that One representative opinion is an Editorial published in the above-quoted newspaper in September 2009, emphasizing that the Chinese government has not ignored such an emergency. While has been increasing its armed forces along the China-DPRK border for emergency readiness, the Editorial asserts, "China may probably wage direct intervention with this when drastic change breaks out in North Korea, or bring the issue to the United Nations to prevent the reunification of the Peninsular under ROK's unilateral direction." This will, it concludes,

threaten ROK and the whole Korean nation with an anguish situation, i.e., “rendering its own [national] fate dominated again by the neighboring powers” as in the historic past.

On China’s side, when policy elites think about reunification of the Peninsular, the U.S.-ROK military alliance is always a primary factor in the picture for many of them, thereby contributing a lot to their reluctance to accept, let alone welcome, that prospect. Though the expectation China now has about the future of the Peninsular is ambiguous, undefined, or even fragmentary, but there are indeed two clear and determined “Nos” which reflects the deeply embedded strategic suspicion held against ROK: The Peninsular must not function as a strategic fortress for the U.S. against China, and must not damage China’s territorial and national integration by any irredentist and “Pan-Korean” aspirations. In turn in ROK, too numerous people too easily assumes without doubts that China just as the U.S. and Japan always regards Korean reunification as a major strategic negative, though China’s top leaders declared publicly times in recent years that China will welcome the autonomous and peaceful reunification of the Peninsular, as well as that China has welcomed improvement of North-South relations in various areas.

China and Korean Integration: China’s Interests

These statements from China’s leaders and government under them are definitely not mere rhetoric. China really has interests in the North-South détente and even final reunification of the Peninsular through peaceful and autonomous integration, besides understanding with sympathy of the just inspiration of the Korean people and of the imperative requirement of these for international peace and progress.

China obviously has solid interests in the North-South détente. Though the Koreans, especially the North, would not pleased to see and conceivably even not permit China’s involvement beyond a minimum degree in the North-South relations. And probably, the anticipation of that has made China always involved so little in the North-South relations. However, the Chinese government did declare times that it was really looking forward to seeing the reduction of tensions and the improvement of the relations between the North and

South, or in the official reported words of President Hu Jintao himself in August 2008 when he received President Lee Myung-Bak that “China, as a close neighbor to the Peninsular and a friend to both the North and South, will be insisted as in the past in [supporting] the process of North-South reconciliation and cooperation.”

It is easy to realize that détente in the Peninsular would relieve China of the occasional fear of large-scale military conflict breaking there, a sort of situation highly threatening to China’s security interest and diplomatic convenience. Détente in the Peninsular would also greatly mitigate Beijing’s often embarrassing difficulty in keeping itself as “a friend to both the North and South”, and avoid the American, Japanese, and South Korean responses in the form of non-combative military measures responding to North Korea’s action against the South (including strengthening American military presence and alliances in the region and expanding their military collaboration) which are bound to make China’s security environment somewhat worse as their inevitable by-effect.

Even reunification of the Peninsular, toward which China’s attitude has been the object of so much strategic suspicion on the part of so many South Koreans, is indeed in China’s long-term interest if it would be realized peacefully and autonomously as China’s leaders publicly declared more than once.

As emphasized above, their words in to this effect should not be ignored or treated as mere rhetoric. The contemporary leaders of China are quite principled people, perhaps more than many of their counterparts in the world. They never show frivolity or play hypocrisy on such important and solemn issues as Korean reunification. A peaceful and autonomous reunification through integration will eliminate much of the present potential dangers to China’s security and difficulties in its diplomacy, let alone that one have to accept what will inevitably come and resistance will be both futile and counterproductive.

Moreover, a rising China with its huge magnitude, increasing strength, and reasonably good relations with most of the related countries, is becoming much more self-confident than

ever before to meet possible negatives that might bring about by the Korean unification. This is a great possibility that one should never forget.

Unpredictable Calamity and Strategic Preparation

Back to the future: There might be calamitous future, besides the better ones. The calamitous future is what international opinion has discussed very frequently about North Korea, i.e., a North Korea has both usable nuclear missiles and an extremely provocative foreign policy, or a North Korea drastically becomes unviable and lapses into a cataract of instability and even collapse. Against the first scenario, the international community has conducted up to now a quite ineffective strategy or something as lack of strategy, with the major great exception of the still implemented U.N. Security Council sanction Resolution 1874. Against the second scenario, its performance even below the minimum level, without any *collective* strategic preparation for addressing the possible calamity including the probable unilateral *laissez faire* actions of power politics on the part of the Powers over the northern part of the Peninsular if there would be no *joint* decision of them based on joint “strategic Planning” before the unpredictable happen.

Unpredictability is a major feature of this scenario, and the lack of collective strategic preparation partly resulted from disagreement among the Powers on what sort of the future might be in North Korea. Just as International Crisis Group in its most recently published research report on North Korea (Asian Briefing No. 101, March 15, 2010) said, “Instability, a coup d’état or collapse would not be observable from the outside until well underway.” But severe economic malfunction resulted from the recently failed monetary reform and more, exceptionally frequent miscalculated policy decisions both domestic and foreign made by Pyongyang during the past year, and the much under-prepared state of the more urgent “dynastic succession” (a state that has been well-know according to any common-sense logic based on some most fundamental facts) all suggest that, in the cautious words of International Crisis Group, “Although unlikely in the short-term, fissures in the senior leadership, particularly during a succession crisis, could not be ruled out.” And of course grave “fissures in the senior leadership” could lead to the calamity as mentioned above.

Therefore, there seems an increasingly need for some joint strategic planning on the part of United States and its allies with China in the extent as much as possible *and* with utmost carefulness on the very sensitive issue of how to deal with that possible calamity. The present situation is still what a Reuter's senior correspondent in Beijing described one year ago as "an ominous silence" which "divides China and the United States [and its allies in the region] on what they will do." "China has shrunk from talking with Washington about contingencies in North Korea," he wrote. "[I]f Beijing's leaders worry about the stability of their neighbor, they have not been sharing those fears with others." Moreover, what have happened since then in both U.S.-China and China-DPRK relations makes things in this respect even much more difficult. But the stakes are too high to let the matter afloat for itself. "Impulses aren't enough," as this author was quoted by the Reuter correspond, "we'd need policies we agree on."

Korean Integration and Regional Integration

After the above review of the past and the present, we could look into the necessarily ambiguous and somewhat unpredictable future: Post-integration Peninsular. However ambiguous and difficult to predict, one thing is certain: Korean integration must be supported by regional integration in terms of institutional security cooperation among Powers, including an integrated Korea along with China, the United States, Japan, and Russia.

Strategically speaking, it requires all of them without exception taking the strategy of "transcending" as one of their primary strategic approaches in dealing both individually and collectively with their regional security environment, along with of course that of the necessary and restrained "self-help."

The strategy of "transcending", in the words of Professor Paul Schroeder, the inventor of the term and one of the most distinguished post-World War II scholar on the European international history, is defined as "an effort to surmount international anarchy and go beyond the normal limits of conflictual politics by striving for an international consensus or formal agreement on norms, rules and procedures to solve the problem, end the threat and prevent its

recurrence.” As to security problem particularly, “transcending” means trying to create, foster and develop regional and sub-regional security regimes, for the purpose of gradually producing a kind of international atmosphere and framework of institutions, in which a relatively stable and predictable peaceful mutual expectations can burgeon, grow, and come into a full being. Whether the historical experience of the “Concert of Europe” in the 19th century, or the post-World War II international realities first of all in the North Atlantic area and Europe, or the well-developed theories of international regimes and constructivism, all support the truthfulness of “transcending.”

Because of the problem of security dilemma and related obstinate problem of strategic suspicions between Powers, their national security strategies relating to East Asia and the Peninsular must include the one of “transcending”. This demands that they should commit to create and foster all those regional security regimes that could be expected produce more benefits than costs to them. Only depending on such security regimes that can mitigate substantially or even in the end remove the security dilemmas, can they, whether an integrated Korea, a much raised China, a confused Japan on various crossroad, or a relatively declined United States, become safer in the region and beyond. Self-buildup and military alliance would be much insufficient or even counter-productive for their individual security.

China has in an increasing degree committed *in principle* to the institutional cooperative security in the region, in despite of various difficulties including the frustrating experience in dealing with North Korea nuclear problem. China knows clearly that for both common interests of international society and the particular interests of herself, “transcending” is desirable or even imperative. China is engaging in the most recent years in the various efforts for security multilateralism, with a remarkably much more pro-active posture than what she adopted previously. The most critical area is still Northeast Asia. What are especially needed for China are comprehensive long-term strategic thinking and firmer determination in practice, just as those for other Powers in the region.

The Future of the integrated Korea

- Focusing on the Implications for Peace and Prosperity in East Asia

Yun, Dukmin

Professor, Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security

Since the division of the Korean peninsula in 1945, Korea has overcome the ravages of the war, a tragic struggle between the Korean people in just a half a century's time to transform itself into an advanced country of democracy and market economy built upon the hard work and sacrifice of its people. Against the backdrop of mature democracy and advanced market economy, the 60-year-old Korea is at a point in time where it needs to actively pursue a integration policy based on a functional and practical approach rather than a political and artificial approach. Moreover, this year is the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the ensuing German integration.

For the past ten years, the Korean government, rather than encourage discussion on reintegration, discounted the idea of the German-style absorptive integration by emphasizing its costs. Such policy combined together with negative images about North Korea that arise from nuclear weapons program, the severity of the food crisis, the tyranny, intensifies the Korean people's tendency to prefer the stability of the status quo rather than the chaos of reintegration. Historical necessity alone has proven to be non-effective in arousing Korean people's interest in integration. integration policies should therefore present tangible benefits and conveniences derived from integration. This needs to be presented not only to the South Koreans but also to the North Korean people. The same goes for the international society. The international society will support integration on the Korean peninsula when it decides that integration is not a threat and rather beneficial.

This paper seeks to evaluate the future vision of Korea after integration. In particular, it will evaluate first, the impact that a integrated Korea will have on stability and prosperity in East Asia and second, the direction that integrated Korea aims at.

The Need to Discuss a New Vision for integration

It is imperative that a vision about peaceful integration be actively constructed, to serve both as a future vision for the Korean nation and also as a new path for political economic development. It is high time that an economically prosperous and democratic Korea find a new vision and a force for new growth that brings all of Korean people's energy together. Korea needs to leap forward and peaceful integration can serve as a new frontier.

As of today, the official integration plan is the 1989 National Community integration Formula, which was derived from the national consensus at the time. In this regard, Korea should continue to succeed this formula but at the same time, modify it to reflect the changes in the strategic environment that took place thereafter. The biggest change that distinguishes the strategic environment of the then and now is the end of the Cold War. Consequently, the possibility of integration is much higher than it ever was during that time. Factors such as North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the specialities of the inter-Korean relationship, the significant difference in the two entities' political economic systems, mutual lack of confidence particularly in the politico-military realm, and vast difference in economic wealth should be considered together. As such, integration should be pursued in a manner that sets aside political issues and instead takes on a functional approach that will be phased and incremental over the span of at least twenty or more so years. During this time, coordination with international society is very important. Efforts to reassure the international society must complement these activities. It is crucial that Korean integration be perceived as an event that will accelerate regional stability and prosperity, not something that will bring instability to the region and threaten the safety of the neighboring states or the region. In sum, Korea should continue to abide by the National Community integration formula but at the same time, but at the same time construct a new integration vision that takes into account the changes that took place in its strategic environment during the past two decades.

Domestically, there is a tendency to refer to the case of the German integration, and thereafter, focus on the cost and the consequent burden for the people. However, integration can serve as a force for new growth depending on what kind of policies are implemented.

If these costs are defined as costs needed for integration preparation and shock absorption, they could be lower than is generally thought to be. And this may be at a level that Korea can afford. Of course, even at that level, considering the size of its economy, foreign debt, and foreign reserve, independent financing by South Korea alone will be limited. Ultimately, help from the international society is needed.

As we have witnessed from the German integration, creating social overhead capital in a short period of time to reduce social tension and resolve conflicts that will arise from the integration, which will arrive unexpectedly, is impossible. What is possible then, is the provision of various measures in political, economical, social and cultural aspects that will alleviate the impact of integration. These measures can also serve as opportunities where the international society would learn to recognize and accept Korea's leading role in the integration process. Further, they will allow for a integration process that blends in the neighboring countries' expectations and interests to develop.

Stability and Prosperity in East Asia and Korean integration

The type of integration process itself will greatly influence the stability and prosperity of the East Asian region. Geographically, the Korean peninsula is connected to China and Russia, and close to Japan. Consequently, it has been a point where these powerful countries' divergent interests intersect. China and Japan have traditionally considered the peninsula as "lips to their teeth", a region where their respective vital interests lay. Russia, for its part, has shown considerable strategic interest, as can be seen by the historical examples of the Russo-Japanese War, and particularly Stalin's interest reflected in the Soviet Union's involvement in the Korean War. As a result of the Pacific War, the United States has come to consider the peninsula the outermost front line in its policy of containment against the continental powers. In short, the Korean peninsula is a hot spot where the maritime powers and the continental

powers, and the world's four most powerful countries' interests come head to head against each other.

As such, integration on the Korean peninsula cannot but influence these powerful countries' interests either directly or indirectly. If a integrated Korea succeeds in overcoming the chaos of integration process, it will create a country with aggregate population of 80 million people. Then, in terms of population size, Korea may have potentiality that is similar to France, Germany, or the United Kingdom. However, due to Korea's geopolitical environment, its influence in the region will be significantly curbed by its strong neighbors (China, Japan, Russia) in comparison with European countries of similar sizes. Therefore, its foreign policy direction will undoubtedly be shaped under the influence of both the continental and maritime powers.

The advancement integration formula that the Hansun Foundation has proposed envisions a peaceful integration process moves along in connection with the modernization and democratization process of North Korea, and South Korea's degree of advancement. Such formula is thought to be one that will contribute to stable prosperity and development of East Asia. Korea integration will not only stimulate development in North Korea but also the economically backward three Northeast provinces in China. This will surely provide a new momentum for growth in East Asia. Additionally, integrated Korea will serve as a connecting bridge that brings together the continent and the sea to create a synergistic effect where their respective developments will complement each other. The process of reconstructing and developing the North Korean economy is expected to not only stimulate the South Korean economy but also the Chinese and the Japanese economy. Consequently, they will create a new dynamic of regional economic cooperation. In order to boost the North Korean per capita GNI to US \$3,000, approximately US \$4 billion worth of foreign investment is needed every year for the next ten years. It is not possible for South Korea to invest that much alone. The international society's cooperation is necessary. The process through which the North Korean economy is revitalized, along with the process of integrating the Korean peninsula into one single market will reinvigorate regional cooperation. In particular, the Korean integration can be expected to remove the political and ideological barriers and thereby increase economic

interactions among Korea, China and Japan. More specifically, it will catalyze the conclusion of a trilateral free trade agreement among these countries. Such agreement could be a positive development in constructing a basis for political economic integration as the European Union had in the case of Europe.

Meanwhile, from the political security aspect, the Korean integration will lead to significant changes in the East Asian peace architecture. Since the 1945 division and 1950 War, the East Asian security architecture has remained in place without any modifications in its fundamental structure. In spite of the end of the Cold War, which brought about changes all over the globe, the presence of North Korea and the ensuing regional instability has deterred these changes. However, Korean integration will bring about dramatic changes in the region, in terms of alliance relationships, future direction of military power enhancement, and multilateral security cooperation. By removing one of the most fundamental reasons for the current confrontational stance, it will strengthen security cooperation in the region.

In particular, the future of the regional security structure will actively discussed among the relevant parties. The six party talks may be transformed into a venue for cooperative security, a mechanism already in place in Europe. Korean integration will have a sizeable impact on the countries in the region in terms of which direction the integrated Korea will take and whether it will be capable of steadily managing a smooth integration process. In this regard, constructing a regional cooperative security mechanism will effectively increase the transparency of not only the integration process but also the future direction of the integrated Korea. As a result, it will alleviate the concerns of the countries in the region.

Future Vision of the Integrated Korea

The integrated Korea, with a population of 80 million people, has the potential to become a middle-sized country comparable to Germany, France or the United Kingdom. The size of these three countries could considered the standard for those that belong to the G8. South Korea is already a member of the G20 and accordingly, has taken on an important role in the international society. By becoming a standard G8-sized country, an integrated Korea will

have access to activities related to global governance. Integration, in other words, can provide a stepping stone upon which Korea will participate in global governance, in this age of globalization. Furthermore, integration will generate positive developments for the Korean economy including the appreciation of the national brand value of Korea and create a market of 80 million potential consumers. The extensive infrastructure development in the North Korean region can be a source of new growth for the South Korean companies.

Nonetheless, predictions that the integration will result in astronomical costs because of the huge investments needed to promote even development in the North Korean region will lead to significant burden on the Korean economy. If these costs are defined as costs needed for integration preparation and shock absorption, they could be lower than is generally thought to be. And this may be at a level that Korea can afford. Of course, even at that level, considering the size of its economy, foreign debt, and foreign reserve, independent financing by South Korea alone will be limited. Ultimately, the integration costs will differ depending on how we prepare for integration and through what mechanism shocks arising out of contingencies will be absorbed. In regard to this, one option that could be expected to reduce costs is to pursue extensive reforms in the North Korean economy and an effective regime change, which will prevent contingencies and thereby induce a soft landing. But above all this, the biggest problem that will take place in the regime change process or contingencies is the migration of the North Korean people to South in a search for better wages and better living conditions. Preventing mass migration will be the most important tasks entailed in reducing integration costs. However, forcibly preventing or legally restraining voluntary migration violates the spirit of the Korean Constitution and is a considerable political burden. Therefore, providing economic incentive aimed at preventing mass migration is needed. In light of this, the Korean integration plan seeks first prevent mass migration through performing sizeable investments in North Korea and thereby promote even and equal development. Financing this segment of the costs will take up an important part of the overall integration costs. While it is true that the Korean society is losing its vigor owing to the world's lowest birth rate and its rapidly aging population, the integration of the Korean peninsula into a single market will stimulate the Korean economy. Furthermore, it will heighten the foreign investors' interests. According to a

report from Goldman Sachs, a gradual integration of the two Koreas will create an economy which will surpass that of Japan or Germany in terms of Gross Domestic Product size.

Integration will also provide an opportunity to an even development and improvement of the quality of life for the Korean people. Most of all, it will drastically improve the lives of the North Korean people. The Korean integration policy assumes that it will take a long-term gradualist and functionalist path based upon first, the reconstruction of the North Korean economy to a certain level, through inter-Korean interaction and cooperation and second, formation of the economic community between the two Koreas. As was seen in the German experience, integration will place the even development of the two Koreas as a long-term goal and thereupon lead to concentration of development in North Korea, in the areas of not only physical infrastructure but also human resources. The Korean government plans to provide a comprehensive package encompassing the five areas of economy, finance, infrastructure development, social welfare and education. An international fund amounting to US \$40 billion jointly raised with the international society, will be invested in these areas to meet the goal of raising the per capita income of North Korean people to US \$3,000. When this goal is materialized, the North Korea society will undergo significant changes. Per capita income of US \$3,000 is the level where every household comes to buy white goods and cars, in other words, the level where a middle class is formed. It will also open an era where real inter-Korean economic cooperation will become possible, instead of a unilateral economic assistance on South Korea's part. This will be the foundation upon which the two Koreas can develop into an economic community.

Conclusion: Direction for Future Korea

Concerning the future direction of integrated Korea, there are discussions about whether Korea will rejoin to become part of the continental powers or will remain a maritime power. Considering that the geopolitical nature of its peninsular characteristics, an integrated Korea is likely to aim to play the role of a connecting bridge between the two groups. Immediately after the integration, a nationalistic movement may be temporarily observed. However, in reality, a more rational path through which Korea will stick to the alliance relationship with

the United States in order to check and balance the powers of the most powerful countries in the world in its neighborhood. The three basic goals of free democracy, market economy and alliance relationship with the United States should remain in place even after integration. The relationships with Japan, China and Russia should also be deepened. In particular, Japan and China are two most important economic partners. And under the force of globalization, Korea, Japan and China will not much choice but to envision and search for an integrated economic community as the European Union.

Globalization in international politics and international order leads to relatively less relevance for geopolitics. Nation-states are increasingly seen to emphasize the importance of thinking globally and acting accordingly. An integrated Korea, also, will accordingly show interest in global governance and therefore amplify its voice on the international stage. Taking account of Korea's geopolitical value jointly with the universal values of world history, an integrated Korea will have to become a nuclear free country. It is realistically impossible to integrate the two Koreas when North Korea still has nuclear weapons in its arsenal. In the context of the world's four strongest powers' (US, China, Japan, Russia) interests, a nuclear Korean peninsula will be a source of instability. Consequently, garnering the international society's support for integration will be impossible. Historically, the Korean peninsula suffered numerous invasions from both the continent and the seas. On the other hand, it rarely attacked its neighboring countries. The various kingdoms and dynasties on the peninsula tended to be peaceful. In the same context, the stability and prosperity of an integrated Korea depends on its peace-oriented policies. In particular, because its prosperity will be contingent upon access to the world market, integrated Korea will prefer stability over change of the order.

If integration is not pursued under artificial political integration but rather leads to deepening of the inter-Korean interaction and free travel of both human and physical resources, a de-facto economic integration, then the future direction for integrated Korea will naturally lead to one direction.

If the free human and physical interactions lead to a de-facto economic community, then the decisions made by the free peoples of both the South and North Korea will result in an advanced democratic country that guarantees freedom, welfare and human dignity for everyone on the Korean peninsula.

통일한국의 미래상 - 동아시아 평화와 번영의 함의를 중심으로

외교안보연구원 교수

윤 덕 민

1945년 한반도가 분단된 이래, 대한민국은 동족상잔의 참화인 한국전쟁을 극복하고 온 국민의 피와 땀으로 불과 반세기만에 경제발전과 민주주의를 동시에 이루어내어 세계가 자랑하는 자유민주주의와 시장경제의 선진국가로 탈바꿈하고 있다. 이러한 성숙된 자유민주주의와 선진 시장경제를 배경으로, 건국 60년의 대한민국은 분단된 조국을 정치적·인위적인 접근이 아닌 기능주의적이고 실용주의적 접근을 통해 통일로 이끄는 정책을 적극 추진해야 할 시점에 서 있다고 본다. 더욱이 2010년 베를린 장벽이 무너져 독일통일이 이룩된 지 20년이 되는 해이다.

독일통일이후 현재에 이르기까지, 한반도에서의 통일논의는 활성화되기보다는 거의 들리지 않고 있다. 독일통일의 경험은 통일과정에 천문학적인 비용이 필요하다는 부정적 인식을 한국인들에게 심화시켰다. 특히 지난 10여년간 한국정부도 통일논의를 활성화시키기 보다는 통일비용 부담을 강조하면서 독일식의 ‘흡수통일’을 배제하여 왔다. 이러한 한국정부의 정책은 물론 핵무기 개발, 심각한 경제식량난, 폭정 등 북한에 대한 부정적 이미지는 한국국민들에게 혼란스러운 통일보다는 안정적인 현상유지, 즉 남북분단을 선호하는 경향을 심화시키고 있다.

이제 한국 국민들에게 통일의 역사적 당위성만가지고 통일에 대한 관심을 고조시키는 일은 더 이상 유효하지 않다. 통일이 가져오는 혜택, 편익을 구체적으로 제시하는 일이 통일방안에서 마련되어야 할 것이다. 이는 비단 남한 국민들뿐만 아니라 북한주민들에게도 구체적으로 제시되는 것이 필요하다. 독일통일은 서독의 노력도 중요했지만, 결국 동독주민들이 서독을 선택한 결과이다. 남이든 북이든 한반도에 사는 국민들에게 통일이 가져오는 혜택을 구체적으로 제시할 수 있을 때, 통일에 대한 관심이 높아질 것이다. 이는 또한 국제사회에 대해서도 마찬가지라고 본다. 한반도 통일이 자신의 안전에 위협되지 않고 이익이 있다고 판단될 때, 국제사회는 한반도 통일을 지지할 것이다.

본고는 통일이후의 한반도 미래상을 평가하는데 목적이 있다. 특히 통일된 한반도가 동아시아의 안전과 번영에 미치는 영향과 함께 통일한국이 지향하는 방향을 평가하기로 한다.

새로운 통일비전논의의 필요성

국가의 미래비전으로서 그리고 정치경제에 있어 새로운 활로로서 평화통일의 비전을 적극 마련하는 것이 필요하다. 경제성장과 민주화를 이룬 대한민국은 국민의 에너지를 하나로 모으는 새로운 국가비전과 성장동력이 필요한 시점이다. 평화통일은 새로운 도약을 위한 대한민국에게 '뉴프론티어'(new frontier)가 될 수 있다.

한국의 공식적 통일방안은 1989년 국민적 합의에 마련된 민족공동체 통일방안이다. 한국은 민족공동체통일방안'을 계승하는 한편 변화된 전략환경을 반영하여 이를 발전시켜갈 필요성이 있다. 1980년대 통일방안을 만들 당시와 현재를 비교할 때, 엄청난 전략환경의 변화가 존재한다. 가장 큰 변화는 냉전의 종결이며, 통일의 가능성도 냉전시기와는 비교할 수 없을 정도로 높아졌다.

'민족공동체통일방안'은 냉전시대에 있어 통일의 가능성보다는 북한의 연방제 통일방안에 대한 대항적 성격으로 만들어진 측면을 부인할 수 없다. 더욱이 인위적인 정치통합 문제로 남남갈등의 소지를 안고 있다. 또한 한국은 더 이상 단일민족이 아닌 국제화된 나라라는 점도 고려해야 한다.

북한의 핵무기 개발, 남북관계의 특수성, 상이한 정치경제체제와 정치군사적 신뢰부족 그리고 급격한 경제격차 등을 고려, 한반도 통일은 정치적 요소를 배제한 단계적이고 점진적이고 그리고 기능주의적 접근을 통해 장기간(20년 이상)에 걸쳐 추진하는 것이 필요하다. 특히 이 과정에서 국제사회의 협력이 매우 중요하다. 한반도의 통일은 지역의 불안정을 초래하여 주변국이나 지역의 안전을 위협하는 것이 아니라 지역의 안전과 번영을 촉진할 수 있다는 인식을 국제사회에 확산하는 노력이 수반되어야 할 것이다.

한국은 '민족공동체통일방안'을 계승하는 한편 지난 20년간의 급격한 전략환경의 변화를 반영한 새로운 통일비전을 필요로 한다.

한국 국내에는 독일통일의 예를 들어 통일을 비용문제와 국민부담의 부작용과 관련한 입장에서 생각하는 경향이 있지만 통일정책의 여하에 따라서는 대한민국의 새로운 도약의 동력이 될 수 있다. 독일통일의 경험은 통일과정에서 전문학적인 비용이 필요하다는 부정적 인식을 한국인들에게 심화시켰다. 독일은 국가통합의 경제적 비용을 중시하지 않고 조기 정치통합을 추진하여 전문학적 재정적 비용을 필요로 했다. 노후연금, 실업보험수당 등 동독주민들에게 서독과 동일한 사회보장을 제공하고 동독의 마르크화를 서독의 마르크화와 1대1로 교환하였다. 독일의 통일비용은 사실상 동서독의 생활수준을 동일하게 하기 위한 비용이었다고 볼 수 있다. 한국 경제력과 낙후한 북한 경제현실을 감안할 때, 독일통일보다 훨씬 큰 부담이 될 것이라는 것이 일반적 평가이다. 그러나 독일통일과 동일한 형태의 통일과정은 한국에게는 불가능한 선택지이다.

통일비용을 통일의 충격을 흡수하는 능력과 준비를 위한 비용으로 본다면, 일반적으로 보는 통일비용보다는 한국이 충당할 수 있을 정도의 낮은 수준이 될 수 있다. 물론 그러한 비용이라 할지라도 한국의 경제규모, 외채, 외환보유고 등을 감안할 때, 여전히 관련 재원을 자체조달하는 것에는 한계가 있을 것이다. 결국 국제사회의 도움이 필요하다.

독일 통일의 예에서 보듯이 통일의 날은 예고없이 다가올 가능성이 높다. 단시일내 사회긴장 및 갈등을 치유하고 인프라(SOC)를 마련하는 것은 불가능하며, 따라서 통일의 충격을 완화하기 위한 정치경제사회문화 등 다방면에 걸친 장치가 사전에 마련되어야 한다. 우리가 통일방안을 준비하는 것은 또한 통일에 관한 국제환경을 조성하는데 유용할 것이다. 통일과정에서 한국의 주도적 역할을 국제사회에 인식시키는 계기가 될 수 있으며, 주변국들의 기대와 이해를 고려한 통일과정을 모색할 수 있을 것이다.

동아시아 안전과 번영 그리고 한반도 통일

어떠한 방식으로 한반도가 통일이 되느냐는 동아시아의 안전과 번영에 지대한 영향을 미칠 것이다. 중국, 러시아와 지리적으로 이어져 있고 일본과 근접한 한반도는 지정학적으로 강대국의 이해관계가 교차하는 곳이었다. 중국과 일본은 각각 한반도를 ‘ , ’의 사회적 이해가 걸린 지역으로 간주해왔으며, 러시아도 러일전쟁에서 보인 관심 그리고 한국전쟁에서의 스탈린의 관심 등을 볼 때 전략적으로 중시해왔다. 미국도 태평양전쟁의 결과 한반도에 관여하고

대륙세력을 견제하는 최전선으로 중시하여왔다. 결국 한반도는 해양세력과 대륙세력의 이해가 교차하는 곳이며 세계에서 가장 강력한 네나라의 이해가 교차하는 지역이다.

한반도의 통일은 세계에서 가장 강력한 나라들의 이해에 직간접적으로 영향을 미칠 수밖에 없다. 통일한국의 향방은 주변관계국들에게 초미의 관심사가 아닐 수 없다. 통일한국은 통일과정의 혼란을 극복한다면 인구 약 8 천만으로 규모면에서 유럽의 프랑스, 독일, 영국 등과 비슷한 잠재력을 갖는 국가가 될 수 있을 것이다. 그러나 동아시아의 지정적 조건으로, 즉 초강대국들인 이웃국들(중국, 일본, 러시아)로 인하여 지역에서의 영향력은 유럽의 비슷한 규모의 국가들에 비하여 매우 제한적일 것이다.

통일한국은 지정학적 위치로 인하여 필연적으로 대륙세력과 해양세력 사이에서 영향을 받으며 외교방향을 설정해갈 수밖에 없을 것이다. 한반도의 국가들은 전통적으로 대륙국가인 중국의 영향을 받았지만, 대륙으로부터의 많은 침략에도 불구하고 정치경제문화상의 정체성을 유지하여왔다. 1945 년 남북 분단의 결과, 대한민국은 해양세력의 영역에 속하게 되었으며 미국과의 동맹관계를 통해 안전과 번영을 확보할 수 있었다.

지역의 안전을 손상시키지 않는 평화적 통일이 역내국가로서는 가장 좋은 통일의 시나리오일 것이다. ‘한반도선진화재단’ 이 마련한 선진화통일방안은 북한의 근대화와 민주화 그리고 한국의 선진화 진전에 따라 한반도가 평화적으로 통합되어가는 과정을 담고 있으며, 이는 동아시아의 안정적인 번영과 발전에 기여할 수 있는 방안으로 생각된다.

중국의 경우, 등소평의 실용주의 노선을 통해 비약적 경제성장을 이룩했지만, 고도성장이 초래한 불평등을 해결해야 하는 과제를 안고 있다. 특히 내륙과 해안 지역간의 격차를 여하히 줄여갈 수 있는냐는 중국경제의 향방에 중대한 과제의 하나이다.

과거 중화학공업의 중심지로서 중국경제의 중요한 부분을 차지하고 있던 동북 3 성은 중국의 개방이라 낙후된 지역으로 전락하였다. 중국의 적극적인 개방정책에도 불구하고 동북 3 성이 낙후되어 있는 가장 큰 이유는 북한 탓이라고 본다. 동북 3 성 배후에 일본, 한국이라는 매우 앞선 시장이 존재함에도 불구하고, 폐쇄적인 북한의 존재는 동북 3 성을 섬과 같은 내륙지역으로 전락시켰다. 동북 3 성의 발전은 사실상 북한의 개방에 달려있다고 판단되며, 특히 한반도가 하나의 통합된 시장화하는 과정은 동북 3 성의 발전에 결정적 기회가 될 것이다.

한반도 통일은 북한은 물론 낙후된 중국의 동북 3 성 발전을 촉진시켜 동아시아의 새로운 성장동력이 될 수 있을 것이다. 또한 지정학적으로 한반도가 가교가 되어 대륙과 해양의 발전이 연계되는 시너지 효과가 촉진될 것으로 기대된다. 북한경제를 재건하고 발전시키는 과정은 한국뿐만 아니라 중국, 일본의 경제에도 새로운 활력이 될 것이며 새로운 지역 경제협력의 다이내미즘을 창출할 수 있다. 북한경제를 주민소득(GNI) 3000 불 수준까지 끌어올리기 위해서는 향후 10 년간 매년 40 억불정도의 해외투자가 필요하다. 이러한 해외투자는 한국 혼자만으로는 어려우며 국제사회의 협력이 필요하다. 북한 경제가 활성화되는 과정, 한반도가 하나의 시장으로 통합되는 과정은 지역협력을 활성화하는 효과를 가져다 줄 것이다. 특히, 한반도 통일은 인위적인 정치 및 이념 장벽이 사라짐으로써 한중일간의 경제교류를 증대시키고 특히 한중일 FTA 가 촉진되어 유럽의 EU 와 같은 정치경제적 통합 토대를 구축하는 긍정적 환경이 될 수 있다.

한편 정치안보적 측면에서도 한반도 통일은 동아시아의 평화구조에 있어서 중대한 변화를 초래할 것이다. 1945 년 남북 분단 이래, 특히 1950 년의 한국전쟁 이래 구축된 동아시아의 안보 구도는 근본적 조정없이 지속되어왔다. 세계적인 냉전종결에도 불구하고, 북한이라는 지역 불안정 요인은 지역의 안보구도에 대한 변화를 억제하여왔다. 한반도의 통일은 동맹관계, 군사력의 구축방향, 다자간 안보협력 등에 있어 극적이니 환경변화를 초래할 수 있을 것이다. 더욱이 대립의 근본적 이유중 하나가 사라짐으로써 지역내 안보협력을 강화시키는 효과를 가져다줄 것이다.

특히 통일이후, 지역의 안보구도를 둘러싼 다국간 논의가 활성화될 것이다. 6 자회담은 유럽과 같은 협력안보(cooperative security)의 장으로 전환될 수 있을 것이다. 통일한국이 어떠한 방향을 갈 것인지, 안정적으로 통일과정을 관리할 수 있을 지, 한반도 통일은 역내국가들의 안전에 적지않은 영향을 미친다. 역내 협력안보체제의 구축은 한반도 통일과정은 물론 통일이후의 통일한국 방향에 대한 투명성을 높여줄 수 있으며, 궁극적으로 역내국가의 우려를 해소하는 방편이 될 수 있을 것이다.

미래 통일한국의 비전

통일한국은 인구 8 천만을 갖는 중견국가로서 독일, 프랑스, 영국과 같은 규모의 국가로 부상할 수 있다. 이들 국가들은 G8 국가의 표준적인 규모라고 볼 수 있다. 이미 한국은 G20 의 참가국으로 국제사회에 있어 중요한 역할을 수행하는 위치에 서게되었지만, 통일된 한국은

G8 의 표준적인 규모로서 글로벌 거버넌스에 참여할 수 있는 기반을 확보할 수 있다. 즉 통일은 세계화 시대의 글로벌 거버넌스에 한국이 참가하기 위한 발판이 될 수 있다.

더욱이 통일은 한국의 국가브랜드 가치를 높이고 소위 Korea discount 현상을 해결하는 길이기도 하다. 또한 8 천만의 시장형성과 지리적 분단의 해결은 한국경제에 있어 매우 긍정적인 환경이 될 것이며, 통일과정에서 북한지역에 대한 대대적인 인프라개발은 한국기업의 새로운 성장할로가 될 수 있다.

물론 통일이 한국경제에 상당한 부담이며, 북한지역의 균등 발전을 위해 집중적인 투자를 필요로 하여 소위 ‘통일비용’ 이 천문학적으로 들 것이라는 예측도 있다. 통일비용을 통일의 충격을 흡수하는 능력과 준비를 위한 비용으로 본다면, 일반적으로 보는 통일비용보다는 한국이 충당할 수 있을 정도의 낮은 수준이 될 수 있다. 물론 그러한 비용이라 할지라도 한국의 경제규모, 외채, 외환보유고 등을 감안할 때, 여전히 관련 재원을 자체조달하는 것에는 한계가 있을 것이다.

결국 어떠한 방식으로 통일을 준비하고 급변사태의 충격을 어떻게 흡수할 것인지에 따라, 통일비용은 달라질 수 있다. 우선, 북한에서 급변사태를 예방하고 연착륙을 유도하는 방안, 즉 북한경제의 대대적인 개혁과 체제전환의 효율적 추진은 통일비용을 줄이는 길일 수 있다. 그러나 가장 큰 문제는 역시 북한체제전환과정, 급변사태과정 등에서 임금격차, 생활환경 차이로 인하여 수많은 북한주민의 남한 이동 가능성이다. 인구이동을 방지하는 방안은 통일비용을 줄이는 가장 중요한 과제일 것이다. 인구이동을 강제적으로 막거나 법으로 제약하는 일은 한국의 헌법정신에 위반되며 상당한 부담이 된다. 경제적 인센티브를 제공하여 인구이동을 막는 것이 필요하다. 이를 위해, 한국이 생각하는 통일방안은 일단 북한에 대한 대규모 투자를 통해 인구이동을 막고 국토개발, 균등발전을 꾀하는 것으로 이에 따른 자원마련이 통일비용의 중요한 부분을 차지할 것이다.

세계적인 저출산과 급속한 고령화 진입으로 한국사회는 활력을 잃고 있다. 해외투자자의 눈에는 한국이 일본모델을 따라가고 있는 것으로 보일 것이다. 한반도가 하나의 시장으로 통합되어가는 과정은 탄력을 잃고 있는 한국경제에 새로운 활력을 불어일으키는 기재가 될 것으로 기대된다. 또 그것은 해외투자자들의 관심을 고조시키는 방편이 될 것이다. 골드만삭스의 보고서에 따르면, 남북한의 점진적 통합을 전제로 통일한국의 GDP가 일본, 독일을 능가할 것으로 전망한다.¹⁾

한편, 통일은 한반도에 사는 사람들의 삶의 질을 균등하게 발전시킬 수 있는 계기가 될 것이다. 실질적 의미에서 남북한의 소득격차는 30-40 배에 달하며, 영양상태, 평균수명, 복지 등 기본적인 삶의 질에 있어서의 격차도 크게 벌어져 있는 상황이다. 무엇보다도 통일은 북한주민의 삶의 질을 획기적으로 향상시킬 것이다.

기본적으로 한국의 통일정책은 장기적 관점에서 남북교류와 협력을 통해 북한경제의 일정한 재건과정과 남북 경제공동체 형성을 통해 점진적이고 기능주의적으로 통합해가는 것을 상정하고 있다. 독일의 경험에서 보듯이, 통일은 남북한의 균등한 발전을 장기적 과제로 하여 인프라는 물론 인적 자원 등 북한지역의 집중적 개발을 가져올 것이다.

한국정부는 북한주민의 소득이 3000 불이 되도록 국제사회와 공동으로 400 억불의 국제협력기금을 마련하여 경제, 재정, 인프라, 복지, 교육 등 5 대분야에 걸친 포괄적 패키지 지원을 제공할 생각을 갖고 있다. 소득 3000 불이 현실화될 경우, 북한사회는 중대한 변화를 겪게 될 것이다. 소득 3000 불은 백색가전이 가정마다 폭발적으로 보급되게 자가용이 생기는 시점이다. 즉 중산층이 형성된다는 의미한다. 또한 북한경제가 국민소득 3000 불 시대에 돌입할 경우, 그것은 남한의 일방적 지원이 아닌 진정한 의미에 있어 남북 경제협력이 가능한 시점이 될 것이며, 남북한의 경제공동체로 발전할 수 있는 토대가 될 것이다.

결어: 통일한국의 지향점

1) Goohoon Kwon, "A United Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks (Part1), Global Economics Paper No. 188, September 21, 2009.

통일한국의 향방을 두고, 다시 대륙세력의 일원이 될 것인지 아니면 해양세력으로 남을 것인지에 관한 논의가 있다. ‘반도’라는 지정학적 특성상 통일한국은 대륙세력과 해양세력 사이의 가교 역할이라는 이상적인 역할을 지향하려할 가능성이 높다. 일단 통일직후 민족주의적 움직임이 통일한국에서 일시적으로 관찰될 것이지만, 현실적으로는 세계에서 가장 강력한 이웃들 사이에서 이들의 힘을 견제하기 위해 미국과의 동맹관계를 견지하려는 합리적 노선이 지속될 것이다.

자유민주주의와 시장경제라는 가치관과 미국과의 동맹이라는 세가지의 기본적 지향점은 통일이후에도 유지되어야 할 것이다. 또한 일본, 중국, 러시아와의 관계도 심화시켜갈 것이다. 특히 일본과 중국은 경제적으로 가장 중요한 파트너이며 세계화의 흐름하에서 장기적으로는 한일중 3국도 유럽연합과 같이 경제공동체로서의 통합 과정을 모색할 수밖에 없을 것이다.

국제정치 내지는 국제질서에 있어서 ‘세계화’라는 조류는 지정적 의미를 상대적으로 퇴색시키고 있으며, 국가들은 점점 글로벌할 관점에서 생각하고 행동해야할 필요성을 제기하고 있다. 통일한국도 세계화의 도전에 따라 글로벌 거버넌스에 대한 관심을 보일 것이며, 특히 국제무대에서의 발언권을 확대하려 것이다.

한반도의 지정적 가치, 세계사의 보편적 가치 등을 고려할 때, 통일한국은 비핵평화 국가이어야 할 것이다. 북한의 핵무기를 안고 한반도가 통일하는 방향은 현실적으로 불가능하다. 핵무장한 한반도는 세계에서 가장 강력한 4 대강국(미중일러)의 이익을 고려할 때 불안정의 근원이 될 것이며, 통일에 관한 국제사회의 지지를 확보하는 것이 불가능해질 것이다. 역사적으로 한반도의 국가들은 수 많은 침략을 대륙이나 해양으로부터 받았지만 주변국을 침공한 예를 극히 드물다. 매우 평화적이고 평화적인 국가들이었다. 통일 한국의 번영과 안전도 역시 평화지향적 정책에 의해 좌우된다고 본다. 특히 통일 한국의 번영은 여전히 세계시장으로의 자유로운 접근에 의해 보장될 것이기 때문에 통일 한국은 질서의 변화보다는 안정을 추구하는 국가로 남을 것이다.

통일이 인위적인 정치통합을 목적으로 추진되지않고 남북간의 교류를 심화시키고 자유로운 인적 물적 왕래가 가능한 사실상의 경제통일이 이루어진다면, 미래 통일 한국의 방향은 자연스럽게 결정될 것으로 판단된다.

우선, 남북간의 자유로운 인적 물적 교류로 사실상 통합된 경제공동체로 진전된다면, 남북주민의 자유의사에 따른 결정은 한반도 구성원 모두에게 자유, 복지, 인간존엄성이 보장되는 선진민주국가로 귀결될 것이다.

Post-Integrated Korea: Opportunities for Economic Prosperity in East Asia

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1. The Growth Potential of a Unified Korea

Unthinkable as it might sound, until at least the late 1970s North Korea led South Korea in terms of income per head and degree of industrialization. North Korea was one of the rising stars of Asia and the developing world in the 1960s with a head-start over what was then still an impoverished South Korea. North Korea's finest hour was in the early 1970s, when its rapid early industrialization not only put it ahead of South Korea but also impressed other developing countries. This lead has been definitively and decisively reversed and North Korea now plumbs the depths of poverty.

The old planned economy of North Korea has suffered from output contraction following the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991 that resulted in sharp reduction of energy supply and aid to North Korea. Output in North Korea fell by 20% from 1992 and reached trough levels in 1998. Its output had begun to recover since 1998 but the momentum of the recovery has slowed recently, limiting its per capita income in 2008 at a level 23% lower than in 1990. Severe food shortages in mid-2008 demonstrated again the feeble state of the economy. Living standards have deteriorated and remain dire. Much of the population relies on state subsidies in housing and food rations, but the food rationing system has broken down in many areas. The stagnation in recent years, together with the strong performance of other former planned economies that embraced market reforms, has left North Korea far behind its former socialist peers, including Mongolia and China. Similarly, its per capita income has declined from 12% of South Korea's in 1993 to 5.5% in 2008, according to Bank of Korea estimates.

The outlook for North Korea's domestic politics and economy remain as uncertain as ever, and may become more so during the forecast period. Despite this uncertainty, the reunification of the Korean Peninsula will provide great economic opportunities. In 2009, a Goldman Sachs report projected that the GDP of a unified Korea in USD terms could exceed that of France and Germany in 30-40 years, should the untapped growth potential of North Korea be unleashed through the realization of meaningful economic reforms and investment inflows.² The report highlights three main factors: 1) an abundant and competitive labor force in North Korea; 2) ample room for synergy between South Korean capital and technology, and North Korean natural resources and labor; and 3) the potentially large gains from productivity and currency appreciation in North Korea which is typical in transition economies.

North Korea has favorable demographics and a well-educated labor force. Its demographics are relatively young and the population is growing roughly twice as fast as in South Korea. The working age population, according to 2008 UN projections, will grow at 0.7% a year over the next 10 years, compared with zero growth in South Korea. Also with closer inter-Korean integration, the labor force could increase substantially given the currently large military population, which is nearly 1.3 million or 16% of males between the ages of 15 and 64. In addition, 37% of the population live in rural areas, as was the case in South Korea in the late 1970s, providing an ample pool for the industrial workforce.

As for the quality of human capital, education is one of North Korea's success stories. As in South Korea, literacy and primary education for all were early goals and were quickly attained. Free universal secondary schooling was in place by 1975. Pre-college education is compulsory up to the age of 16 and is provided by the state. Over 200 higher colleges train specialists, mainly in science and technology. This system produces an educated and disciplined labor force. Even though school attendance rates have reportedly fallen since 1995

¹ "A United Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks (Part I)," Global Economics Paper No: 188.

owing to famine, an abundant and competitive labor force provides a favorable economic backdrop that could spark a growth spurt, once economic reforms are undertaken. In fact, experience from the Kaesong Industrial Complex suggests that North Korean workers have a strong work ethic and a good potential for productivity enhancement. The per capita income in North Korea at market prices is similar to that of Vietnam and India, and about one third of China's, all of which benefit from competitive wages and a large domestic demand pool.

North Korea also has large potential deposits of minerals, valued at around 140 times North Korea's 2008 GDP at current market prices. North Korea has the world's largest deposits of magnesite. Its deposits of minerals include brown coal and anthracite, iron ore, gold, silver, and non-ferrous metals such as zinc and copper. In contrast, South Korea has virtually no mineral resources. Before the separation, it was from North Korea that came resources that fueled industrialization in the Korean peninsula. With North Korean natural resources and labor and South Korean capital and technology, a unified Korea holds much potential for explosive synergy.

Once economic reforms take hold, the North Korean economy could benefit substantially from productivity gains and currency appreciation. The experience of transition economies shows that the output of the Eastern European and CIS transition economies grew 6.2% per annum from trough levels, while Asian transition economies experienced average annual growth of 8.4% over 1992-2008. Large productivity growth in transition economies indicates that a sizeable part of GDP growth in these economies has come from better allocation of resources and a more efficient use of existing resources. This would apply to North Korea once it sincerely pursues economic reforms and economic integration with South Korea. The experience of transition economies also suggests that the purchasing power of North Koreans could grow much faster than real GDP. GDP in USD terms in transition economies increased, on average, tenfold over 15 years, with 80% of the growth coming from real exchange rate appreciation. The appreciation was particularly rapid for resource-rich countries.

The Goldman Sachs report assumes that, during the first transition period of 15 years, North Korea's currency appreciates at 11% per annum, which is the average pace of other

transition economies, and its real GDP could grow at 7% on average which eventually translates into an average growth rate of 5.5%. Under these assumptions, the GDP of a united Korea in USD terms could exceed those of France, Germany and Japan in 30-40 years. According to the report, per capita income in North Korea could reach half of the South Korean level in 20 years after the start of integration.

2. Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI)

The Tumen River runs from the East Sea into Manchuria and serves as part of the boundary between China, North Korea and Russia. The resources of the Tumen River area are immense and varied. The Russian area has large reserves of oil, coal, and gas as well as vast mineral reserves of gold, tin, diamonds, iron, phosphate, copper and molybdenum. China also has oil and coal reserves along with such minerals as iron, magnesium, magnesite, molybdenum, and manganese. North Korea has large ores of tungsten, graphite, gold, barite mica, and iron. In addition to the above resources, land and fresh water resources are considerable. There are extensive forests, great prairies, wild animals, and plants. Also should a full-capacity port and expanded rail facilities be developed along the Tumen, traders would have a far shorter and cheaper route from the Far East to the markets of Europe than existing overland rail lines or the current sea route that runs from the port of Dalian around the Korean Peninsula and through the East Sea. Perhaps more important, the river's development potential holds out the hope of a cooperative, rather than hostile, relationship in the 21st century among the nations of Northeast Asia -- the three countries along the river, plus Japan, South Korea, and Mongolia.

The Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI), formerly known as Tumen River Area Development Project (TRADP), is a plan to develop the Tumen Basin as a place for economic cooperation and competition. In July 1990, the Chinese Association of Asia-Pacific Studies, East-West Center and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) jointly sponsored the Conference on Northeast Asia Economic and Technical Cooperation in Changchun, China. At this conference and the following one in August 1991, the development of the Tumen River area and regional cooperation in Northeast Asia were discussed as central themes. In 1991,

with support from the UNDP; China, Russia and North Korea initialized the TRADP, which was designed to boost the regional economy. After operating for more than a year on preparatory assistance, TRADP was formally launched in 1993 with the objective of creating a joint special economic zone to be built on land leased from China, Russia and North Korea. In December 1995 formal agreements were signed among member countries which established the TRADP Coordination Committee with membership by China, Russia and North Korea and the TRADP Consultative Commission comprising of China, North Korea, Mongolia, South Korea and Russia.

In 2005, at the 8th Consultative Commission Meeting held in Changchun, China, the member states of TRADP signed the Changchun Agreement. As a result, the new GTI was established as an inter-governmental framework and the TRADP's geographic coverage was expanded to include more provinces in the region. At that time the member states, China, Mongolia, Russia, North and South Korea, also agreed to extend the period of cooperation for ten more years to 2015 and to take full ownership of the program through increased contribution of financial and human resources, with the continued support of the UNDP. The GTI called for continued regional interaction, more cooperative projects in the region, and intensifying efforts to involve the private sector in development issues.

After the sudden withdrawal of North Korea last year, the GTI is now a joint mechanism of the four member countries. It should provide a unique multilateral forum for the member countries to identify and implement regional initiatives that encourage economic growth, improve living standards and contribute to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The goal of GTI is to transform the area into a free economic zone for trade, so that the region would prosper and attract investment into the area; and also to transform the Tumen River area into the transportation and trading hub for Northeast Asia. The GTI member states have identified four priority sectors of development for the Greater Tumen Region – energy, trade and investment, transportation, and tourism. The successful growth of these sectors will provide the region with a robust investment infrastructure and economic growth.

There are a number of problems associated with this development project. Improved

transport infrastructure and reducing impediments for border crossing to a minimum are fundamental to trade facilitation and other forms of economic cooperation in this region. Among others, the countries involved have long been political adversaries, and the agreement could inadvertently lead to further instability in the region if there is significant disagreement on issues. However, the dire need to foster economic growth in a region would drive states to cooperate. The Greater Tumen Region has enormous untapped potential as a regional transport hub.³ Because of the location of the Tumen River area at the crossroads of trade and transport routes between Europe, Northeast Asia and North America, a central unifying concept for the GTI is the development of the region as a trade hub. Specifically, the GTI would capitalize on the region's beneficial geographic location that provides access to deep sea ports, the Trans-Siberian railway, and East Asian markets, and combine Japanese and Korean capital and know-how with low-cost Chinese and North Korean labor to exploit and process the natural resources of Mongolia and the Russian Far East.

Reunification of Korean Peninsula certainly provides opportunities for taking advantage of the region's massive potential. Especially, ports in North Korea provide landlocked region, such as Northeast China, with an outlet and an east-west transport corridor. In this sense, the Rajin-Sonbong region has attracted much attention from China and Russia due to its ice-free, warm water ports. This region was designated a 'Free Economic and Trade Zone' in 1991, but had very little economic impact. Over the years, North Korean authorities have enacted a few measures to try to keep the project alive, but there has been no significant turnaround. Following North Korea's decision to raise the status of the Rajin-Sonbong region to the 'Rason Special City', it has revised the 'Law on the Rajin-Sonbong Trade Zone.' With the revision of the law on the Rason area, North Korean authorities are again focusing their attention on the region, with the goal of 'opening the door to a strong and prosperous nation' by 2012. Yet without significant economic reform in North Korea, a large influx of investment into this region remains difficult to imagine .

² The geographical coverage of the Greater Tumen Region involves now the three Northeast provinces and Inner Mongolia of China, Eastern provinces of Mongolia, Eastern port cities of South Korea and the part of the Primorsky Territory of Russia.

Once the potential of the Rajin-Sonbong region as a trade hub materializes, the GTI will undoubtedly receive a great boost. For China, the project would give traders in Northeast China easier access to major international ports without having to circumnavigate the Korean Peninsula, thus stimulating growth in China's northeast rustbelt. For Russia, the project would give it ability to better exploit resources in Siberia and allow easier access to North Korea's resource-rich hinterland; the area just to the south of the Tumen contains reserves of oil, minerals, coal, timber, and abundant farmland. The Tumen River transportation corridor is also of considerable interest to Mongolia, because it can help open up the eastern part of the country and improve port access. Mongolia, endowed with rich mineral resources, is critically in need of infrastructure development in order to attract foreign direct investments and promote foreign trade. A railway line linking Mongolia with the ports, which are currently being developed and expanded in North Korea and Russia, would considerably reduce the time and the costs for delivery of Mongolia's exports.

Integration of the Korean Peninsula

April 9th

Roundtable Discussion

April 9th

Opening Remarks

John J. Hamre (President and CEO, CSIS)

Congratulatory Remarks

Park Jin (Chairman, National Assembly's Foreign Affairs,
Trade and Unification Committee)

Development Reports

Cho, Young-Key (Professor, Korea University)

Son, Kisup (Professor, Pusan University of Foreign Studies)

Choo, Jaewoo (Professor, Kyung-Hee University)

Roundtable Discussion

Chair: Park, Se-II (Chairman, Hansun Foundation)

Moderator: Hong, Seong-Phil (Professor, Yonsei Law School)